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I. INTRODUCTION
It came as no surprise that the Supreme Court of the United
States recently granted certiorari1 to consider the complex issues
raised by application of the forfeiture provisions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)2 and the Continu-
ing Criminal Enterprise Statute (CCE)3 to attorneys' fees. The issues
have raised fundamental questions concerning the meaning of the
sixth amendment right to counsel and the very nature of our adver-
sary system. Moreover, they have divided the circuit courts and the
1. United States v. Monsanto, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988), granting cert. to 852 F.2d 1400 (2d
Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 363
(1988), granting cert. to 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.) (en banc).
2. RICO, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, was title IX of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 901-904, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). To be convicted under
RICO, the defendant must have participated in the affairs of an "enterprise" through a
"pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962. An "enterprise" is defined broadly and
can include a legal entity, such as a company or a union, or an informal group of individuals
who band together for the purpose of committing a pattern of crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4).
The concept of "racketeering activity" is far broader than ordinary notions of organized crime
behavior, extending to many traditional felonies, such as robbery and murder, as well as many
types of "white collar" crime, including securities fraud and use of the telephone or mail for
illegal purposes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-64. A "pattern" constitutes two or more acts of
racketeering committed within ten years of each other, excluding time spent in prison, at least
one of which acts must have occurred within the past five years. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). For
extensive analysis of RICO, see I K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY §§ 7.01-.30
(1984); Bradley, Racketeering, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L.
REV. 837 (1980); Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 661 (1987), Parts III & IV, id. at 920; Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291
(1983). The RICO criminal forfeiture provisions are contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1963.
3. CCE, the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, was part of the Controlled
Substances Act, title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-66 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986)). To be convicted under CCE, the defendant must have received "substantial
income" as the manager, organizer, or supervisor of a drug-related "continuing criminal
enterprise... in concert with five or more other persons." 21 U.S.C. § 848(d). The criminal
forfeiture provisions of the Controlled Substances Act are codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986); however, these criminal forfeiture provisions are not limited to CCE cases, but
rather, apply to all felony drug cases. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1). The Controlled Substances Act
also contains a civil forfeiture provision. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For the
distinction between criminal and civil forfeiture, see infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
FORFEITURE OF A TTORNEYS' FEES
circuit court judges as few recent issues have done.' Finally, these
issues have been litigated with increased frequency as the incidence
of federal prosecutions under RICO and CCE has expanded
dramatically.'
Although the use of civil or in rem forfeiture has a long history in
America,6 criminal or in personam forfeiture, designed to punish the
4. Compare United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445 (The
government may not deprive a criminal defendant of the only assets he has with which to pay
attorney's fees without first conducting a hearing on the question.), mandate stayed by 864
F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332 (Property pledged by the
defendant to his attorneys for bona fide legal services rendered is exempt from forfeiture.),
reh'g en banc granted, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400
(2d Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam) (A criminal defendant is entitled to access to restrained assets
to the extent necessary to pay reasonable attorneys' fees.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988)
and United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (1986) (The ex parte restraining order freezing the
defendant's assets until the completion of the trial was held to violate FED. R. Civ. P. 65.),
modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987) with United States v. Bissell, No. 87-8246, slip. op.
(1 1th Cir. March 2, 1989) (rejecting sixth amendment and procedural due process challenges
to forfeiture of attorneys' fees); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988)
(The restraining order issued pursuant to the forfeiture count of the indictment did not violate
the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 17, 1989);
United States v. Nichols, 841 F2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988) (The forfeiture statute does not exempt
attorneyfees.) and United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.) (en
banc) (Attorneys' fees are subject to forfeiture proceedings unless grounded in legitimate
assets.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988). Other courts have confronted these issues less
directly. See United States v. Friedman, 849 F.2d 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting question but
leaving it unresolved); United States v. Henderson, 844 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing
appeal for lack of jurisdiction over district court order that found civil forfeiture statute to be
unconstitutional as applied to reasonable attorneys' fees). Many of the cases cited above were
split decisions. See Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (eight separate concurring and dissenting
opinions following a brief per curiam order); Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485 (2-1 vote); Jones, 837 F.2d
at 1336 (Davis, J., concurring, but stating a preference for the opposite result reached in Caplin
& Drysdale); Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d 637 (7-4 vote).
5. It is estimated that as many as twenty-five percent of the criminal cases brought in
federal court now involve offenses subject to criminal forfeiture. See Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1488;
see also Webb & Turow, RICO Forfeiture in Practice: A Prosecutorial Perspective, 52 U. CIN.
L. REV. 404, 406-07 (1983) (discussing increased use of RICO forfeiture provisions in
indictments).
6. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1974); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827); Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1486; United States v. Sandini,
816 F.2d 869, 872-73 (3d Cir. 1987); Brickey, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: The Impact of
RICO and CCE Forfeitures on the Right to Counsel, 72 VA. L. REV. 493, 493 n. 1 (1986); Fried,
Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 329 n.l (1988); Reed
& Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests, " and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. REV.
57, 60-69 (1983). Civil forfeiture proceedings are in rem actions against the property that the
government seeks to obtain. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14-15. The guilt or innocence of the
owner or possessor is considered irrelevant in a civil forfeiture action, because under a legal
fiction, the property itself has committed the wrong. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7, 24-
26 (1881). Moreover, because the property is considered "tainted" upon the commission of the
wrongful act, the government's interest vests at the time of the act. Nichols, 84f F.2d at 1486.
Civil forfeiture is widely used, typically for contraband or instrumentalities employed in the
commission of a crime. Id. at 1486-87. Although considered "quasi-criminal" for certain
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owner of the property to be forfeited as an incident to conviction for a
crime, traditionally has been disfavored by our law and rarely has
been authorized.7 Under English common law, conviction of treason
or a felony carried with it forfeiture to the Crown of the defendant's
entire estate, without regard to whether the forfeited property was in
any way involved in, or derived from, the crime.8 Colonial hostility to
the English practice resulted in the prohibition of the forfeiture of an
estate for conviction of treason contained in article III of the United
States Constitution.9 The first federal criminal code, adopted in 1790,
extended the prohibition against forfeiture of estate to the conviction
of any crime. 10 Although the use of civil forfeiture continued, Con-
gress used criminal forfeiture only once during the entire period from
1790 to 1970:11 the Confiscation Act of 1862,12 which authorized the
seizure of the life estates of confederate soldiers. 3
In 1970, Congress reintroduced criminal forfeitures as a new tool
in the burgeoning war on organized crime and illegal drugs.' 4 The
failure of traditional criminal sanctions to control drug trafficking and
fourth and fifth amendment purposes, see United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401
U.S. 715, 718 (1971); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 697, 700-02
(1965), in rem forfeitures generally are viewed as civil proceedings. See United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984); United States v. Henderson, 844 F.2d
685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988).
7. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1486-87; Sandini, 816 F.2d at 873.
8. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682-83; Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1486-87; Sandini, 816 F.2d at
873; United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1038-39 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830
(1980). The English practice was based on the notions that all property derived from society
and that a member of the community who violated the law was deemed to have violated "the
fundamental contract of his association" with society and thereby forfeit "his right to such
privileges as he claims by that contract." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF ENGLAND *299. This reflected the basic premises of feudal society that the King owned all
property and land and that a convicted felon's property would revert to the Crown and his
lands would escheat to his lord as a consequence of his breach of the King's peace. See Calero-
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.").
10. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (1982))
("[N]o conviction or judgement . . . shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of
estate.") repealed by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 212(a)(2), 235
(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, 2031-32.
11. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1487; Sandini, 816 F.2d at 873.
12. 12 Stat. 589.
13. The Civil War forfeiture was upheld in Bigelow v. Forest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339 (1869),
and Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870).
14. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 588-89 (1981); Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1487;
United States v. McKeithen, 822 F.2d 310, 313 (2d Cir. 1987); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 78-79 (1969); Fried, supra note 6, at 330 ("the first new punishment for crime since
the rise of the early nineteenth century"); id. at 335 ("an innovation virtually without
precedent in American law"). The Controlled Substances Act also contained a civil forfeiture
provision. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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other organized crime activities concerned Congress. In order to
combat the enormous profitability of these activities, Congress intro-
duced criminal forfeiture to the RICO and CCE statutes as a device
to eradicate the economic power bases that made possible the organ-
ized pursuit of such activities. A defendant convicted of a CCE
offense was required to forfeit any "profits" thereby obtained,15 and a
defendant convicted of a RICO offense was required to forfeit any
"interest" acquired through such conduct. 6
These new tools, however, failed to stem the tide of illegal drug
trafficking and organized crime. Few RICO or CCE cases were filed,
and the amount of assets forfeited was negligible. 17 Congress held
hearings to investigate the use of criminal forfeiture under RICO and
CCE,'8 and many shortcomings in the existing statutes were identi-
fied. The most significant of these was the government's inability to
prevent the concealment or transfer of forfeitable assets to third par-
ties prior to conviction in order to evade forfeiture. 9 The govern-
ment's inability to prevent these transfers was due, in part, to the
absence of a statutory procedure permitting the issuance of a pre-
indictment restraining order.20
Congress responded to these problems by enacting the Compre-
hensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,2I which amended the RICO and CCE
15. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2)(A).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a); see Russelo v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) ("interest"
construed to include the proceeds produced by the illegal enterprise). The jury in a criminal
forfeiture proceeding must return a special verdict specifying the extent to which the interest
or property is subject to forfeiture. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(e). Criminal forfeiture under RICO
or CCE can occur only after conviction of the underlying crime and entry of this special
verdict of forfeiture. See, e.g., United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d
1445, 1451, mandate stayed by 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Ambrosio, 575
F. Supp. 546, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
17. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASSET FORFEITURE-A SELDOM
USED TOOL IN COMBATTING DRUG TRAFFICKING (1981). From 1970 to 1980, indictments
seeking forfeitures under RICO and CCE were returned in only 98 cases with 258 named
defendants, involving property valued at two million dollars. Id. at 10; Fried, supra note 6, at
339-40 n.55.
18. See Forfeiture in Drug Cases: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1981-82); Forfeiture of Narcotics Proceeds:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
19. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-97 (1982) [hereinafter S. REP. No.
225], reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3377-80; S. REP. No. 520,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982).
20. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1988); S. REP. No. 225 supra
note 19, at 194, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3377.
21. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57 (codified in scattered sections
of 18, 19, 21, 26 & 28 U.S.C.).
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forfeiture provisions.22 The 1984 amendments expanded both the
number of crimes subject to criminal forfeiture and the scope of prop-
erty subject to forfeiture.23 The amendments also added procedures
for the issuance of a restraining order before, at the time of, or after
the filing of an indictment.2 4 In addition, the amendments borrowed
the civil forfeiture notion that property became tainted at the time of
the wrong 25 by including a "relation-back" provision that vested title
to the property in the government upon the commission of the act
giving rise to forfeiture.26 The amendments made any such property
subsequently transferred to a third party subject to a special verdict of
forfeiture, unless the transferee could establish in a separate hearing
that he was a bona fide purchaser for value who, at the time of
purchase, was reasonably without cause to believe that the property
was subject to forfeiture.27
The new tools provided by the 1984 amendments have been uti-
lized with increased effectiveness. One result, not envisioned by Con-
gress, has been to prevent defendants indicted in such cases from
using their assets to hire attorneys to represent them in their criminal
trials. Pretrial restraining orders, often obtained ex parte by prosecu-
tors based solely on the allegation of forfeiture in the indictment, and
the threat of postconviction forfeiture of assets transferred to attor-
neys as a fee, have deterred or prevented private criminal defense
attorneys from taking such cases.28  As a result, prosecutors have
22. The RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions are virtually identical. Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) with 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
23. Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1488. For a description of the changes made by the 1984
amendments, see Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984:
Raising the Stakes, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 747, 750-76 (1985).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e); see United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905,
910 (1987), replaced on reh'g en banc on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988); United
States v. $39,000 in Canadian Currency, 801 F.2d 1210, 1219 (10th Cir. 1986).
25. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-20 (1971); 0.
HOLMES, supra note 6, at 24-25.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Professor Fried suggests that this "relation
back" provision was "the most remarkable innovation" in the 1984 amendments, and that, by
going beyond the taint doctrine of civil forfeiture, Congress adopted a principle "essentially
without historical support." Fried, supra note 6, at 346-47 & n. 92. Congress also retained the
civil forfeiture provision contained in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, permitting prosecutors in drug cases the option of seeking civil forfeiture as well
as criminal forfeiture and doing so either in conjunction with the criminal proceeding or in an
independent civil proceeding. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a); see United States v. Henderson, 844 F.2d
685, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Dunn, 802 F.2d 646, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987); S. REP. No. 225, supra note 19, at 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3374, 3376, 3381.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c), (m); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), (n).
28. See infra Sections II(A)-(B).
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exercised almost unfettered discretion to deprive defendants of the use
of their assets to hire counsel of choice, thereby relegating them to
appointed counsel and producing the extensive litigation that has now
led to Supreme Court review.
This Article examines the unanticipated effects of this applica-
tion of the 1984 amendments to attorneys' fees. Section II analyzes
the impact of fee forfeiture on the structure of the criminal justice
system. More specifically, it examines the financial effects on criminal
defense attorneys, the ethical problems created, and the overall
impact on the nature of the adversary system. Section III analyzes
the clash between the forfeiture provisions and the sixth amendment
right to counsel of choice. It examines the historical origins of the
right and contrasts it with the right to appointed counsel. It then
analyzes the appropriate standard of constitutional review when gov-
ernment acts to prevent the defendant from retaining any private
counsel. Section III then discusses a separate first amendment basis
for a right to retain counsel for the assertion of rights in a criminal
trial. This Section concludes with an analysis of Congress' expressed
objectives underlying the 1984 amendments, in order to determine
whether they may be accomplished without applying forfeiture to
bona fide attorneys' fees, as distinguished from sham transfers to
attorneys in order to evade forfeiture.
Although this Article concludes that this application of the for-
feiture statutes is unconstitutional, the constitutional question that the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider need not be resolved.
Section IV suggests the use of two techniques by which the Supreme
Court may avoid the constitutional dilemma: the canon of statutory
construction that counsels that an act should not be interpreted to
violate the Constitution if a constitutional interpretation is possible,
and an administrative law technique that calls for close scrutiny of
broad delegations of congressional authority to administrative officials
when that discretionary authority is invoked in a manner that
intrudes on fundamental constitutional values. In view of the serious
constitutional problems under the sixth and first amendments
presented by the application of the forfeiture statutes to bona fide
attorneys' fees, this Article suggests that either of these techniques
should be employed to construe the statute so that it does not author-
ize forfeiture of legitimate attorneys' fees.
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II. THE IMPACT OF FEE FORFEITURE ON THE STRUCTURE OF
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. The Financial Effects on Criminal Defense Attorneys
The facts of United States v. Monsanto,29 one of the fee forfeiture
cases now before the Supreme Court, illustrate the unanticipated
problems of applying the forfeiture statutes to attorneys' fees. Peter
Monsanto, together with eighteen others, was indicted in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York for vari-
ous violations of the narcotics and racketeering laws.3" The indict-
ment also sought forfeiture of several items of property alleged to
have been obtained from the proceeds of illegal narcotics activities.31
On July 8, 1987, with the unsealing of the indictment, the government
obtained an ex parte, postindictment restraining order enjoining the
sale or transfer by Monsanto of two parcels of real property-a
$335,000 home in Mount Vernon, New York and a $30,000 coopera-
tive apartment in the Bronx, New York.32
A Boston criminal defense attorney who planned to represent
Monsanto attended the first pretrial conference in the case on July 31,
1987, but declined to enter a formal appearance.33 At a later pretrial
hearing held on August 6, 1987, a New York attorney entered a lim-
ited appearance on Monsanto's behalf to litigate a motion seeking to
vacate or modify the restraining order so that Monsanto could use the
restrained property to retain counsel of choice for his pending crimi-
nal trial and to exempt such legal fees from post-trial forfeiture.34
Although the court concluded that the restraining order had rendered
the defendant de facto indigent, it denied his motion, suggesting that
retained counsel could be paid from his frozen assets, but only to the
extent of rates established by the Criminal Justice Act (CJA). 5 In
29. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
30. Id. at 1401.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. En Banc Brief for the United States at 6, United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400
(2d Cir.) (No. 436, Docket 87-1397) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363
(1988).
34. Such limited appearances in RICO and CCE cases involving forfeitures have become
increasingly common. See, e.g., United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 454 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1334 (D. Colo. 1985); Committee on
Criminal Advocacy, The Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees in Criminal Cases: A Call for Immediate
Remedial Action, 41 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 469, 478-79 (1986); Note, Against Forfeiture of
Attorneys' Fees Under RICO.- Protecting the Constitutional Right of Criminal Defendants, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 124, 134 (1986).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see infra text accompanying note 38.
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view of the unwillingness of the attorneys consulted by Monsanto to
represent him at these rates, the court's order in effect prevented him
from representation by counsel of choice. Because of his forced indi-
gency, Monsanto was required to stand trial with an appointed coun-
sel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act.36
The Monsanto case illustrates the financial impact of the forfei-
ture provisions on the criminal defense bar.37 Few, if any, private
attorneys are willing to undertake the representation of a defendant in
a complex RICO or CCE action without a fee, or even for a fee, at
CJA rates and maximum amounts. Under CJA, attorneys are paid
$60 per hour for in-court time and $40 per hour for out-of-court time,
with a maximum fee of $3,500, subject to a limited opportunity to
obtain waiver of this maximum amount within the discretion of the
trial court and with the further approval of the chief judge of the
circuit.38 Not only are these hourly rates substantially below those
charged by experienced attorneys in most large cities-$150-250 per
hour and more-but they are only slightly higher than the $39 per
hour overhead costs of private practice in many districts, as calcu-
lated in 1985.39 Indeed, Congress did not design the CJA to be com-
pensatory, but merely to reduce financial burdens on assigned
counsel."° In view of the complexity, duration, and intense time pres-
36. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1401-02; see Brief For the United States of America at 24,
United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (1987) (No. 87-1397) [hereinafter Mbnsanto Panel
Government Brief], replaced on reh'g en banc, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988). Monsanto was convicted on all counts, including the criminal
forfeiture counts, on July 25, 1988, and his conviction is now on appeal.
37. Another recent illustration is the highly publicized case of E. Robert Wallach, former
counsel to Attorney General Edwin Meese and former United States representative to the
United Nations Human Rights Commission, indicted under RICO for allegedly peddling his
influence with former Attorney General Meese. Nat'l L.J., April 4, 1988, at 2, col. 2. After
Wallach's assets were frozen by court order, "his two high-profile defense attorneys dropped
him.... Mr. Wallach, in seeking new counsel, is reported to have contacted four well-known
New York and New Jersey defense attorneys, but had no luck." Id. Criminal defense lawyers
described Wallach's search for counsel as "so extensive because he was looking for a miracle."
Id.
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d).
39. Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1985: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1985) (testimony of U.S. District Judge Thomas J. MacBride, Chairman of the U.S.
Judicial Conference Comm. to Implement the Criminal Justice Act). By contrast, the federal
government, which employs some 17,000 lawyers, sometimes pays outside counsel at the rate
of $285 per hour to represent it. Lefstein, Keynote Address, Colloquium, Effective Assistance of
Counsel for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: Has the Promise Been Fulfilled?, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 5, 10 (1986).
40. H.R. REP. No. 864, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1963) (The limit "was conceded by
virtually every witness at the hearings to be below normal levels of compensation in legal
practice."); S. REP. No. 346, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963) (referring to the $10 to $15 per
hour limit of the original 1964 act as "less than the prevailing rates in many areas"); ATT'Y
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sures of such cases, experienced defense counsel-even when well-
paid-often find it impossible to undertake such cases and to main-
tain their practices at the same time.41 Thus the economics of private
law practice will preclude virtually all private practitioners from
accepting such cases at CJA rates. Moreover, even when a preindict-
ment or pretrial restraining order is not obtained, the possibility of a
postconviction forfeiture of proceeds of a crime in the possession of a
third party will discourage any private attorney from agreeing to rep-
resent the defendant for a fee in such a case.42
GEN. COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(Allen Committee) REPORT 49 n.71 (1963) (characterizing the $15 per hour rate as
"conservative and considerably below that which is charged by retained counsel for similar
services" and observing that "[n]o member of the Committee believes the figure is genuinely
compensatory"); REPORT OF COMM. TO IMPLEMENT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT OF 1964,
36 F.R.D. 285, 294 (1965) ("The payment.., under the Act will, in most cases, be something
less than compensatory."); Note, Adequate Representation for Defendants in Federal Criminal
Cases: Appointment of Counsel Under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
758, 774, 783-84 (1966).
41. See United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 754 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Tarlow, RICO
Report, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 1987, at 18; Lefcourt & Horwitz, The RICO Era: Megatrials,
Megaproblems, Megabucks, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1988, at 1, col. 2; see also United States v.
Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985) ("[T]he defense of RICO accusations requires
the marshalling of facts and information of vast quantities, perhaps constituting the whole of
several worldwide business enterprises."). One such case involved a seventeen month trial, one
of the longest federal jury trials on record, and lasted more than three years from indictment to
verdict. See United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (the "Pizza
Connection" case); S. ALEXANDER, THE PIZZA CONNECTION: LAWYERS, DRUGS, MONEY,
MAFIA (1988). Although the attorney for the lead defendant accepted the case for a fee of
$250,000, in view of the length of the trial and its impact on his practice, he came to regard the
case as a financial disaster. Conversation with the author in New York City (March 15, 1989).
Another RICO "megatrial," involving twenty-six defendants, was halted before completion of
the government's case after fifteen months of trial when counsel for the lead defendant became
terminally ill. United States v. Accetturo, 842 F.2d 1408 (3d Cir. 1988); see Tarlow, RICO
Report, THE CHAMPION, May 1988, at 22. By that point the government had introduced 201
tape recordings of intercepted communication and 320 of its 364 exhibits, and there were
27,000 pages of recorded testimony. Id. The trial was resumed later with local counsel who
had no prior connection with the trial proceedings, being pressed into service as replacement
counsel over both his and the defendant's objections. See Accetturo, 842 F.2d at 1408. After
five additional months of trial, all defendants were acquitted. See also United States v. Salerno,
No. 86-CR-245 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 1989) (WESTLAW 1989 WL 6640) (14 month trial).
42. United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 720 (7th Cir. 1988), petition for cert.
filed; United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1403 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, C.J., concurring,
joined by Oakes & Kearse, JJ.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988); United States v. Harvey,
814 F.2d 905, 921 (1987), replaced on reh'g en banc on other grounds sub nom. United States v.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988). A
defense lawyer, in the view of most courts, would find it virtually impossible to satisfy the
"reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture" standard of 18
U.S.C. § 1963(c), (m) and 21 U.S.C. § 853(c), (n). E.g., Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1410 (Winter,
J., concurring, joined by Meskill & Newman, JJ.); Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. at 196. But see
United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1474 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on other grounds, 809
F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987); infra notes 392-407 and accompanying text.
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Application of the forfeiture statutes in this manner precludes
representation by any criminal defense attorney with experience in the
highly specialized RICO and CCE areas, indeed by any private attor-
ney.43 The availability of counsel in such cases would be totally
chilled, not only by the preconviction and potential postconviction
forfeiture of fees," but also by the ethical problems resulting from the
availability of forfeiture.
B. The Ethical Problems Created by Fee Forfeiture
If an attorney agrees to represent a RICO or CCE defendant
under the threat of fee forfeiture, his fee will depend upon winning the
case. Not only would this impose a financial risk that few private
attorneys could afford, but it also places the attorney in violation of
Rule 1.5(d)(2) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
prohibits contingent fees in criminal cases.45 Such contingent fees are
ethically banned because they pose inevitable conflicts of interest
between attorney and client and, by making the defense attorney an
interested party in the case, provide the potential for corrupting
justice.46
43. The message of the forfeiture provisions to defense attorneys is clear: "'Do not
represent this defendant or you will lose your fee.' That being the kind of message lawyers are
likely to take seriously, the defendant will find it difficult or impossible to secure representation
.... [The statute will] insure that no lawyer will accept the business." Badalamenti, 614 F.
Supp. at 196. That defense lawyers have indeed received this message is revealed by a survey
conducted by Professor William Genego, which included 1,648 defense attorney responses.
Genego, Report from the Field: Prosecutorial Practices Compromising Effective Criminal
Defense, THE CHAMPION, May 1986, at 7, 13.
The impact of fee forfeiture on the willingness of defense lawyers to take these cases was
described in an amicus brief submitted in the Monsanto case by three organizations of defense
attorneys:
Members of our organizations have been in the position where they have declined
to represent prospective clients in need of counsel solely because they feared the
impact of the forfeiture provisions. Moreover, given the economics of private
practice in New York and the length of the time commitment that most RICO
and CCE cases require, the exemption from forfeiture of funds to pay an attorney
at CJA rates--as the district court proposed here-will in no way alleviate the
problem that defendants in Monsanto's position are simply unable to retain
counsel of their choice.
Joint Brief of Amici Curiae New York Council of Defense Lawyers, New York State Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and New York Criminal Bar Association at 29, United
States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
363 (1988).
44. See Cloud, Forfeiting Defense Attorneys' Fees: Applying an Institutional Role Theory to
Define Individual Constitutional Rights, 1987 Wis. L. REV. 1, 35-37, 44-46; supra note 43.
45. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(d)(2) (1984); see also ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.3(e) (1980); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (1980).
46. See United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Badalamenti,
19891
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:765
Moreover, the forfeiture provisions inevitably place counsel in a
number of additional ethical dilemmas. Counsel is placed in an
untenable position when he represents a defendant knowing that the
defendant's assets and previously paid legal fees may be the subject of
forfeiture.47 Although an attorney's duty is to represent his client
zealously, this obligation may be undercut by his recognition that
acquiring too much information from his client may adversely affect
counsel's ability to retain his fee or to seek postconviction recovery of
it as a bona fide purchaser for value.4 s In addition, this predicament
profoundly burdens the attorney-client privilege.49 Trial and grand
jury subpoenas, increasingly issued to defense attorneys, may require
defense counsel to testify about the amount and method of fee pay-
614 F. Supp. at 196-97; United States ex rel. Simon v. Murphy, 349 F. Supp. 818, 823 (E.D.
Pa. 1972); Cloud, supra note 44, at 49; Uelmen, Converting Retained Lawyers Into Appointed
Lawyers: The Ethical and Tactical Implications, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 5 (1987); Note,
supra note 34, at 140-42. Moreover, given the inevitable conflicts of interest caused by such
contingent fee representation, a defendant represented by an attorney on this basis will be
denied his sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of an attorney who is "free from
conflicts of interest." Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 481 (1978). The potential that such a conflict will affect the attorney's representation
of his client to the client's detriment is heightened in the plea bargaining process, in which the
attorney may be tempted to avoid plea discussions or recommend against a plea of guilty that
may jeopardize his fee. As the Supreme Court has noted: "To assess the impact of a conflict
of interest on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be
virtually impossible." Holloway, 435 U.S. at 491. In the sixth amendment context-a criminal
prosecution at any stage after the right to counsel has attached, see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 122 (1975); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306-14 (1973)-the mere existence of such
a conflict of interest is sufficient to make out a constitutional violation, even absent a showing
of resulting prejudice. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980). By contrast, in non-
sixth amendment criminal contexts--cases at stages prior to the focus of adversarial judicial
proceedings--or in non-criminal contexts--cases in which the relevant constitutional
limitation is due process rather than the sixth amendment-the existence of a conflict of
interest without a showing of prejudice may not violate the Constitution. See Manson v.
Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (Prejudice is the "linchpin" of a due process violation.);
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977) (Prejudice is a necessary element of a due
process claim.). For this reason, the Supreme Court's decision in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S.
717 (1986), upholding a settlement agreement in a class action civil rights case in which the
defendant state offered a settlement conditioned upon a waiver of the plaintiffs' attorneys'
claim to a statutory fee award, is distinguishable. Although the offer burdened the attorneys'
ability to advise their clients free of divided loyalties, the attorneys nonetheless appeared able
to disregard the conflict of interest, and their clients accepted the offer, which the attorneys
had evaluated favorably. Id. at 728.
47. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1348-49 (D. Colo. 1985); Cloud, supra
note 44, at 57-58; Uelmen, supra note 46, at 5-8; Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Should
Defendants Be Allowed to Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the "Fruits of the
Crime?", 39 STAN. L. REV. 663, 672-74 (1987).
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m); 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(n), 881(a)(6).
49. See Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349; Cloud, Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client
Relationship. The Impact of Fee Forfeiture on the Balance of Power in the Adversary System of
Criminal Justice, 36 EMORY L.J. 817, 827-28 (1987); Uelmen, supra note 46, at 8; Note, supra,
note 34, at 142-46.
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ments in an effort to demonstrate the forfeitability of the fee."° These
subpoenas place counsel in the position of being a witness against his
client, itself banned by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,5
and inevitably chill attorney-client communications.52 Placing the
attorney's own fee in the dock with the accused therefore necessarily
deters all ethical criminal attorneys from representing defendants in
such cases.53
C. The Impact on the Adversary System
Applying the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions to attorneys'
fees will have an enormous impact on the structure of the criminal
defense bar and on the nature of the adversary system, an impact that
Congress plainly did not consider.54 There is no indication that Con-
gress intended to cede to the prosecutor the authority to eliminate
chosen defense counsel and to alter profoundly the adversary system
by the simple expedient of adding forfeiture claims in the indictment.
Nor is there any hint in the legislative history of the original RICO
and CCE forfeiture provisions enacted in 1970, or in the civil forfei-
ture amendments to CCE added in 1978, that Congress ever consid-
ered giving the executive branch such controversial power.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per
curiam), aff'g by equally divided court, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass. 1986); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Served on John Doe, Esq. (Slotnick), 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. Roe v. United States, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); United States v. (Under Seal), 774
F.2d 624 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum (Shargell), 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Ousterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.
1983); In re Grand Jury Matters, 593 F. Supp. 103 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.
1984); Pierce & Colermarino, Defense Counsel as a Witness for the Prosecution: Curbing the
Practice of Issuing Grand Jury Subpeonas to Counsel for Targets of Investigation, 36 HASTING
L.J. 821 (1985); Stern & Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and
a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783 (1988); Suni, Subpoenas to Criminal Defense
Lawyers: A Proposal for Limits, 65 OR. L. REV. 215 (1986); Weiner, Federal Grand Jury
Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal for Reform, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 95 (1985); Note, A
Critical Appraisal of the Justice Department Guidelines for Grand Jury Subpoenas Issued to
Defense Attorneys, 1986 DUKE L.J. 145.
51. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1984); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102 (1980); Uelmen, supra note 46, at 7-8.
52. United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (E.D. Va. 1986) (Such inquiries
will "chill the openness of attorney-client communications."), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (1987), replaced on reh'g en banc sub nom. United
States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363
(1988); Rogers, 602 F. Supp at 1349 ("[T]he threat of an attorney having to disclose
information obtained from his client will chill the openness of those communications, thereby
impinging on the right to counsel.").
53. See Cloud, supra note 44, at 57-65.
54. Committee on Criminal Advocacy, supra note 34, at 477; see infra notes 329-47, 409-
24 and accompanying text.
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Forfeiture of attorneys' fees presents a grave threat to the very
nature of our adversary system." The unrestricted discretion given to
prosecutors under the government's interpretation of the forfeiture
statutes creates a serious potential for prosecutorial abuse. Virtually
any indictment charging a felony violation of federal law can be
framed as a RICO indictment.56 As a result, the government can gain
the "ultimate tactical advantage of being able to exclude competent
defense counsel as it chooses merely by appending a forfeiture indict-
ment. '"57 Thus the government can deprive a defendant of counsel
already retained by making it unlikely that counsel will be paid or will
be able to keep any fees already received. 58 Similarly, for the defend-
55. See generally Cloud, supra note 44 (Attorney fee forfeitures would restrict the ability
of defense attorneys to perform their institutional role of guaranteeing that the adversary
system operates properly.); Note, supra note 34, at 146-48 ("By discouraging privately
retained, experienced lawyers from representing RICO defendants, the government's proposed
interpretation of the Act threatens to disrupt the fair and balanced administration of justice.").
56. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1340; Krieger & Van Dusen, The Lawyer, the Client and the
New Law, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (1985); Lynch, supra note 2, at 663 (describing
RICO as "a weapon that could be used against virtually any kind of criminal behavior"); Note,
supra note 34, at 147; see United States v. Davidoff, 845 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988)
(referring to the "wide latitude accorded the prosecution to frame a charge [under RICO] that
a defendant has 'conspired' to promote the affairs of an 'enterprise' through a 'pattern of
racketeering activity' "); P. Low, J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW 430 (2d ed.
1986) (describing RICO as "a sprawling and uncertainly defined criminalization of a broad
range of actions"). For a discussion of the recent use of RICO for alleged violations of the
federal securities fraud laws see Hagedorn, Dread of RICO is Likely to Grow, May Bring Push
for Mob Only Use, Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1988, at A7, col. 1; see also, e.g., United States v.
Regan, 858 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1988). Moreover, not only are federal law violations within the
purview of RICO, but "[i]n theory, RICO can serve as a device to obtain federal jurisdiction to
prosecute common law crimes against a person or property that would normally be within the
province of local law enforcement." Lynch, supra note 2, at 921; see also United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981) (RICO represents an expansion of federal jurisdiction
over state crimes.). In short, RICO, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, describing the now
simple conspiracy charge, has become the new "darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery."
Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925); see Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling
of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 165 (1980).
57. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1347; accord United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1404
(2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring) ("The forfeiture statute puts too much power in the hands of
the prosecution to determine who will not be defense counsel .... "), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
363 (1988); United States v. $70,476 in U.S. Currency, 677 F. Supp. 639, 646 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
("In effect, the prosecutor could have a role in selecting, influencing, or vetoing the defendant's
choice of counsel."), appeal dismissed, 845 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1988). See generally Genego,
Prosecutorial Control Over a Defendant's Choice of Counsel, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 17
(1987) (examination of practices that provide prosecutorial control over the defendants' choice
of counsel).
58. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1476 (5th Cir. 1986) (Rubin, J., concurring)
("The tool of the restraining order, thus put into the hands of the prosecution, gives the
Government power to exclude vigorous and specialized defense counsel."), modified on other
grounds, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987); $70,476 in US. Currency, 677 F. Supp. at 646
(Forfeiture "could be used by the government to discourage employment of vigorous and
specialized defense counsel."); Committee on Criminal Advocacy, supra note 34, at 484 ("[I]f
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ant who has not yet retained counsel, the government can use the
forfeiture procedure virtually to eliminate the pool of private attor-
neys willing to provide representation, relegating the defendant to an
appointed counsel.59
Should the forfeiture statutes be so broadly construed, the prose-
cutor would enjoy awesome power to affect the balance between the
accused and the government in the criminal process.6° The unfettered
power to disqualify the defendant's selected champion and to render
unavailable representation by private counsel provides the prosecutor
an unfair tactical advantage that will transform our existing adversary
system. 61  The private criminal defense bar provides a significant
check on the power of the professional prosecutor and judge.62 To
serve this checking function, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized, the defense attorney must be independent of the govern-
ment.63 Our existing system of criminal representation, placing sub-
the government wishes to exclude a lawyer from a particular case, it need only allege a RICO
violation, add a forfeiture section to the indictment, and then inform the defendant's lawyer
that it will seek forfeiture of his legal fees in the event of a conviction. Such unfettered power
would strike at the heart of the adversary system."); Note, supra note 34, at 147-48; Note,
supra note 47, at 678.
59. See Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402, in which the defendant was unable to retain any of a
number of private counsel with whom he discussed representation under the cloud of a pretrial
restraining order freezing his assets. The defendant was forced to go to trial with an attorney
appointed from the court's Criminal Justice Act (CJA) panel. Id.
60. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (Partisan advocacy on both sides
best promotes the ultimate objective of discovery of the truth.); Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.
470, 474-75 (1973) (Due process requires a "balance of forces between the accused and his
accuser."); see generally Cloud, supra note 44 (Attorney fee forfeitures would restrict the
ability of the defense attorney to perform his institutional role of guaranteeing that the
adversary system operates properly.).
61. See Richardson-Merell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 441 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("When a trial court mistakenly disqualifies a party's counsel as the result of an
abusive disqualification motion, the court in essence permits the party's opponent to dictate his
choice of counsel. . . . [T]his result is in serious tension with the premises of our adversary
system ...."). Justice Brennan was referring to disqualification of counsel in civil cases.
When the context is criminal rather than civil and the adversary is the government, already
possessing a considerable advantage as a result of its virtually unlimited investigatory and
prosecutorial resources, see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1149-50 (1960), the threat to the adversary system is
considerably more severe.
62. See Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 118, 134-35, 137 (1987).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n.17 (1984) ("[A]n indispensable
element of the effective performance of [defense counsel's] responsibilities is the ability to act
independently of the Government and to oppose it in adversary litigation." (quoting Ferri v.
Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979)); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 322 (1981)
("There can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services of an effective and
independent advocate."). The trial of John Peter Zenger provides an early illustration of the
value of an independent criminal defense bar. See infra notes 105-57 and accompanying text.
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stantial reliance on the private bar, insures this essential
independence-as well as its appearance-far more than would a sys-
tem relying exclusively on attorneys paid by or employed by the gov-
ernment in certain classes of cases.' Yet the private bar effectively is
excluded from these cases as a result of fee forfeiture. Moreover,
those private lawyers willing to represent clients who have not yet had
the use of their assets restrained will find their independence compro-
mised by the prospect of continued representation only at the grace of
prosecutors who are their adversaries in the proceeding. 65 As an inev-
64. Most public defender programs are government agencies or private nonprofit
corporations under contract with the government or the court. Many of these programs are
structured such that the trial judges directly or indirectly exercise a measure of control. See
Singer & Lynch, Indigent Defense Systems: Characteristics and Costs, in THE DEFENSE
COUNSEL 110 (W. McDonald ed. 1983). In such cases, "public defenders may be torn between
their duty to the client and their duty to the court and its crowded calender." Bazelon, The
Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1973); see also A. BLUMBERG,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ISSUES AND IRONIES 215 (1979); M. LEVIN, URBAN POLITICS AND THE
CRIMINAL COURTS 79, 282 (1977); G. ROBIN, INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 262 (1984); E. SILVERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 305 (1978).
Discussing this threat to the independence of public defenders, Judge Bazelon noted:
I have been reliably informed that a director of one such agency periodically
checked with trial judges to determine whether his staff attorneys were too
aggressive or took too much of the court's time. Criticism of a trial judge was
passed on to the offending lawyers. Such practices may be conducive to rapid
and efficient processing of cases but are not conducive to diligent and
conscientious advocacy.
Bazelon, supra, at 6. These pressures and the inherent contradiction of the public defender's
role as a state-paid agent hired to frustrate the prosecution of those publically identified as
enemies of the state make public defenders "social anomalies" and contribute to their popular
conception as inept bureaucratic functionaries susceptible to coercion by judges and prosecu-
tors. L. MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE SHADOW OF
REPUTE 1 (1987). See A. BLUMBERG, supra, at 234; L. MCINTYRE, supra, at 2, 45-48, 62-74;
Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in the Public Defender's
Office, 12 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 255 (1965); Wice, Private Criminal Defense: Reassessing an
Endangered Species, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 39, 40-41 (W. McDonald ed. 1983). When
private counsel are appointed by the court to represent indigent defendents, similar threats to
independence exist. See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND
ITS PROCESSES 32 (4th ed. 1983) ("[T]he dependency of attorneys on judicial favor for contin-
ued appointments jeopardizes the independence of counsel and the vigor of the adversary sys-
tem .... "). Not only is independence jeopardized by the attorney's interest in future judicial
appointments, but in the case of representation under the CJA, it is further threatened by the
fact that compensation in excess of the $3,500 statutory limit is dependent on the approval of
both the trial judge and the chief judge of the circuit. See supra note 38 and accompanying
text. As a result of these problems, defendants tend to distrust both public defenders and
appointed counsel. Like public defenders, appointed lawyers are perceived as paid by and
therefore beholden to the government. See J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE
DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 31 (1978).
65. See United States v. Estevez, 645 F. Supp. 869, 871-72 (E.D. Wis. 1986), aff'd on other
grounds sub nom. United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1988), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 17, 1989); Genego, The Legal and Practical Applications of Forfeiture of
Attorneys' Fees, 36 EMORY L.J. 837, 841-43 (1987). The mere existence of this threat to
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itable result of this, and other ethical and financial problems, many
excellent attorneys will leave criminal defense work for more lucrative
civil litigation practice.
Far too many young lawyers in the 1980's lack the dedication
and public spirit of lawyers coming to age in the 1960's. The financial
pressure on our best law students to go to Wall Street and earn four to
five times the salaries of public defenders is hard to resist. Some of
the best attorneys in the country traditionally have been members of
the criminal defense bar. Not surprisingly, the rewards for the best
criminal defense attorneys of their day have always been high. More
than perhaps any other profession, law is a meritocracy, and more
than any other profession, law is a marketplace. The best talent can
command enormous fees in any of law's increasingly specialized
fields. Prosecutors who employ the forfeiture tool effectively threaten
the future financial viability of some of the highest paying and most
difficult subspecialities of criminal defense-the white collar and the
drug law bars. Many of the best attorneys choosing the speciality of
criminal defense work undoubtedly are attracted by the prospect of
practicing in these fields. The best attorneys in these subspecialties
command shockingly high fees, although no more so than the most
talented members of the securities, antitrust, commercial litigation, or
personal injury bars. Though the law's gradual transformation from a
profession into a business is lamentable, in a society governed by the
marketplace as ours is, attorneys in these subspecialties who find their
hourly rates slashed to the $40 to $60 per hour limits provided under
the CJA will move to other fields or decline to enter criminal practice.
The ethical conflicts created for attorneys subject to potential fee for-
feiture,66 coupled with these financial pressures, inevitably will have
this effect.
This exodus of talented attorneys could devastate the criminal
defense bar. Since the Supreme Court's 1963 landmark decision
independence of counsel may violate the sixth amendment. See Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("Government violates the right to effective assistance when it interferes
in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to
conduct the defense."); cf City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2144
(1988) ("[T]he mere existence of the licensor's unfettered discretion, coupled with the power of
prior restraint, intimidates parties into censoring their own speech, even if the discretion and
power are never actually abused.").
66. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1404 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring)
("The forfeiture provisions infect the system with unavoidable conflict of interest and ethical
dilemmas for the defense attorney that jeopardize the right to due process."), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 363 (1988); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("A
lawyer would find himself in inevitable positions of conflict."); see Uelman, supra note 46, at 6;
supra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
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in Gideon v. Wainwright 67 and its progeny 6s extended the right to
appointed counsel to all indigent defendants facing possible imprison-
ment, the criminal defense bar has expanded. Yet it is still too small
to meet the needs of all defendants. Many public defender programs
are badly overloaded and underfunded, 69 and increasingly depend on
law student interns practicing under special court rules as part of a
law school clinical program. Many of the nation's residents of death
row are unrepresented. 7° If the financial top of the criminal defense
market is destroyed by fee forfeiture, fewer and less capable lawyers
will enter the field. Most criminal defense lawyers apprentice into the
field, spending a year in law school in a criminal defense or prosecu-
tion clinic, working several years as a public defender or prosecutor,
and ultimately moving into private criminal defense practice. The
decimating effect of fee forfeiture on the opportunities in private crim-
inal practice will deter law students from electing these clinical place-
ments and young lawyers from working in the comparatively low
paying public jobs in state public defender and prosecutor offices. The
number of young lawyers entering the criminal justice system and
67. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
68. See cases cited infra note 80.
69. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985). A 1982 survey
of public defender programs concluded:
(M]eaningful compliance with the Constitution is often absent due to inadequate
funding. Indeed, public defender and assigned counsel programs experience
virtually every imaginable kind of financial deficiency. There are neither enough
lawyers to represent the poor, nor are all the available attorneys trained,
supervised, assisted by ample support staffs, or sufficiently compensated.
N. LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR 56 (1982); see also R. COVER,
0. Fiss & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 777-79 (1988); Singer & Lynch, supra note 64, at 113
(survey of organized defender organizations showing that eight percent employed no secretar-
ies or other support staff and only thirty-three percent employed both secretaries and investiga-
tors). For earlier studies demonstrating the lack of compliance with the constitutional
mandate that all indigent defendants facing possible imprisonment receive appointed counsel,
see S. KRANTZ, C. SMITH, P. FLOYD & J. HOFFMAN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
CASES: THE MANDATE OF ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 5-6 (1976); NATIONAL LEGAL AID
AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE 22 (1973). Although the
resource problems discussed here are more prevalent at the state level, many federal districts
lack defender programs, relying instead on CJA appointments. Additionally, many federal
defender programs are inadequately funded to absorb complex RICO and drug conspiracy
cases. The impact of RICO and CCE forfeiture, however, is not limited to the federal level. In
view of the propensity of the states to follow the federal example, see N. ABRAMS, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 167 (1986) (RICO has become a statutory model for
the states); Fried, supra note 6, at 332, n.26 (compilation of state RICO statutes), it is likely
that if the federal forfeiture provisions are upheld, similar forfeiture practices will proliferate in
the states, where the most serious resource problems exist for public defender programs. The
impact of having to absorb a significantly increased caseload would be devastating.
70. Lefstein, supra note 39, at 7-8; Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction
Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 513 (1988).
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staffing the public sector positions in the field necessary to make the
system work will be seriously diminished.
Moreover, the impact on the criminal defense bar's willingness to
represent indigent defendants may be substantial. Given the limits on
hourly rates and total compensation under CJA,7 1 few experienced
attorneys will agree to take appointments in RICO and CCE cases for
what are frequently complex and lengthy trials.7 2 Indeed, the forfei-
ture of attorneys' fees may seriously jeopardize the viability of the
CJA panels of volunteer attorneys existing in many districts. Many
lawyers will be reluctant to serve on such panels if it is possible that
they will be appointed to a complex RICO or CCE case, the trial of
which could take many months or even several years. This sentiment
was voiced at a recent meeting of attorneys serving on the CJA panels
for the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York.13 One panel member also noted that her inter-
est in performing pro bono publico work on behalf of indigent defend-
ants animated her willingness to serve on the CJA panel, and that she
would not feel this way about being appointed to represent a wealthy
defendant who was indicted under RICO or CCE and who was ren-
dered de facto indigent by a pretrial restraining order.74 Therefore,
not only does the application of the forfeiture provisions to attorneys'
fees discourage private attorneys from serving on such panels to the
ultimate detriment of all indigent defendants, but it also inevitably
places unbearable strains on already poorly funded public defender
programs. 5 The added burdens on these programs caused by the sys-
tematic substitution of appointed counsel for private counsel in com-
plex cases ultimately will fall on the truly indigent, who will have to
compete for these limited resources.
Preserving the private defense bar, which is severely threatened
by fee forfeiture, particularly if extended beyond RICO and CCE, is
essential to both litigant and societal acceptance of the outcome of
criminal trials76 and ultimately to public confidence in the administra-
tion of justice. Indigent defendants represented by public defenders
71. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
73. Meeting of March 28, 1988, in New York City, attended by the author.
74. Meeting of March 28, 1988, supra note 73.
75. See Concerning Forfeiture of Attorney's Fees: Hearings before the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986) (statement of Edward Marek on behalf of Federal
Public Defenders and Federal Community Defenders); ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION,
REPORT No. 125A TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 7 (1986).
76. See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 33-34 (1988); infra note 186 and accompanying text.
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often feel a diminished sense of participation in the proceedings."
Although for the indigent there may be no solution to this problem,
we should not extend the problem to more defendants by decimating
the private defense bar through fee forfeiture. The enormous variabil-
ity in the quality of criminal defense attorneys may raise serious
problems of equity, but we should not solve these problems by elimi-
nating the most competent members of the bar, as we inevitably
threaten to do with fee forfeiture. If anything, we should preserve the
financial rewards the most capable criminal lawyers have historically
earned, in order to maintain the incentive structures that attract tal-
ented lawyers to criminal work. By changing these incentive struc-
tures, fee forfeiture will restructure the criminal defense bar in a
manner that inevitably will diminish its overall quality.
The net impact on the nature of the adversary system in the
criminal area will be devastating. Private champions for the defend-
ant will be replaced by attorneys paid for and in some cases also
trained and supervised by the very government that seeks to deprive
the defendant of his liberty. The quality of representation received by
all criminal defendants inevitably will suffer. Giving the prosecutor
this power through fee forfeiture cuts strongly against the grain of our
adversary system and our basic concepts of fairness, impairing the
criminal defense bar and its ability to provide quality representation.
We simply cannot afford the loss of talented defense attorneys that
forfeiture of bona fide attorneys' fees will bring, not in a society that is
committed to procedural fairness, the presumption of innocence, and
the adversary system, and that boasts that it is far better that ten
guilty people go free than that one innocent person be falsely
imprisoned.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
A. Applying the Forfeiture Provisions to Bona Fide Attorneys' Fees
and the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice
Congress undoubtedly has broad constitutional authority to pun-
ish crime and to enact measures designed to deter crime. Although
the imposition of forfeiture as a criminal sanction after conviction is
not a traditional criminal punishment in America, such forfeiture
would be difficult to assail constitutionally. Imposing criminal forfei-
ture prior to conviction, however, raises serious constitutional issues.
Preconviction restraint on the transfer or use of property in order to
protect the government's ability to impose postconviction forfeiture
77. See supra note 64.
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might seem reasonable as a provisional remedy to protect the status
quo, but it imposes tremendous burdens on the accused that are in
some ways more onerous than ultimate conviction. Despite probable
cause to believe a defendant has committed a crime, an indicted
defendant is presumed innocent in our system. Due process demands
that, until a defendant has had his day in court, has put the prosecu-
tion to its proof, has had the opportunity to make his defense, and has
had the benefit of the judgment of a jury reflecting the conscience of
the community, he may not be punished.
Although forfeiture seems a routine provisional remedy, when its
use prevents a defendant's assertion of his due process rights through
counsel of choice, questions of fundamental constitutional proportion
arise. The combination of pretrial restraining orders and post-trial
forfeiture of assets in the possession of either the defendant or a third-
party transferee raises special problems for the defendant's right to
counsel and, as has been seen, for the future of the criminal defense
bar. A defendant whose assets are restrained prior to trial suffers seri-
ous hardships. His prior ability to use his assets as he likes-to buy
caviar, to travel to Europe, or even to go to the movies-is dramati-
cally affected. But the impact that criminal accusation brings-a
cloud on the defendant's reputation, potential loss of job and friends,
pretrial detention-has always been severe. These burdens are inher-
ent in criminal accusation. Yet none of them affect the defendant's
opportunity to have his day in court, other than at most indirectly.
Forfeiture applied to attorneys' fees, on the other hand, directly and
severely affects the defendant's exercise of his rights due under our
Constitution.
Moreover, purveyors of caviar, travel agents, and operators of
movie theaters may suffer slightly as a result of losing customers
under criminal indictment, although they presumably will be able to
resist any government-initiated forfeiture proceeding directed at them
to recover assets transferred to them by the defendant in exchange for
goods or services, qualifying as bona fide purchasers without knowl-
edge. Criminal defense attorneys, on the other hand, will be dramati-
cally affected. Not only do they stand to lose their basic customers,
but if their client is convicted, they risk loss of fees received for serv-
ices provided in good faith. Unlike caviar dealers, travel agents, and
movie theater owners, who rarely know or care about the source of
their customers' payments, criminal defense lawyers are almost inevi-
tably on notice that their clients' payments may be from the proceeds
of crime. 8 Ironically, criminal defense attorneys are the only provid-
78. See United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1410 (2d Cir.) (Winters, J., concurring,
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ers of legitimate preconviction services to the accused whose fees will
be routinely subject to forfeiture, and this is so precisely because they
are the only such providers whose relationship with the accused is
constitutionally protected.
The combination of these financial effects and the inherent ethi-
cal problems created by fee forfeiture will deter private counsel from
taking these cases. This will have a devastating effect on the criminal
defense bar and on the very nature of our adversary system. Addi-
tionally, it will deprive defendants of the ability to be represented by
counsel of choice.
1. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE: THE
HISTORICAL ORIGINS
Like many fundamental constitutional rights, the right to coun-
sel of choice is not absolute and may depend on the financial resources
of the individual who seeks to exercise it. The right, however, is
unquestionably an "essential component" or "essential element" of
the sixth amendment.79 Moreover, although the right to appointed
counsel is now well-recognized,8" the framers designed the sixth
amendment primarily to protect the right to counsel of choice. This is
revealed by an examination of the historical origins of the sixth
amendment and of the most famous trial of the colonial period, the
trial of John Peter Zenger,8' which stands both as a vindication of the
right to retain counsel of choice and an early demonstration of the
importance of the right.
In essence, the sixth amendment was a reaction against the prior
English practice of prohibiting counsel in serious criminal cases and
requiring the defendant to "appear before the court in his own person
and conduct his own cause in his own words."82 The harshness of the
joined by Meskill & Newman, JJ.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988); United States v.
Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
79. United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801 (6th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Tosh, 733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 208 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979)" see also United States v. Unit No. 7 &
Unit No. 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445, 1450 (A defendant's sixth amendment "right to hire private
counsel to aid in his defense" is an interest "among the highest in our constitutional hierarchy
of values.") mandate stayed by 864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988).
80. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 458 (1942));
cf Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (right to appointed counsel on first direct appeal);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (same).
81. See infra notes 105-57 and accompanying text.
82. 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 211 (2d ed.
1898), quoted in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 (1975); see also Argersinger, 407 U.S.
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practice is illustrated by one of the most famous English treason tri-
als, the 1586 trial of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots. 3 Mary, who faced
charges of conspiring to assassinate Queen Elizabeth I, requested the
assistance of counsel, but was refused on the ground that "forasmuch
as it was a matter of de facto and not de jure, and altogether con-
cerned a criminal cause, she neither needed nor ought to be allowed
council in answering thereof.""4 As a result, Mary was forced to
attempt to defend herself in a language that was not her own, making
a mere naked denial of the charges.8 5 She protested: "The laws and
statutes of England are to me most unknown; I am destitute of coun-
sellors, and who shall be my peers I am utterly ignorant. My Papers
and Notes are taken from me, and no man dareth step forth to be my
advocate."'8 6 The court ignored Queen Mary's protests, and she was
convicted and executed by decapitation.8"
The English common law practice of prohibiting a defendant
from being represented by counsel in felony and treason cases was "so
outrageous and so obviously a perversion of all sense of proportion
that the rule was constantly, vigorously and sometimes passionately
assailed by English statesmen and lawyers.""8 Under the pressure of
at 30; Betts, 316 U.S. at 466; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932); J. BEAL, A TREATISE
ON PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 224, at 251-52 (1899); W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-10 (1955); J. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-
1800 356 (1986); J. BELLANY, THE LAW OF TREASON IN ENGLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE
AGES 166 (1986); 5 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra
note 8, at *345, 355-58; M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 228
(1936); G. WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL
6-9 (3d ed. 1963).
83. Trial of Mary Queen of Scots, 1 How. St. Tr. 1161 (1586); see A. STEWART, TRIAL OF
MARY QUEEN OF SCOTS (1951).
84. Letter from Sir Frances Walsingham to Sir Edward Stafford, reprinted in A.
STEWART, supra note 83, at 192.
85. Mary Queen of Scots, 1 How. St. Tr. at 1170-88.
86. Id. at 1169.
87. Id. at 1190, 1195-1201, 1207. Another renowned illustration of the English practice
was the 1649 trial of the Protestant dissenter and leveler, John Lilburne, for the treasonous act
of writing a pamphlet calling for the impeachment of Oliver Cromwell. Trial of Lt. Col. John
Lilburne, 4 How. St. Tr. 1269 (1649). Lilburne sought counsel: "I again humbly desire to
have counsel assigned to me to consult with, what these formalities in law signify; so that I
may not throw away my life ignorantly upon forms." Id. at 1294. His request was denied, and
he challenged the court: "IT]hen order me to be knocked on the head immediately in the place
where I stand, without any further trial, for I must needs be destroyed, if you deny me all the
means of my preservation." Id. at 1297. Unlike Queen Mary, however, Lilburne successfully
defended himself, declining to admit or deny his authorship of the pamphlet he was accused of
having written. Id. at 1292. His case is credited with establishing the privilege against self-
incrimination in English law. See L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 307 (2d ed.
1986).
88. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932). For example, Blackstone criticized the
incongruity of the practice, asking: "Upon what face of reason can that assistance [of counsel]
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criticism, the English rule began to change in the period preceding the
American Revolution. The rule was relaxed in 1695 in order to per-
mit counsel in treason cases.89 It was mitigated in other felony cases
in the early 1700's by the increased willingness of courts to permit
counsel to argue points of law.90
The colonies clearly rejected the English rule91 as obnoxious to
basic principles of justice.9 2 At the time of the adoption of the United
States Constitution, the constitutions of the states guaranteed "that a
defendant is not to be denied the privilege of representation by coun-
sel of his choice." 93 The early colonial charters established that the
"right to counsel" meant to the colonists "a right to choose between
pleading through a lawyer and representing oneself."'94 At the time
James Madison drafted the sixth amendment, some state constitutions
guaranteed the right to be heard by counsel and others provided a
right to be "allotted counsel." '95 Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, enacted by the First Congress and signed by President Wash-
ington one day before the framers proposed the sixth amendment,
provided that "in all the courts of the United States, the parties may
be denied to save the life of a man, which is yet allowed him in prosecutions for every petty
trespass?" 5 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *355. The practice was defended by Chief
Justice Coke, who argued that prohibition of counsel did not prejudice the accused because
"first, the testimonies and proofs of the offense ought to be so clear and manifest, as there can
be no defense of it; secondly, the court ought to be instead of counsel for the prisoner." G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 82, at 8 (quoting King v. Thomas, 2 Bulstrode 147, 80 Eng. Rep. 1022
(1613)). Glanville Williams characterized this apology for the practice as "pure humbug." Id.
89. W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 9 (citing 7 & 8 W. 3, c. 3, s. 1).
90. W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 9-10; S. Landsman, supra note 76, at 16. The movement
for reform culminated in legislation in 1836 granting the right to retain counsel in all
cases. W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 11 (citing 6 & 7 W. 4, c. 114, s. 1); T. COOLEY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 698 (8th ed. 1927) ("[I]t has cost a long struggle, continuing
into the present century, to rid the English law of one of its most horrible features.").
91. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 386 (1898) ("(To] the credit of [England's]
American colonies, let it be said that so oppressive a doctrine had never obtained a foothold
there."). Even before adoption of the federal Constitution, the English rule was rejected by the
colonies and by both judicial practice and constitutional provision. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 827
("Colonial judges soon departed from ancient English practice and allowed accused felons the
aid of counsel for their defense."); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942) (The constitutions
of the colonies "were intended to do away with the rules which denied representation, in whole
or in part, by counsel in criminal prosecutions."); Powell, 287 U.S. at 61 ("The rule was
rejected by the colonies."); id. at 64 ("[I]n at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of the
English common law... had been definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized
.... .).
92. See, e.g., Z. SWIFT, II A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 398-
99 (J. Byrne printer 1795-96) ("We have never admitted that cruel and illiberal principle of the
common Law of England that when a man is on trial for his life, he shall be refused counsel
."), quoted in Powell, 287 U.S. at 63 n*.
93. Betts, 316 U.S. at 465-71.
94. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 828; see W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 14-18.
95. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 831; see W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 18-22.
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plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of
* . . counsel."
96
Therefore, the framers meant to protect the right to retain coun-
sel when they guaranteed in the sixth amendment the right of the
accused "to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense." 97 By
rejecting the English practice that denied the accused the right to
appear through counsel in felony and treason cases, "[tihe Sixth
Amendment thus extended the right to counsel beyond its common
law dimensions." '98 The sixth amendment, however, was not regarded
as providing a right to appointed counsel. 99 The contemporaneous
understanding was that "the right to counsel meant the right to retain
counsel of one's own choice and at one's own expense."' "°° Indeed,
this was the understanding until the Supreme Court, in the 1938 case
of Johnson v. Zerbst,10 l first read the sixth amendment to require that
96. 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789); see Faretta, 422 U.S. at 805-06; W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 28.
This right is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 22-24. The amendment
generated little discussion, and there is no basis to believe that it was understood to go beyond
the right to retain counsel. W. BEANEY, supra, at 24, 28-29.
98. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30 (1972).
99. Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 660-66 (1948) ("[T]he right guaranteed [by the sixth
amendment] is one of employing counsel, not one of having counsel provided by the
Government." (quoting NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
(Wickersham Commission), REPORT ON PROSECUTION 30 (1931))); Holtzoff, The Right of
Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 1, 7 (1944) ("[F]rom its adoption
in 1791 until 1938, the right conferred on the accused by the Sixth Amendment . . . was
generally understood as meaning that in the Federal courts the defendant in a criminal case
was entitled to be represented by counsel retained by him"); see W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at
28-29. In his analysis of the original understanding of the sixth amendment, Professor Beaney
points to the action of Congress in adopting Section 35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73,
signed the day the sixth amendment was proposed by Congress, and the federal criminal code
of 1790, 1 Stat. 112, passed seven months before the amendment's ratification, as revealing that
the amendment's drafters contemplated the right to retain counsel and not a right of appointed
counsel. The 1789 statute provided that parties in federal courts could appear personally or by
the assistance of counsel. 1 Stat. at 92. If the same Congress that proposed the sixth
amendment believed that it "embodied a startling change from this statutory rule, some
discussion concerning the proposal would undoubtedly have occurred on the floor." W.
BEANEY, supra, at 28. The 1790 statute provided for the appointment of counsel upon request
of the defendant in capital cases in federal court. 1 Stat. 118. Beaney asks:
If the proposed Sixth Amendment counsel provision included a guaranty of
appointed counsel in all felony cases, why did Congress pass this halfway
measure? It is logical to conclude that Congress passed the act because the Sixth
Amendment was irrelevant, in its view, to the subject of appointment of counsel
W. BEANEY, supra, at 28.
100. W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 21. Justice Story described the sixth amendment right
to counsel as "the right to have . . . counsel employed for the prisoner." 3 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1788, at 665-66 (1833).
101. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The right to appointed counsel was not, however, held applicable
to the states except in the more limited context in which due process required it to avoid an
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:765
counsel be appointed in any federal case in which the accused had no
attorney and did not waive the assistance of counsel. Prior to Zerbst:
there was little in the decisions of any courts to indicate that the
practice in the federal courts, except in capital cases, required the
appointment of counsel to assist the accused in his defense, as con-
trasted with the recognized right of the accused to be represented
by counsel of his own if he so desired.l12
Justice Black's opinion in Zerbst for five members of the Court thus
gave new meaning to the sixth amendment. Not surprisingly perhaps,
in view of the absence in the historical record of any support for a
constitutional right to appointed counsel, Black ignored history in
announcing the existence of the new right.103
Not only did the Supreme Court understand the sixth amend-
ment, from its adoption until 1938, as protecting the "right of the
accused to be represented by counsel of his own if he so desired,""
but also the colonists would have been shocked at the notion that a
defendant could be deprived of the right to retain his own counsel and
instead ordered to stand trial with counsel appointed by the court.
The most celebrated trial of the colonial era, and one that had a
profound effect on the framers-the trial of John Peter Zenger, a New
York printer charged with printing false and seditious articles criticiz-
unfair trial. E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932). Betts, of course, was ultimately overruled in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), which held that the sixth amendment right to appointed counsel is applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
102. Bute, 333 U.S. at 661.
103. Professor Beaney labeled Justice Black's opinion "notable'! for its "indifference to the
historical aspects of the right to counsel." W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 42.
The probable intentions of the proponents or ratifiers of the Sixth Amendment
were ignored. This rather cavalier treatment of the historical phases of a
question presented for the first time to the Court suggests that the majority of the
justices wished to gain some advantage from the lack of prior decisions which
had direct relevance to the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment provision at
the time. It was obvious that this particular judicial vacuum could not be filled
as the justices wished by recourse to history.... If, in examining the Court's
technique, one used the narrow historical approach to constitutional
interpretation, he would find it difficult to justify this decision. Black, with a
specific goal in view, wisely refrained from the type of historical reconstruction
which the Court so frequently indulges in when history apparently supports the
desired position. He ignored both the action of the first Congress in passing a
law in 1790 which required the appointment of counsel in capital cases at the
very time that the Sixth Amendment was being proposed and the generally
accepted meaning of the counsel provision of the states in 1791, when the
Amendment was ratified. In effect, the Court chose to adopt a more enlightened
procedure because modem conditions and attitudes seemed to make such action
desirable.
Id. at 42, 44.
104. Bute, 333 U.S. at 661.
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ing the government° 5"-stands as a vindication of the right to appear
through chosen counsel, rather than one appointed by the court.
Zenger's newspaper, the New York Weekly Journal, criticized the
despotic rule of William Cosby, who had been appointed Governor of
the British colony of New York in 1731 by King George II.106
Although appointed in July of 1731, Cosby did not arrive in New
York until August of 1732.117 In the intervening period, Rip Van
Dam, a prominent New York politician, had served as acting
governor. 108
The "venal, tyrannical and overbearing" Cosby alienated a
number of New York politicians soon after his arrival in the colony
when he demanded that Van Dam relinquish half the salary he had
earned as acting governor.'0 9 Van Dam refused, and Cosby filed suit
in the New York Supreme Court, asking the court to sit as a court of
exchequer.110 This would have avoided a jury trial in which a jury of
New York colonists presumably would have been more sympathetic
to Van Dam than to the royal Governor. I" Courts of exchequer,
however, were despised in the colonies as arbitrary tribunals com-
posed of high government officials who would not be as sympathetic
to those who were not well-connected to the government as would
common law courts in which trial by jury prevailed."12 When Chief
Justice Lewis Morris of the New York Supreme Court ruled against
Governor Cosby's right to use the court in the suit against Van Dam,
105. A narrative of the trial with commentary, prepared by James Alexander, one of
Zenger's attorneys, was printed by Zenger in 1736, shortly after the trial, and was widely
distributed in colonial America. J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND
TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (various
eds.). The book has been reprinted many times, often as parts of longer works on the trial.
See, e.g., J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER
ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL (S. Katz 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
Katz]; L. RUTHERFURD, JOHN PETER ZENGER: HIS PRESS, HIS TRIAL AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY
OF ZENGER'S IMPRINTS (1904) (containing an exact reproduction of Alexander's original
narrative); THE TRIAL OF PETER ZENGER (V. Buranelli ed. 1957) [hereinafter Buranelli]. My
description of the trial, infra notes 98a-155 and accompanying text, is drawn from the original
narrative, from the works cited above, and from Finkelman, The Zenger Case: Prototype of a
Political Trial, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 21 (M. Belknap ed. 1981). Citation to the
Alexander narrative is to the Katz edition and is referred to as Narrative.
106. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 24.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 25.
109. Id. at 24.
110. Id. at 25.
111. Katz, Introduction, in Katz, supra note 105, at 3.
112. Id. at 25; Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies Over Chancery
Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN
POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 401-23 (S. Katz 2d ed. 1976).
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Cosby dismissed Morris from office."' In order to ensure the Gover-
nor's control over the court, he replaced Morris with James DeLan-
cey, then a young judge on the court." 4 Morris then organized a
number of prominent New Yorkers, including Van Dam and attor-
neys James Alexander and William Smith, into an anti-Cosby polit-
ical faction." I
The New York Weekly Journal, formed in November of 1733 in
response to these and other incidents of corruption by the Cosby
administration, functioned as an "instrument of propaganda" in the
growing political war between the Morris faction and the Gover-
nor. 6 Its founders were Zenger, attorney James Alexander, and sev-
eral other Morris supporters. '17  With Zenger as its editor and
publisher, the newspaper became an important weapon in the height-
ening political battle waged against the Governor."' The Journal
pointedly criticized the Governor, often using innuendo, allegory, and
satire. 119 In response, the Governor ordered four issues of the Journal
to be burned publicly and had Zenger arrested.
120
Two noted New York attorneys who had been leaders in the
opposition movement, James Alexander and William Smith, came to
Zenger's defense.' 2' Judge DeLancey, the Cosby lieutenant appointed
to replace Lewis Morris as Chief Justice, rebuffed the lawyers'
113. The Lords of the Board of Trade in London later declared that the removal of Morris
had been illegal. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 31.
114. Buranelli, Introduction, in Buranelli, supra note 105, at 38 ("Cosby had hand-picked
his judge to insure control of the court."); Finkelman, supra note 105, at 24 (referring to
DeLancey as "the governor's handpicked jurist").
115. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 25.
116. In 1733 the Morrisites won sweeping victories in various local elections. Morris
himself defeated a Cosby appointee in an election as representative of Westchester County to
the Provincial Assembly notwithstanding the attempt of the local sheriff, a Cosby partisan, to
corrupt the balloting. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 23, 26; Katz, Introduction, in Katz, supra
note 105, at 1-2.
117. Zenger, a German immigrant who had opened a printshop in 1726, was selected as the
Journal's publisher and nominal editor. Zenger was one of only two printers in New York at
the time, and the other, William Bradford, with whom Zenger had earlier apprenticed, then
served as Governor Cosby's official printer. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 41 n.17 (citing I.
THOMAS, THE HISTORY OF PRINTING IN AMERICA (1810 & reprint 1970)).
118. Katz, Introduction, in Katz, supra note 105, at 11.
119. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 26. It also introduced to its readers the Whig ideology
of the early eighteenth century, with philosophical and ideological essays written by Alexander
and Morris and reprintings of essays by English writers such as Joseph Addison, Richard
Steele, and the authors of "Cato's letters," John Tranchard and Thomas Gordon. Id. The
newspaper advocated constitutional checks on arbitrary rulers, the virtues of representative
government, and freedom of the press. Id.
120. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 27.
121. Id. at 31. James Alexander was also an editor of the Journal. Id. at 26.
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attempts to win Zenger's release and set an excessive bail,'2 2 which
kept Zenger in jail for nearly nine months. 123 When two grand juries
refused to indict him, Attorney General Richard Bradley filed an
information charging Zenger with seditious libel. 124 The printer was
brought to trial in August of 1735 before Judge DeLancey. 125
When defense attorneys Alexander and Smith challenged
DeLancey's authority to act as judge by questioning the validity of his
commission and the fairness of his presiding in the case, 126 DeLancey
responded by disbarring them. 127 This unprecedented 128 order disbar-
ring Alexander and Smith "well illustrates the intense and bitter par-
tisanship that characterized the action of the government party." 129
Cosby and his allies, including Judge DeLancey, were determined to
122. Although under English law DeLancey was required to set bail "according to the
quality of the prisoner, and the nature of the offense," he demanded a bail for Zenger, accused
of a relatively minor offense, of ten times the printer's net worth. Finkelman, supra note 105,
at 27. The high bail seemed designed to keep Zenger, one of the only two printers in colonial
New York at the time, see supra note 117, in jail and away from his printshop; indeed he was
jailed for nearly nine months and "denied the use of pen, ink and paper, and the liberty of
speech with any persons." Finkelman, supra note 105, at 27. Thus, although largely a pawn in
the game between the Morrisites and the Governor's forces, Zenger became a martyr. During
Zenger's detention his family continued to publish the Journal with Alexander's help. Id. at
30.
123. Id. at 27.
124. Cosby's counterattacks against the Journal had been rebuffed by a number of colonial
political institutions. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 26-29. When two successive grand juries
declined to indict Zenger, Cosby asked the legislature to order various issues of the Journal to
be publicly burned. The popularly elected Assembly refused, so Cosby had the order issued by
the Governor's Council, which he dominated. However, the popularly elected and Morris
dominated New York city council, known as the Court of Quarter Sessions, refused the
sheriff's request to direct the common hangman or whipper to conduct the public burning of
the newspapers. As a result, the sheriff himself, together with several other Cosby appointees,
publicly burned the papers. Charging Zenger in an information after the representative grand
jury refused to return an indictment was unpopular in colonial America, both because it
frustrated the grand jury's role as a popular check on arbitrary government and because
Attorney General Bradley was known for abusing the power for pecuniary gain. Finkelman,
supra, at 28-29.
125. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 33.
126. See Narrative, in Katz, supra note 105, at 50-51; Finkelman, supra note 105, at 31-32.
Among the grounds for challenge was the fact that Cosby had appointed DeLancey to serve
"during pleasure" instead of "during good behavior," as required by English and colonial law.
Id.
127. DeLancey told attorney Smith in open court: "You have brought it to that point that
either we [DeLancey and associate Judge Philipse, also challenged by the lawyers] must go
from the bench or you from the bar: Therefore we exclude you and Mr. Alexander from the
bar ...." Narrative, in Katz, supra note 105, at 53. The judge labelled the actions of the
attorneys as contempt. Id. at 54.
128. L. RUTHERFURD, supra note 105, at 51 ("It is the only instance in legal history of such
an order being issued for such a reason.").
129. Id.; see Finkelman, supra note 105, at 32 ("This was undoubtably the most highhanded
action by any member of the Cosby administration.").
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defeat the growing populist opposition to their regime, and the
upcoming trial of Zenger was an important battle they needed to
win. 130 The disbarrment was "a shrewd move," calculated to increase
the likelihood of Zenger's conviction' 3' by depriving him of his cho-
sen counsel when "there were no attorneys in the province who would
be so vigorous and bold in defense of the printer as Alexander and
Smith."'
132
Following the disbarment of his attorneys, Zenger, without
funds, immediately petitioned the court for appointment of counsel. 
133
DeLancey obliged him by appointing John Chambers, "a competent
lawyer but a Governor's man."1 34 Chambers "was a young man with-
out much experience in the law, and had been one of the signers of
[an] address complimenting Cosby's administration, and was really
affiliated with the court party."'135  Chambers had Zenger plead not
guilty and was successful in avoiding an attempt to pack the jury.
36
He certainly lacked the zeal of Alexander and Smith, however.
37
Zenger's friends had little confidence in the court-appointed attor-
ney;1 3 8 Alexander was "apparently skeptical of Chambers' ability to
defend Zenger properly"' 39 and, along with Smith, began to look for
another lawyer to try the case.140
At the trial, Chambers' opening statement asserted that Zenger's
statements were not specific enough to be libelous, and that the proof
the jury would hear would be deficient to establish libel. 141 Although
his strategy was not as bold as that planned by Alexander, "it was
130. Katz, Introduction in Katz, supra note 105, at 20.
131. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 32; see L. RUTHERFORD, supra note 105, at 56; accord
Katz, Introduction, in Katz, supra note 105, at 21 (The disbarment "can probably be explained
as a tactic to deprive Zenger of competent legal counsel, since there were few lawyers in New
York at the time and probably none so skilled as Smith and Alexander.").
132. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 32.
133. L. RUTHERFORD, supra note 105, at 56.
134. Katz, Introduction, in Katz, supra note 105, at 21; Finkelman, supra note 105, at 32
("a competent attorney, but a member of the pro-Cosby faction").
135. L. RUTHERFORD, supra note 105, at 57.
136. "He prevented a stacked jury when the clerk offered a selected list of jurors instead of
the names listed in the freeholders book. Later, when the sheriff altered the list of possible
jurors, Chambers again interceded on his client's behalf." Finkelman, supra note 105, at 32.
137. L. RUTHERFORD, supra note 105, at 56. For example, Chambers declined to press the
point that his exceptions should be part of the record.
138. Katz, Introduction, in Katz, supra note 105, at 22.
139. Id. at 220 n.60.
140. Id.
141. Chambers' opening statement is only summarized in Alexander's narrative of the trial.
Narrative, in Katz, supra note 105, at 61. His brief for the opening statement is reprinted,
however, in an appendix to the Katz edition. John Chambers' brief, in Katz, supra, at 148-51
app. B.
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competent and indicated that he proposed a conscientious defense of
his controversial client."' 142 However, "the stage seemed to be set for
a weak defense of the printer."'' 43 Alexander, although disbarred, had
continued to work on the case and developed a more daring strategy
than the conventional one conceived by Chambers. 1" The plan was
to base Zenger's defense on the truth of the Journal articles, thereby
trying Cosby in the process, and on that basis to seek a jury acquittal
on the libel charges.
145
With the financial backing of Lewis Morris, Alexander engaged
Andrew Hamilton, a distinguished attorney from the neighboring col-
ony of Pennsylvania and reputedly the best lawyer in North America,
to execute the defense plan.'46 Following Chambers' opening state-
ment, Hamilton, appearing unannounced, came forward to represent
Zenger. 47 Judge DeLancey, undoubtedly aware of Hamilton's repu-
tation and "startled" by his sudden appearance,' 48 took no action to
prevent Hamilton from taking over the defense. 
49
Hamilton made an impassioned plea to the jury in support of the
liberty to expose and oppose tyranny by speaking and writing the
truth.1 50 Admitting that Zenger had published the statements in
question, he asserted that the printer could not, however, be convicted
of libel for printing the truth, and that the jury should determine not
only whether Zenger had printed the statements, but also whether
they constituted libel. These were novel contentions unsupported by
English common law.1 5' Attorney General Bradley, trying the case
for the government, argued that truth was no defense under British
law.I52 Judge DeLancey agreed and instructed the jury that it was to
determine only whether Zenger had published the statements, leaving
142. John Chambers' brief, in Katz, supra note 105, at 148.
143. Katz, Introduction, in Katz, supra note 105, at 23.
144. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 33.
145. Buranelli, Introduction, in Buranelli, supra note 105, at 70.
146. Katz, Introduction, in Katz, supra note 105, at 22; L. RUTHERFURD, supra note 105,
at 58-59. Hamilton, "perhaps the most famous and competent attorney in the mainland
colonies," had previously "been involved in political disputes in Pennsylvania that were similar
to the Morris-Cosby rivalry in New York ...." Finkelman, supra note 105, at 33.
147. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 33.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 22, 33, 40 n.1.
151. Id. Indeed, not only was truth not a defense to libel at the time, but it was considered
an aggravation of the crime. Id. at 34, 40 n.1. Because the doctrine that he was trying to
overturn had originated in the Star Chamber, abolished by Parliament during the English Civil
War, Hamilton could argue that it should no longer be followed. Id.
152. Katz, supra note 105, at 74.
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the law of libel to the court. 1 3 Hamilton's speech therefore was an
invitation to jury nullification. The New York jury, striking a blow
for colonial self-government and freedom from despotic rulers, rebuf-
fed the court and acquitted Zenger. 154 Hamilton was honored for his
stirring defense, and Alexander and Smith later won reinstatement to
the bar after an appeal to the New York legislature.
155
The trial of John Peter Zenger, widely known, read about, and
debated in eighteenth century England and America, was an impor-
tant political and ideological precedent that made possible the Ameri-
can Revolution some forty years later.'56 It played an important role
in forging many of the principles later enshrined in the Constitution
and Bill of Rights, including freedom of speech and of the press, the
independent jury as a bulwark against government tyranny, and the
right to self-government. 157 Among them surely was the indepen-
153. Id. at 69 ("A libel is not to be justified; for it is nevertheless a libel that it is true."); id.
at 75, 78, 100.
154. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 35.
155. L. RUTHERFURD, supra note 105, at 139-40.
156. Zenger's case was seen as "a victory of democracy and of the people over tyranny,"
and an "important political precedent" for both "the American Revolution and the Bill of
Rights." Finkelman, supra note 105, at 22, 36, 38. The trial "helped create a climate of civil
disobedience in which the idea of political independence was conceived and nurtured." Id. at
22 (quoting R. MORRIS, FAIR TRIAL: FOURTEEN WHO STOOD ACCUSED FROM ANNE
HUTCHINSON TO ALGER Hiss 69 (rev. ed. 1967)). It became "an important ideological and
political precedent." Finkelman, supra note 105, at 22. The impact of the Zenger trial on
colonial America was significantly augmented by the publication in 1736 of Alexander's
Narrative of the trial, see supra note 105, and by its constant reprinting in America and
England during the colonial period. Finkelman, supra, at 24, 36-37. By 1738 there were
probably five editions of the Narrative in print. Id. at 37. Other editions appeared in England
in 1750, 1752, 1765, and 1784, and in America in 1756, 1770, and 1799. Id. The Narrative
became the most famous publication issued in the period before the Revolution. Id. It was,
"with the possible exception of Cato's Letters," the "most widely known source of libertarian
thought in England and America during the eighteenth century." Id. (quoting L. LEVY,
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICA 133
(1960)). Thus, the Narrative was widely available throughout the colonial period. It was well
known in colonial America, "for each generation had read reprints of the case." Id. at 39.
Moreover, the case provoked several articles critical of the principles it represented and a series
of defenses written by James Alexander and published in Benjamin Franklin's Pennsylvania
Gazette. Id. at 36-37. The colonists "had been reading and learning about" the principles of
Zenger's case "for decades," and the case "was important to the lawyers and political thinkers
of eighteenth-century England and America" and "had a lasting impact on the development of
a libertarian ideology" in both countries. Id. at 39, 36, 37.
157. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 38 ("Zenger's case helped lead to... the creation of the
Bill of Rights and freedom of the press."); id. at 22 (Zenger's trial was a precedent for the Bill
of Rights, represents "a great victory for liberty and freedom of the press," and was "one of
the landmarks in the development of freedom of the press."). The wide "availability of the
Zenger Narrative and the memory of Zenger's victory were important factors in the creation of
the new republic and the securing of a free press." Id. at 39. "[I]n the revolutionary period
[Zenger's legacy] was always there as a guiding light for those who were gradually developing
an ideology of freedom of expression." Id. at 40. Zenger's trial was "[tjhe most famous
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dence of the defense bar and its role as a significant check against a
partisan or corrupt judge or prosecutor.
Imagine Zenger's trial, however, if Judge DeLancey had prohib-
ited Hamilton from representing him, or if Attorney General Bradley
had had such power and Chambers alone represented Zenger. If this
had happened, Zenger would not have received a defense by a lawyer
in whom he had confidence. Even though it appeared that the young
attorney would have provided a competent defense by attacking the
sufficiency of the proof on the publication charge, he would not have
raised the arguments, unknown at the time under English law, that
truth should constitute a defense and that the jury's role should
extend to the determination of whether the statements published were
libelous. The result of Zenger's trial presumably would have been
quite different. Moreover, had DeLancey prohibited Zenger's repre-
sentation by counsel of choice and insisted on Zenger appearing
through the young court-appointed lawyer as a tactic to gain adver-
sarial advantage-as he apparently had done earlier in disbarring
Alexander and Smith,"'8 the impact on the appearance of justice
would have been severe. Can there be any doubt that the colonists,
who in their colonial charters had rejected the English practice of
prohibiting representation by counsel and affirmed the defendant's
right to appear through his own chosen counsel, would have been out-
raged at such an attempt to force an appointed attorney on a defend-
ant who wished to appear through counsel of his own choosing?
Happily this is not what occurred, and Zenger's trial stands as a tri-
umph for the institution of the independent criminal defense bar and a
vindication of the right to counsel of choice. These lessons were fresh
in the minds of the framers when they drafted the sixth
amendment. '59
That the framers were intent on protecting the right to appear
through chosen counsel is further demonstrated by the actions of
Congress in enacting the federal criminal code of 1790,' ° seven
months after the sixth amendment was proposed but before it was
ratified. The Act provided that a defendant in a treason or other capi-
tal case "shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel," and
further authorized the court "upon his request, [to] assign to him such
counsel not exceeding two, as he may desire." 6 ' Thus, although the
historical example of jury nullification in the United States." Gobert, In search of the
Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 300 n. 140 (1988).
158. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
159. Finkelman, supra note 105, at 40.
160. 1 Stat. 112; see supra note 99; W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 28.
161. 1 Stat. 118 (emphasis added).
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defendant could defend by counsel, one would not be appointed to
represent him absent his assent.
Long before courts regarded the sixth amendment as a source for
the right to appointed counsel, 162 the sixth amendment guaranteed the
fundamental right to retain counsel of choice. 163 Appearance through
retained counsel was the model the framers had in mind. Indeed, in
1932 when the Supreme Court first recognized a qualified right to
appointment of counsel in capital cases as a matter of due process, it
referred to this qualified right as "a logical corollary from the consti-
tutional right to be heard by counsel."' 164 Furthermore, in 1942, when
discussing the right to self-representation, 165 the Court referred to the
sixth amendment as embodying "the correlative right to dispense with
a lawyer's help."' 166 If the right to appointment of counsel and the
right to self-representation are "corollaries," then the right to retain
counsel of one's own choosing must be the primary right. It is this
basic right to retain counsel that Judge Cooley, author of the most
widely used nineteenth century constitutional law treatise, referred to
as "perhaps [the defendant's] most important privilege."' 16' Further-
more, it is this basic right that Justice Story referred to in his influen-
tial Commentaries on the Constitution, which equated the "right to
counsel employed for the prisoner" with the right to trial by jury.
1 68
This fundamental component of the sixth amendment right to
counsel therefore is separate and distinct from the right to appointed
counsel that it significantly predates. The right to counsel "includes
not only the right to have an attorney appointed by the State in cer-
tain cases, but also the right of an accused to 'a fair opportunity to
secure counsel of his own choice.' ",169 Furthermore, "a defendant
must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult with
162. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); see supra notes 101-103 and accompanying
text.
163. See supra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
164. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72 (1932).
165. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
166. Id. at 279, cited with approval in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 815 (1975).
167. 1 T. COOLEY, supra note 90, at 700, quoted in Powell, 287 U.S. at 70. Cooley plainly
was referring to the constitutional right to retain counsel, as the United States Supreme Court
had not yet recognized a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Moreover, he accepted
Story's earlier definition of the sixth amendment right to counsel, see supra note 100, as "the
right to have ... counsel employed for the prisoner." W. BEANEY, supra note 82, at 28-29.
Indeed, Cooley retained Story's definition unchanged in his subsequent edition of Story's
treatise on constitutional law. See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
§ 1794 (T. Cooley ed. 1873).
168. 3 J. STORY, supra note 100, § 1788, at 665-66.
169. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 (1932)).
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counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of little
worth."' 0 The right to counsel of choice has been widely recognized
by both the Supreme Court,17  and by the circuit courts.1 72
2. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE CONTRASTED WITH THE
RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL: FURTHERING
PARTICIPATORY AND AUTONOMY VALUES AS
WELL AS THE INTEREST IN
RELIABILITY
Would this right to counsel of choice, so dignified by our consti-
tutional history and traditions, be satisfied by the provision of
appointed counsel? In the context of forfeiture litigation, the govern-
ment has contended that giving a defendant who is rendered impecu-
nious by a pretrial restraining order an appointed attorney satisfies the
170. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954).
171. See, e.g., Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988) ("[T]he right to select
and be represented by one's preferred attorney is comprehended by the Sixth Amendment
.... "); Crooker, 357 U.S. at 439; Chandler, 348 U.S. at 9-10; Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 661
(1948); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53
(1932).
172. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 818-19 (3d Cir. 1988); United States
v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 817 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10,
16 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 958-60 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Served on John Doe, Esq. (Slotnick), 781 F.2d 238, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1985) (en
bane), cert. denied sub nor. Roe v. United States, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); Wilson v. Mintzes,
761 F.2d 275, 285 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Milburn v. United States, 474 U.S. 994 (1985); United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d
1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984); Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984); United
States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Phillips, 699 F.2d 798, 801
(6th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Tosh, 733 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.
1984); United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082
(1983); United States v. LaMonte, 684 F.2d 672, 673 (10th Cir. 1982); United States v. Curcio,
680 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825, 827-28 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982);
United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951
(1984); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 209 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982);
United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337,
341 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979); United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1075 (1979); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Vargas-Martinez, 569 F.2d 1102, 1104 (9th Cir. 1978); In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183,
1186 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, 1219 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v. Inman, 483 F.2d 738, 739-40 (4th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 988 (1974); United States v. Pigford, 461 F.2d 648, 649 (4th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 358 (7th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Carey v.
Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970); United
States ex rel. Davis v. McCann, 386 F.2d 611, 618 (2d. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958
(1968); United States v. Mitchell, 354 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Johnston, 318
F.2d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 1963); Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1961);
Lee v. United States, 235 F.2d 219, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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requirements of the sixth amendment. 1 3 Although a number of
courts have accepted the government's argument,174 even assuming
that appointed counsel would provide the effective assistance of coun-
sel mandated by the sixth amendment, this contention fundamentally
misconceives the separate and distinct nature of the right to counsel
of choice. 
175
The "essential aim" of the sixth amendment, as Mr. Chief Justice
Rehnquist recently stated in Wheat v. United States,176 may be "to
guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather
than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the
lawyer whom he prefers."' 177 A criminal justice system relying on
appointed rather than retained counsel, however, is not the adversary
system contemplated by the sixth amendment, no matter how effec-
tive such appointed advocates are. When the government seeks to
deprive a defendant not of a particular preferred counsel as in
Wheat, 78 but of the opportunity to select any private counsel, giving
173. See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 22, United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8
(Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445 (8th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-2499 to -2502) [hereinafter Unit No. 7
Government Brief] ("[I]f [the] defendant is rendered indigent by the lawful seizure of certain
property pursuant to the forfeiture statute, his constitutional rights will be fully protected by
appointed counsel."); Monsanto Panel Government Brief, supra note 36, at 49 (Appellant's
"constitutional rights would be fully protected by appointed counsel.").
174. United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Feb. 17, 1989); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1506-08 (10th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 646 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988); In re Grand Jury Duces Tecum (Payden), 605 F. Supp. 839,
849-50 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Bello, 470 F. Supp. 723, 725 (S.D. Cal. 1979); Brickey, supra note 6, at 517-19.
175. In United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445, mandate stayed by
864 F.2d 1421 (8th Cir. 1988), the court stated:
[W]e reject the government's argument that even if its action should push Kiser
into indigency, the Sixth Amendment would be fully vindicated by offering him
appointed counsel .... This is an extraordinarily impoverished view of the non-
indigent's right. In essence it collapses the two distinct rights into one, the lesser.
Id. at 1451.
176. 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).
177. Id. at 1697.
178. Wheat upheld, by a 5 to 4 vote, the trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to be
represented at his individual trial by an attorney who represented two of his co-conspirators
and thus was found to be subject to an actual conflict of interest. Id. at 1698. The majority
found the sixth amendment right to "choose one's own counsel" to be "circumscribed." Id. at
1697. In addition to the situation presented by the facts in Wheat, the Court cited other
situations in which the defendant's choice of counsel could be rejected, such as when the
counsel chosen is not a member of the bar, when the defendant cannot afford to hire the
attorney, or when the attorney has a previous or ongoing relationship with the government.
Id. The Court found that the actual conflict of interest confronting the defendant's preferred
counsel was justification for the district court's refusal to permit his selection, even though the
defendant was willing to waive his right to conflict-free counsel. The Court determined that
the societal interests in ensuring the conduct of trials within the legal profession's ethical
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him a competent appointed lawyer will not satisfy the principles of
the sixth amendment. 
179
In contexts other than fee forfeiture, lower federal courts have
rejected the contention that deprivation of the right to counsel of
choice can be cured by provision of appointed counsel. 8 0  These
courts have adopted the view that denial of the right to counsel of
choice does not require a showing of prejudice, but that the right is
"so fundamental that any interference cannot be deemed harmless
error" and must result in automatic reversal, even when the defendant
was provided the effective assistance of counsel through appointed
counsel. 
81
This view is grounded in the recognition that the right to counsel
of choice serves substantial interests in addition to the general interest
in accuracy in adjudication. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Flanagan v. United States,182 the right to counsel of choice "reflects
constitutional protection of the defendant's free choice independent of
standards and in promoting the appearance of fairness in the criminal process outweighed the
defendant's interest in asserting his right to representation by counsel of his choice. Id. at
1697-98.
179. See infra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1986). The Rankin court
stated:
The government argues that Rankin was competently represented by appointed
counsel at trial. That, however, is not a relevant consideration. A defendant
who is arbitrarily deprived of the right to select his own counsel need not
demonstrate prejudice. "Obtaining reversal for violation of such a right does not
require [a] showing of prejudice to the defense, since the right reflects
constitutional protection of the defendant's free choice independent of concern
for the objective fairness of the proceeding." Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S.
259, 268 (1984). In this respect, the denial of one's selected lawyer is quite
different from a claim of ineffective counsel where a harmless error test is
appropriate. The right at stake here is similar to that of self-representation.
"The right is either respected or denied; its deprivation cannot be harmless."
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 ... (1984).
Id. at 960-61; see also United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 58 (3d Cir. 1979) (The defendant
"need not show that the dismissal [of counsel] was prejudicial.").
181. United States v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 1988); accord United States v.
Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 816 (Ist Cir. 1987); United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 16
(Ist Cir. 1986); United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986); Rankin, 779 F.2d
at 960-61; Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 285-86 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Lewis, 759
F.2d 1316, 1326-27 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985); United States v. Ray, 731 F.2d
1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1162 (1982); Laura, 607 F.2d at 58; Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1323-25 (5th
Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Ferenc v. Brierley, 320 F. Supp. 406, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
Stacy & Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 79, 111 n. 132
(1988); see also People v. Holland, 23 Cal. 3d 77, 87, 588 P.2d 765, 770, 151 Cal. Rptr. 625,
630 (1978) (en banc).
182. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
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concern for the objective fairness of the proceeding."18' 3 Allowing the
defendant free choice in the critical matter of who will represent him
at trial fosters both the reliability of the outcome and values unrelated
to truth determination."8 4 Thus the right to counsel of choice is criti-
cal to the basic trust between counsel and client that is a cornerstone
of the adversary system.'I 5 This basic trust, indispensable to an effec-
tive attorney-client relationship, both increases the reliability of the
trial and serves a crucial participatory function, "generating the feel-
ing, so important to a popular government, that justice has been
done."'' 8 6 Like the right to self-representation, which exists in large
183. Id. at 267-68.
184. See Stacy & Dayton, supra note 181, at 107 n.109, 111 n.132.
185. Linton, 656 F.2d at 209; see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324 n.17 (1981)
("Our adversary system functions best when a lawyer enjoys the whole-hearted confidence of
his client."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.1 commentary, at 4-29 (2d ed.
1980) ("Nothing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the establishment
of trust and confidence."). In Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983), the Supreme Court rejected
the contention that the defendant's sixth amendment rights were violated by the denial of a
continuance necessary to allow the defendant's court-appointed counsel to represent him at
trial. Id. at 14. The Court's opinion ridiculed the court of appeals' description of the sixth
amendment as embracing a right to a "meaningful attorney-client relationship." Id. at 1, 13-
14 & n.6 (quoting Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981)). This dictum
sufficiently disturbed four members of the Court to provoke them to voice their concern
separately. Id. at 15 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 29 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring, joined by Stevens, J.). The Court's dictum should not be taken to mean that the
sixth amendment does not value a meaningful attorney-client relationship, but merely that the
amendment protects no separate right to such a relationship. See id. at 19-28 (Brennan, J.,
concurring, joined by Marshall, J.). Any sensible construction of the sixth amendment cannot
ignore this underlying value. The majority of the Court found the value of a meaningful
attorney-client relationship of limited importance in the context of Slappy, in which the
defendant, although denied the continuance necessary for his preferred counsel to appear on
his behalf, was represented by an appointed lawyer and the defendant did not assert that any
particular problems arose that interfered with a meaningful attorney-client relationship.
Slappy did not, of course, involve the right to retain counsel of choice, so honored by the
history and traditions of the sixth amendment, but rather, the novel claim of a right to the
appointment of counsel of choice, a claim the acceptance of which inevitably would have
raised considerable administrative difficulties. Id. at 13; see Tague, An Indigent's Right to the
Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 74-75 (1974). The dictum in Slappy, therefore,
should not be read to disparage the wisdom of construing the sixth amendment with a view to
fostering a meaningful relationship between attorney and client, but merely to reject the notion
that the amendment protects a separate right to such a relationship.
186. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (One
of the "central concerns of procedural due process" is "the promotion of participation and
dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process."); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 266 (1978); Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 636 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970); J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE 177-80 (1985) (discussing "the claim that the dignity and self-respect of the individual
can be protected only through processes of government in which there is meaningful
participation by affected interests"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 10-7, at
666 (2d ed. 1988) ("[I]ntrinsic" values of due process include a "chance to participate" by
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part to "affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused" by affording
him some control over the proceeding, 187 the right to counsel of
choice "is premised on respect for the individual."'' 8 8 The defendant's
basic right to choose the type of defense he wishes to present, itself a
fundamental constitutional right 189 supported by participatory and
autonomy as well as reliability values, also supports the right to select
counsel of choice, "[flor the most important decision a defendant
makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney."'" The
defendant's choice of counsel also serves an important advocacy inter-
est that falls within the protection of the first amendment.19' A crimi-
nal defendant engages in communcative activity in the public forum
of the courtroom largely through the attorney he chooses to advocate
his positions. A crucial aspect of the participatory and autonomy val-
ues served by the right to counsel of choice is the selection and
employment of the advocate who will assert the defendant's legal
rights.
Giving the defendant the ability to select his own counsel there-
fore furthers both truth-seeking goals and participatory and auton-
affected individuals, "an opportunity that expresses their dignity as persons."); LaTour,
Determinants of Participant and Observer Satisfaction with Adversary and Inquisitorial Modes
of Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 153 (1978) (empirical showing that
adversarial procedures are favored because they give disputants more "process control");
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 50
(1976) ("[A] lack of participation causes alienation and a loss of that dignity and self-respect
that society properly deems independently valuable."); Michelman, Formal and Associational
Aims in Procedural Due Process, XVIII NoMos 126, 127-28 (1977) (Due process vindicates
values of "participation."); Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for
"Process Values, " 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1974). The right to counsel of choice plays a
critical role in fulfilling these participatory 'values. Thibaut and Walker's classic empirical
work on litigant perceptions of alternative modes of process demonstrates that free choice of
attorney contributes significantly to litigant satisfaction and perceived fairness. J. THIBAUT &
L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 83-84, 94-95, 118 (1975).
187. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 174, 176-77 (1984).
188. Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 1985); see Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (recognizing right of self-representation out of "that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law").
189. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 19 (1967); Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emerging Constitutional Guarantee
in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713, 716 (1976); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 181, at 110-13;
Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal
Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 613 (1978).
190. United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d. Cir. 1979). As Justice Marshall recently
stated, a "primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to grant a criminal defendant effective
control over the conduct of his defense.... An obviously critical aspect of making a defense is
choosing a person to serve as an assistant and representative." Wheat v. United States, 108 S.
Ct. 1692, 1700 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.).
191. See infra Section III(B).
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omy values.' 92 None of these nontruth-seeking values underlying the
right to counsel of choice is satisfied by substituting for it the right to
an appointed counsel meeting the effective assistance of counsel stan-
dard. In addition, "unlike the right to counsel of choice, 'the right to
the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake,
but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive
a fair trial.' "193
In this respect, the right to counsel of choice is like the right to
self-representation, 94 and like that right, its deprivation cannot be
remedied by the provision of appointed counsel, no matter how com-
petent such appointed counsel may be. t95 Forcing a public defender
or other appointed counsel on a defendant who is otherwise able to
hire his own counsel and who desires to do so, without compelling
justification, violates the sixth amendment. Requiring such an
unwanted counsel instead of the counsel of defendant's choice is as
offensive to the sixth amendment as insisting on unwanted counsel
when defendant has chosen self-representation: "An unwanted coun-
sel 'represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unaccept-
able legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such
representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed by
the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense."' 96
Permitting the defendant to select his own counsel honors his
right to free choice and autonomy in a matter of vital concern to
him.197 In addition, it best effectuates the values underlying the right
192. Laura, 607 F.2d at 57. The right permits the defendant to "choose an individual in
whom he has confidence. With this choice, the intimacy and confidentiality which are
important to an effective attorney-client relationship can be nurtured." Id. Recognition of the
importance of uninhibited communication between an accused and his counsel is reflected in
the privilege generally accorded attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
193. Wilson, 761 F.2d at 285 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)).
194. See United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 960-61 (3d Cir. 1980).
195. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975) ("To thrust counsel upon the
accused against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the [sixth a]mendment."); id. at
833 ("[Tlhe notion of compulsory counsel was utterly foreign" to the Founders.).
196. Id. at 821.
197. See id. at 833-34 ("[T]hose who wrote the Bill of Rights ... understood the inestimable
worth of free choice."). Respect for individual autonomy is deeply rooted in American
constitutional history and tradition, which were heavily influenced by Enlightenment views of
popular sovereignty and limited government. See generally B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60
TEX. L. REV. 175 (1982). Thus, due process has been read to protect a liberty interest "in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
598-600 (1977); e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (a woman's right to end a pregnancy); id. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (same); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (right to direct upbringing and education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
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to assistance of counsel by maximizing the trust and confidence
between client and attorney that are preconditions to its successful
exercise. Permitting the accused to select his own counsel also pro-
motes his interest in having assistance independent of the sovereign
that is prosecuting and judging him. It further promotes the public
interest in preserving an independent, private criminal defense bar.
The American tradition of an independent criminal defense bar func-
tioning as a significant check on judicial and prosecutorial abuses of
power predates the Revolution, as the trial of John Peter Zenger dem-
onstrates. 198 In our system of justice it is essential that judges be
independent, 99 that juries be more independent,200 and that defense
counsel be most independent. Indeed, independent counsel is institu-
tionally indispensable to an independent judiciary and jury system.
The attorney's role in our society, and particularly in our crimi-
nal justice system, is essential to the safeguarding of our constitutional
values. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter described it, "all the interests of
man that are comprised under the constitutional guarantees given to
'life, liberty and property' are in the professional keeping of law-
yers .... [The lawyer] stands 'as a shield' . . . in defense of right and
to ward off wrong."' 2 1 In the criminal process, when that shield must
be wielded against government itself, restricting the defendant to a
390, 402 (1923) (same). As Faretta indicates, the Constitution's protection of autonomy values
has been recognized in the criminal context. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834.
198. See supra notes 105-57 and accompanying text.
199. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (granting federal judges life tenure, subject to good
behavior, and freedom from reductions in salary); 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 34 (rev. ed. 1966) (Madison); The Federalist No. 78, at
226 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield ed. 1961); Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence,
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 108 (1970); Kaufman, The Essence ofJudicial Independence, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 671 (1980); Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of the Federal Judges:
Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 665 (1969); see also Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion); Nixon v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 731 (1982); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Chandler v. Judicial Council,
398 U.S. 74, 143 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 137 (Douglas, J., dissenting); United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1955) (dictum).
200. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
151-56 (1968); Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1014 (C.P. 1670); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note
8, at *348.
201. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); see also Penson v. Ohio, 109 S. Ct. 346, 352 (1988) ("[I]t is through counsel that
all other rights of the accused are protected."); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377
(1986) ("[I]t is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights."); Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956) ("Of all the rights
that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive,
for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have."), quoted in Penson, 109 S. Ct.
at 352, and Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 377.
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government-issued shield significantly undermines this protective
function.
Forcing the accused to have an attorney selected and paid for by
the sovereign-and in the case of attorneys employed by public
defender offices, also recruited, trained, and supervised by it-instead
of one chosen by the defendant, defies the value of free choice, jeopar-
dizes independence, diminishes the defendant's trust in the system,
and undermines his ability to reconcile himself to any adverse results
of the proceeding. Furthermore, in the long run, permitting the pros-
ecution to keep private defense counsel out of major criminal trials
will destroy public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of our
system of justice.
A defendant's sixth amendment rights may be exercised in one of
three ways: he may choose a private counsel, an attorney may be
appointed for him, or he may decline counsel and represent himself.
Of the three, the first is the primary method; it is the one envisioned
by the framers of the sixth amendment and the one with the longest
history of constitutional recognition. Moreover, of the three, it is the
preferred method. Neither appointed counsel nor self-representation
202conform as closely to our model of the adversary system, nor do
they effectuate the goals of promoting accuracy, fairness, and public
acceptance of the criminal justice process that the sixth amendment
seeks to serve.
3. THE APPROPRIATE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
The right to counsel of choice is a fundamental right, honored by
our history and traditions and protected by the sixth amendment.
Like other fundamental constitutional rights, denial of this right
should require compelling justification.2 °3 Although enjoyment of the
right to choose counsel is available only to those with sufficient
resources to exercise it, the conditional nature of the right cannot jus-
202. See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ("The very premise of our
adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best
promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.").
203. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, C.J., concurring,
joined by Oakes & Kearse, JJ.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988). Chief Judge Feinberg
stated:
The sixth amendment right to counsel of choice is a fundamental right that
serves to protect other constitutional rights. It is a key element in our system of
criminal justice and distinguishes that system from others that do not allow
individuals the chance to resist in a meaningful way the imposition of
government power upon them. Therefore, the right to counsel of choice cannot
be infringed unless a compelling governmental purpose outweighs it.
[Vol. 43:765
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tify governmental deprivation of the resources that the defendant
would otherwise possess in order to exercise the right.
Virtually all constitutional rights cost money to exercise. The
right to free speech is dependent upon the individual having sufficient
resources to reach his audience. A listener's first amendment right to
receive ideas is similarly dependent upon his ability to travel to a dem-
onstration, purchase a book, pamphlet or newspaper, or own a televi-
sion. A pregnant woman's right to choose an abortion is contingent
upon her having the resources to afford one. Even the free exercise of
religion may cost money. The absence of state action ordinarily pre-
cludes an assertion of a constitutional claim by an individual whose
only bar to the exercise of these fundamental rights is a lack of finan-
cial resources.2°
Constitutional rights generally tend to be negative in nature,
restricting governmental intrusions on liberty. They impose on the
government a duty to refrain from action preventing or burdening
exercise of the right, not an affirmative obligation to facilitate its exer-
cise by providing funds to those lacking sufficient resources to enjoy
the right.2 °5 When, however, the individual possesses sufficient
resources to exercise the right, but for the government's action in
204. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547
(1983) ("We again reject the 'notion that First Amendment rights are somehow not fully
realized unless they are subsidized by the state.'" (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 515 (1959))); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (The constitutional right to choose to
have an abortion does not require the government to fund abortions for poor women.). For
this reason, the Fourth Circuit was wrong in Caplin & Drysdale when it equated "purely
private predicaments [, such as financial inability, that] may leave a defendant without the
counsel of his choice" with government imposed forfeiture. United States v. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 644, 645 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (rejecting a sixth amendment
challenge to application of the forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
363 (1988); see also Brickey, supra note 6, at 533. The Eighth Circuit's analysis in United
States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445, 1451, mandate stayed by 864 F.2d
1421 (8th Cir. 1988), is more compelling:
The government's action here cannot be equated to other "vagaries of life" which
may deplete a defendant's resources. It is one thing for a person to be unable to
pay his other lawyer because he or she lost money in bad investments, spent it in
other ways, or never had it to begin with. It is an entirely different matter for the
government ... purposefully to deprive the defendant of the very assets he needs
to pay his lawyer. This is more like a preemptive strike than a vagary of life.
Id.
205. See Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conundrum: Inalienable Rights, Negative Duties, and
the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. REv. 330 (1985). My citation of Harris v. McRae as
an illustration of this principle in the preceding footnote should not be taken as an
endorsement of the result reached in that case. Indeed, I believe that McRae was wrongly
decided, see Tribe, supra, at 337-39, although I do think that constitutional rights generally
should be regarded as negative in nature. In any event, whatever the arguments may be for
declining to impose a constitutional duty on government to provide the resources needed by
the poor to enable them to exercise rights, these arguments do not justify depriving those with
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interfering with the use of those resources, the governmental action
must be justified.2 °6 Thus it is no answer that the defendant, after
forfeiture, is left without sufficient assets to retain counsel of choice.
Rather, the constitutional issue is whether the government's pretrial
restraint of his assets can be justified when balanced against the signif-
icant individual and societal interests underlying the right to counsel
of choice.
To perform this balancing of competing interests it is necessary
to identify the appropriate constitutional standard of review. Like
other constitutional rights, the right to counsel of choice is not abso-
lute. 20 7  Although not absolute, governmental actions intruding on
fundamental constitutional rights-freedom of expression,208 free
exercise of religion, 209 right to choose an abortion, 210 ight to vote,211
or right to travel,212 for example-receive heightened scrutiny. To be
constitutional, such actions must be shown to be necessary to achieve
a compelling governmental interest.21 3  This heightened standard of
constitutional scrutiny should apply to governmental action that ren-
ders it impossible for a defendant to exercise the fundamental sixth
amendment right to retain counsel for his defense.
What is at stake in the forfeiture of attorney's fees context is
more than a mere regulation of the right to counsel of choice or a
postponement of its exercise, for which lesser scrutiny may suffice.214
Rather, it is the wholesale abridgment of the right to counsel of
resources of the funds needed to exercise fundamental rights, at least in the absence of some
other compelling justification.
206. E.g., United States ex rel. Ferenc v. Brierley, 320 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(Government restraint of the defendant's funds, only part of which were alleged to have been
proceeds of the crime, violated the sixth amendment right to counsel of choice. The defendant,
who otherwise would have used the funds to hire an attorney, was forced to accept an
appointed counsel.).
207. See Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988) ("The Sixth Amendment
right to choose one's own counsel is circumscribed in several important respects."). Even the
first amendment is not absolute. See L. TRIBE, supra note 186, § 12-2, at 792-93, § 12-8, at
832-41; Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1420 (1962); Mendelson,
On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821
(1962).
208. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
209. E.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
210. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (1973).
211. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
212. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
213. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 208-12.
214. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (Feinberg, C.J.,
concurring, joined by Oakes & Kearse, JJ.) ("Many of the cases that allow limitations on the
right to counsel of choice deal only with partial limitations or infringements, such as
preventing a defendant from substituting counsel once the trial has begun... or disqualifying a
particular lawyer .... " (citations omitted)), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988)).
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choice. When a defendant is stripped of all his assets, his right to
retain counsel of choice is not merely postponed or its exercise limited
by the need to accommodate the demands of the administration of
justice. Rather, his ability to exercise the right is totally abridged.215
Such a distinction in the level of scrutiny applied, based upon the
extent of the intrusion on the right involved-with lesser scrutiny
applied to regulation of the exercise of the right and more stringent
scrutiny applied to more serious invasions-typically is made in con-
texts involving other fundamental constitutional rights. For example,
content-based abridgments of speech are subject to exacting scru-
tiny. 216 On the other hand, content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulations on the exercise of first amendment rights are subject to
lesser scrutiny.217 In the abortion context, strict scrutiny is applied to
prohibitions on abortion, resulting in the invalidation of laws banning
first-trimester abortions. 218 Lesser scrutiny, however, is applied to
mere regulations of the exercise of the right, such as requirments that
second-trimester abortions be performed in hospitals or that certain
records be kept in connection with the procedure.219
To uphold the total abridgment of the fundamental right to
counsel of choice presented by application of the forfeiture statutes,
the most compelling of justifications must be required.220 The asser-
tion of an important or significant governmental interest should not
suffice. This is the teaching of Faretta v. California,22' which held
that the sixth amendment right of self-representation outweighs a
number of significant interests that militate against it.222  These
include the interest in judicial economy and efficiency that would be
furthered by requiring counsel rather than permitting an uncounseled
defendant to conduct the defense, as well as the societal interests in
215. Id. (The right in this case "is destroyed almost completely by depriving the defendant
of the means to retain counsel of choice prior to the commencement of trial.").
216. E.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988); Regan v.
Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
217. E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 108 S. Ct. 2495, 2500-01 (1988); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288
(1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); see
Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982); Stone,
Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983).
218. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973)..
219. Id.; see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
220. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring, joined by Oakes & Kearse,
JJ.) ("[T]he governmental justification for such drastic action" should be "overwhelmingly
persuasive.").
221. 422 U.S. 806 (1974).
222. Id. at 835-36.
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accurate adjudication and the appearance of fairness that inevitably
would suffer by the adversarial imbalance when an uncounseled
defendant alone faces a professional prosecutor. Faretta resolved the
conflict between these significant interests and the defendant's sixth
amendment rights in favor of the sixth amendment right to self-repre-
sentation.223 In like manner, the right to counsel of choice, which in
the fee forfeiture context similarly runs the risk of being totally
abridged, calls for the same level of sixth amendment scrutiny and
protection.224
The Supreme Court in Wheat v. United States,2 25 distinguished
the right of self-representation protected in Faretta from the right of
the defendant to choose a particular preferred counsel.226 The Court
noted in a footnote that the "holding" in Faretta did not "encompass"
the right asserted in the case before it.227 The treatment of Faretta in
Wheat, however, does not call into question the propriety of applying
its strict scrutiny approach to fee forfeiture, which constitutes a
wholesale abridgment of the right to choose any counsel. The failure
of the "holding" of Faretta to "encompass" the distinct issue
presented in Wheat, of course, is not surprising. Faretta did not deal
with the right to counsel of choice, but rather dealt with the separate
question of whether a defendant could waive counsel and represent
himself.228 As a result, its holding unquestionably cannot "encom-
pass" the counsel of choice issue presented in Wheat. For the same
reason, the Court's holding in Wheat-that a defendant could not
choose representation by an attorney found to be subject to an actual
conflict of interest 229-- does not "encompass" the discrete question of
whether the government may deprive a defendant of the opportunity
to select any private counsel, let alone one subject to a disqualifying
condition such as conflict of interest.
Although neither the holding of Faretta nor the holding of
Wheat encompasses this separate question, the strict scrutiny
approach of Faretta, rather than the balancing test employed in
Wheat, is appropriate to its resolution. Both in this context and that
of Faretta, denial of the defendant's contention would destroy com-
pletely the right in question-self-representation in Faretta, represen-
223. Id.
224. United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 961 (3d Cir. 1986); Wilson v. Mintzes, 761
F.2d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 1985).
225. Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692 (1988).
226. Id. at 1697 n.3.
227. Id.
228. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1974).
229. Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1700.
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tation by some private counsel of choice here. By contrast, rejection
of the defendant's assertion in Wheat--of a right to be represented by
a particular counsel found to labor under an actual conflict of inter-
est23 0 -still preserves the defendant's opportunity to be represented
by a counsel of choice, albeit not his first choice. Wheat, therefore, is
a case involving necessary and reasonable regulation of the exercise of
the right to counsel of choice, rather than its total abridgment. 231
The question raised by the forfeiture statutes is not whether exer-
cise of the right to counsel of choice can be regulated, such as by
restrictions on the choice of a counsel who is otherwise engaged in
order to prevent undue delay, or on the choice of an attorney disquali-
fied by a factor such as a conflict of interest. Rather, it is whether the
right may be completely destroyed by governmental action that ren-
ders the defendant unable to choose any private counsel. The balance
struck in Wheat, between the need to preserve the appearance of fair-
ness and the ethical standards of the profession, on the one hand, and
the defendant's interest in choosing a particular counsel on the
232other, concededly comes at the expense of the values underlying the
right to counsel of choice. Trust and confidence, essential to the
attorney-client relationship,233 will not be assured as readily if the
defendant's first choice as his attorney is disqualified. The effect on
these values that results from requiring the defendant to appear
through his second choice of attorneys rather than his first, however,
must be regarded as marginal.
There is a vast difference between overriding a defendant's choice
of a particular lawyer and preventing him from employing any lawyer
at all. The latter subverts many important values underlying the sixth
amendment: diminishing the potential for trust and confidence that
are essential to a meaningful attorney-client relationship, 234 depreciat-
ing respect for individual choice and autonomy that serve as a basic
230. Id. at 1695.
231. As Chief Judge Feinberg wrote in his post-Wheat concurring opinion in Monsanto:
[T]he right to counsel of choice cannot be infringed unless a compelling
governmental purpose outweighs it. Many of the cases that allow limitations on
the right to counsel of choice deal only with partial limitations or infringements,
such as preventing a defendant from substituting counsel once the trial has
begun .... or disqualifying a particular lawyer .... In contrast, the right in this
case is destroyed almost completely by depriving the defendant of the means to
retain counsel of choice prior to the commencement of the trial. Therefore, one
would suppose that the governmental justification for such drastic action is
overwhelmingly persuasive.
Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1402 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring, joined by Oakes & Kearse, JJ.).
232. Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1697-98.
233. Supra note 185 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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premise of the right,235 undermining the defendant's sense of partici-
pation in the proceedings,2 36 thereby both lessening its appearance of
fairness237 and his ability to accept its outcome, 238 and ultimately
jeopardizing public confidence in the administration of justice. For all
these reasons, the balancing approach employed in Wheat for measur-
ing the effect of the minor regulation of the exercise of the sixth
amendment right at issue in that case should be rejected here in favor
of the more stringent scrutiny of Faretta.239
Fee forfeiture presents a problem quite distinct from the more
limited intrusions on the sixth amendment involved in prior counsel
of choice cases. Typically, cases that deal with the right to counsel of
choice involve questions of continuances to enable the defendant to
retain or substitute counsel, or to allow his chosen counsel to be avail-
able, or judicial attempts to restrict the defendant's choice of counsel
because chosen counsel labors under a conflict of interest or is not a
member of the bar of the court.2 ' These judicial attempts involve
235. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Wilson v. Mintzes, 761 F.2d 275, 285-86 (6th Cir. 1985);
S. LANDSMAN, supra note 76, at 35.
236. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 821 ("An unwanted counsel 'represents' the defendant only
through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such
representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed by the Constitution, for, in
a very real sense, it is not his defense."); supra note 186 and accompanying text.
237. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2194, 2204 (1988)
("[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.") (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a central value of the sixth amendment is that "legal proceedings appear fair to
all that observe them." Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1692.
238. See S. LANDSMAN, supra note 76, at 33-34 ("Party control [over the litigation] ...
promotes litigant and societal acceptance of decisions rendered by the courts. Adversary
theory holds that if a party is intimately involved in the adjudicatory process and feels that he
has been given a fair opportunity to present his case, he is likely to accept the results whether
favorable or not.")
239. A number of other Supreme Court cases apply the stringent scrutiny approach taken
in Faretta to resolve conflicts between various significant governmental interests and the sixth
amendment in favor of the sixth amendment. In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985);
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964), the Court found that the sixth amendment had been violated when, after adversary
proceedings had begun, the state used an undercover agent or informant to obtain inculpatory
statements from the defendant in the absence of counsel. In Moulton, even though the
government had urged that the gathering of such evidence was necessitated by the police
"interest in the thorough investigation" of both the indicted crimes and new ones, the Court
rejected this plainly significant interest, holding that "the Government's investigative powers
are limited by the sixth amendment rights of the accused." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180. These
cases recognize that a defendant's sixth amendment interests are sufficiently weighty that a
routine and valuable investigative technique may not be employed during that crucial period
when a citizen is guaranteed the assistance of counsel. See also Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate a ban on defendant's consulting with
counsel during an overnight recess in the trial).
240. See, e.g., Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1697-99; Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983); Leis
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regulations on the exercise of the right, not its total abridgment. Yet,
even in these contexts, the courts have protected the right to counsel
of choice from any "unnecessary or arbitrary" interference, holding
that it will yield only when required by the "fair and proper adminis-
tration of justice.
24 1
Unlike these trial-related instances in which the defendant's right
to counsel of choice is balanced against the demands of the efficient
administration of justice, the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions
involve governmental action to strip a defendant of all his assets,
thereby completely precluding his ability to retain counsel. A higher
level of scrutiny therefore should be applied. If Congress were to pass
a statute depriving all RICO or CCE defendants of the right to coun-
sel of choice, that statute would be subjected to strict scrutiny and
found unconstitutional. Can the same result be achieved indirectly
v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1502-04 (10th Cir.
1988) (survey of counsel of choice cases); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on John Doe,
Esq. (Slotnick), 781 F.2d 238, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Roe v.
United States, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986) (survey of counsel of choice cases).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Panzardi Alvarez, 816 F.2d 813, 817 (1st Cir. 1987) (The
right "cannot be denied without a showing that the exercise of that right would interfere with
the fair, orderly and expeditious administration of justice."); United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d
956, 958 (3d Cir. 1986) (The right "may not be hindered unnecessarily."); United States v.
Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1326 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[I]n general, defendants are free to employ
counsel of their own choice and the courts are afforded little leeway in interfering with that
choice." (quoting United States v. Cox, 580 F.2d 317, 321 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1075 (1979))), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 211 (6th
Cir. 1981) (The defendant may not be denied the right "arbitrarily and without adequate
reason."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir.
1979) ("[T]he arbitrary dismissal of a defendant's attorney of choice violates a defendant's
right to counsel."); John Doe, Esq. (Slotnick), 781 F.2d at 250 (quoting United States v. Ostrer,
597 F.2d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1979)); Magee v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 949, 951-52, 506 P.2d
1023, 1025, 106 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649 (1973) (en banc) (per curiam) (The defendent's choice of
counsel may yield only if it "will result in significant prejudice to the defendant himself or in a
disruption of the orderly process of justice unreasonable under the circumstances."). The
Supreme Court indicated in Wheat that trial judges must be afforded wide latitude in
determining, for example, whether a sufficiently serious potential for conflict of interest exists
to outweigh the defendant's choice of a particular counsel. Wheat, 108 S. Ct. at 1699-1700; id.
at 1704 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.). However, the Court's deferential
approach should not be read to alter the standards invoked by the courts cited supra to
measure asserted infringements on the right to counsel of choice, but merely to caution that
deference is owed to trial courts in the application of these standards. See id. at 1699 ("In the
circumstances of this case the District Court relied on instinct and judgment based on
experience in making its decision."). Indeed, the Court's standard for determining if a
defendant's choice of counsel may be outweighed by the need to avoid a conflict of interest is
fully consistent with the typical circuit court standard prohibiting "unnecessary or arbitrary"
interference with the defendant's choice. If an actual conflict of interest or the presence of a
serious potential for such conflict has been demonstrated, prohibiting the defendant's choice is
neither unnecessary nor arbitrary. Id. at 1700 ("The District Court must recognize a
presumption in favor of petitioner's counsel of choice," which can be overcome by a
"demonstration of actual conflict" or by "a showing of a serious potential for conflict.").
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through stripping the defendant of his assets either by pretrial seizure
or by post trial forfeiture of assets transferred to an attorney as a bona
fide fee? Is the governmental interest attempted to be achieved by
such forfeiture sufficient to outweigh the defendant's fundamental
right to counsel of choice? Is the application of a forfeiture statute to
legitimate attorneys' fees an "unnecessary or arbitrary" interference
with the right to counsel of choice? Are other means available to
accomplish the government's interests underlying the forfeiture provi-
sions that would render unnecessary the forfeiture of legitimate attor-
ney's fees?
The government in these cases has sought to avoid this burden of
justification by equating the situation involving forfeiture of property
and other assets in the possession and control of a defendant with the
situation in which a defendant is apprehended in possession of assets
or property that are manifestly the property of some third party. The
argument invokes the specter of the defendant being arrested outside
a bank with the proceeds of a bank robbery.2 42 The bank robbery pro-
ceeds, of course, may not be used to hire an attorney. How then, the
government asks, can other property that constitutes the proceeds of
crime be used for that purpose, particularly in view of the "relation-
back" provisions of the statute that vest title to the property in the
government as of the time of the crime?
This is a false analogy, however. The cash proceeds of a bank
robbery belong to the bank or to its depositors; this is true even in the
absence of a forfeiture statute. These wrongfully deprived owners
have a common law right to the return of their property, and govern-
ment has a compelling interest in obtaining its return that plainly out-
weighs the robber's claim to use it for any purpose, even to hire an
attorney.243 Moreover, this interest simply cannot be accomplished in
242. See Supplemental Brief for the United States on Rehearing En Banc at 28-29, United
States v. Jones, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5556 & 87-5575) [hereinafter Jones En
Banc Government Brief]; Unit No. 7 Government Brief, supra note 173, at 23-24; In Banc
Brief for the United States at 45-46, United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.) (No.
436, Docket 87-1397) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988); Monsanto
Panel Government Brief, supra note 36, at 50-51; see also Brickey, Attorneys'Fees Forfeitures:
On Defining "What" and "When" and Distinguishing "Ought"from "Is," 36 EMORY L.J. 761,
770-72 (1987). Several courts have been persuaded by the bank robbery proceeds hypothetical.
E.g., United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 725 (7th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed
(U.S. Feb. 17, 1989); United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 653, 645-46
(4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988); United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d
74, 81 (1987), replaced on reh'g en banc, 852 F.2d 1400 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
243. In United States v. Nichols, Judge Logan wrote in dissent:
The government's interest in the property allegedly subject to criminal forfeiture
is of a different nature than the interest of a bank seeking to recover stolen
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any way other than the return of the property. In the forfeiture situa-
tion, however, the government's interest in stripping the accused of
his property is not frustrated by permitting a portion of the property
to be transferred to defense counsel.
currency . . . . The latter claims are based upon traditional common law
property ownership concepts embraced in the Constitution. . . . The
government's interest in forfeited property, on the other hand, does not derive
from a common law ownership right to the property, for the government neither
owned the property before the crime nor gave value for the property as a creditor
or purchaser does.
841 F.2d 1485, 1510 (10th Cir. 1988) (Logan, J., dissenting). A similar argument distinguishes
the jeopardy tax assessment authorized by 26 U.S.C. § 6861 (1982). See Caplin & Drysdale,
837 F.2d at 646; Unit No. 7 Government Brief, supra note 173, at 16-17; Monsanto Panel
Government Brief, supra note 36, at 41-42; Brickey, supra note 6, at 525-29; see also United
States v. Brodson, 241 F.2d 107 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (upholding jeopardy tax assessment
against right to counsel claim based on deprivation of funds needed to hire expert accountant),
cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957). The jeopardy assessment is a sequestration of funds that the
Secretary of the Treasury may impose upon an individual taxpayer to secure in advance pay-
ment of taxes that will be due from the taxpayer, if the Secretary finds that the taxpayer
intends to leave the United States. See 26 U.S.C. § 6861. As in the case of the robbery of
property belonging to a third party, the jeopardy assessment situation involves a claim to prop-
erty, in this case by the government, that has a source independent of the statute authorizing
the assessment and arising prior to the acts justifying the assessment or attachment. See Nich-
ols, 841 F.2d at 1510 (Logan, J., dissenting) (equating government's interest in jeopardy tax
assessment with the common law property interest of a creditor claiming a lien against a
debtor's property); United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 926 (1987) ("The critical distinc-
tion, if one be needed, is that the jeopardy assessment has as its purpose the preservation of
property already owed and wrongfully withheld from the government."), replaced on reh'g en
banc sub nom United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988). The government interest in pursuing its claim and in preserv-
ing its ability ultimately to have it satisfied justifies the jeopardy assessment. In the forfeiture
situation, by contrast, the government's claim is based on the forfeiture statute itself, rather
than on an independent source, and does not precede the defendant's possession of the prop-
erty. In addition, the tax laws are designed to raise revenues, something the government can-
not function without. The criminal forfeiture laws, however, are not designed for this purpose.
See Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1407 n. 1 (Winters, J., concurring, joined by Meskill & Newman,
JJ.) (noting government's concession on this point at oral argument). As a result, the govern-
ment's purpose, to strip racketeering and drug trafficking offenders and organizations of their
economic power, can fully be achieved even if part of the forfeiture goes to a defense lawyer
rather than to the government itself. See id. (distinguishing cases involving "the seizure of
property where revenue raising purposes are implicated"); infra notes 358-60 and accompany-
ing text.
A similar argument also would justify forfeiture of contraband that a defendant sought to
use to purchase the services of an attorney, see Jones En Banc Government Brief, supra note
242, at 29, but not of money or other property that the government may believe to be the
proceeds of the sale of contraband. Contraband, such as unlicensed narcotics, unregistered
firearms, counterfeit currency and counterfeiting devices, and smuggled cigarettes, is property
that itself is manifestly unlawful to possess. See 49 U.S.C. § 781 (1982); BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 291 (5th ed. 1979) ("In general, any property which is unlawful to produce or pos-
sess."). Plainly the government's interest in recovering such property is so compelling that it
outweighs a claim by the possessor of the property to use it to hire an attorney. This interest in
removing such property from circulation does not extend as well, however, to the alleged
proceeds of the sale of such contraband.
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In addition, let us assume that the property in question consists
of a parcel of improved real estate owned by the accused for a sub-
stantial period of time, that he has title, and that he is in possession.
Assume further that no third party, such as a bank or a creditor,
asserts a manifest or undisputed claim of ownership. Finally, assume
that the only challenge to the accused's ownership of the property is
brought by the government, and that its claim of entitlement is based
not on a common law ownership right to the property, but on a legal
fiction-forfeiture- that the law disfavors and that cannot divest the
accused of ownership until and unless he is convicted. In these cir-
cumstances, the government's interest in fee forfeiture cannot be
equated with the bank's interest in the bank robbery proceeds.
These distinctions are also reflected in principles of professional
ethics. In the bank hypothetical, an attorney is ethically obligated to
return the property, manifestly that of a third party, to its owner. 2 "
In the case of property that does not appear to belong to another, that
does not constitute the direct fruits or instrumentalities of a crime,
and that bears all the indicia of common law title in the defendant,
however, an attorney is not ethically prohibited from accepting it in
payment of his fee.245
The government seeks to equate these two disparate situations by
invoking the "relation-back" provisions of the forfeiture statutes,
246
under which forfeiture relates back to the time of the act that gives
rise to the forfeiture, and title to the property vests in the United
States upon commission of that act.247 But unlike the loot from the
hypothetical bank robbery, which belongs to the bank or its deposi-
tors, the property forfeited under the relation-back rule "belongs" to
the government only under a legal fiction embodied in the statute.
Use of this legal fiction to deprive the defendant of his common law
property rights and of his sixth amendment right to counsel of choice
must be justified by some compelling governmental interest. Legal
fictions, 248 like metaphors, 249 are so widely used and often have so
244. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(5), DR 7-
102(A)(3), (7) (1980); Cloud, supra note 44, at 56; Morgan, An Introduction to the Debate Over
Fee Forfeitures, 36 EMORY L.J. 755, 756 (1987); see also In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D.
Va.), aff'd per curiam, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967).
245. See Cloud, supra note 44, at 56; Morgan, supra note 244, at 756-57.
246. 18 U.S.C § 1963(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (Supp. IV 1986); 21
U.S.C. § 881(h) (Supp. IV 1986).
247. See Jones En Banc Government Brief, supra note 242, at 15-16; Nichols, 841 F.2d at
1498-1501; Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 640; Monsanto Panel Government Brief, supra note
36, at 50.
248. For discussion of the phenomenon of legal fictions, see generally L. FULLER, LEGAL
FIcTIONS (1967); Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA. L. REV. 871 (1986).
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powerful an effect on cognition that they tend to color and control our
subsequent conceptions.25 A fiction, however, should not be
employed to substitute for analysis or to obfuscate reality. When its
use is invoked to rationalize a legal result, it "must seek its justifica-
tion in considerations of social and economic policy." ''
249. Metaphor has been the subject of a developing body of scholarship on human
cognition which, drawing on extensive empirical work in experimental psychology, linguistics,
and anthropology, demonstrates that metaphor is a fundamental component of human
reasoning. See generally M. JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF
MEANING, IMAGINATION, AND REASON (1987); G. LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND
DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987); G. LAKOFF &
M. JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980); Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1382-87 (1988).
250. In my view, legal fiction plays a similar role in legal reasoning to that played by
metaphor in human cognition. Like the metaphor, legal fiction often is grounded in physical
experience or objects and is a cognitive device by which we construct and understand legal
concepts by a form of projection or extension. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 24 (1913). Thus, legal fiction
structures our understanding of the legal concept in a way that sometimes makes it difficult to
evaluate the legal concept on its own terms, much as the metaphor often has a great potential
to mislead. See Berggren, The Use and Abuse of Metaphor, I, 16 Rev. Metaphysics: Phil. Q.
236, 244-45 (1962-63); Winter, supra note 249, at 1386-87. The "relation-back" doctrine, as
used in the fee forfeiture context, provides a good illustration of the power of a legal fiction, the
nature of its metaphoric dimension, and its potential to mislead.
251. L. FULLER, supra note 248, at 71; see id. at 10, 70-71. The Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, in rejecting the sixth amendment attack on the
forfeiture statutes, were blinded by the power of the relation-back fiction, employing it as a
substitute for the balancing of interests that the Constitution demands. United States v.
Bissell, No. 87-8246, slip. op. at 1594-95 (11th Cir. March 2, 1989); United States v. Nichols,
841 F.2d 1485, 1498-1501 (10th Cir. 1988); Caplin & Drysdale, 837 F.2d at 640. Judge Phillips
of the Fourth Circuit, dissenting on behalf of himself and three of his brethren, saw the issue
more clearly:
[T]he majority points out that a defendant does not have the resources to exercise
the right [to counsel of choice], hence has no right, when the government has
already, by the relation-back feature of these forfeiture provisions, asserted a
paramount interest in the resources. With all respect, this simply begs the
constitutional question rather than answering it. Indeed, the ultimate
constitutional issue might well be framed precisely as whether Congress may use
this wholly fictive device of property law to cut off this fundamental right of the
accused in a criminal case. If the right must yield here to countervailing
governmental interests, the relation-back device undoubtedly could be used to
implement the governmental interests, but surely it cannot serve as a substitute
for them. Under developed principles defining the qualified right to counsel of
choice, the dispositive issue is whether there are countervailing governmental
interests that do justify the drastic expedient of freezing and ultimately forfeiting
the assets of RICO and CCE defendants to the point that they cannot retain
private counsel for their defense.
Id. at 651-52 (Phillips, J., dissenting, joined by Winter, C.J., Sprouse & Ervin, JJ.). In another
context, the Tax Court recently rejected the relation-back fiction when a taxpayer contended
that assets forfeited to the government under RICO should not be included in his gross income
for tax purposes because title vested in the government at the time of the crime. Gambina v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. [1988 Transfer Binder] Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH) Dec. 45,140 (Oct. 20,
1988).
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B. First Amendment Protection of the Right to Counsel of Choice
The heightened burden of strict scrutiny is required by sixth
amendment principles in order for the government to justify the total
abridgement of the right to counsel of choice presented by fee forfei-
ture. Strict scrutiny is also demanded by first amendment principles,
which in the context of the right to use counsel to assert legal rights,
overlap with those of the sixth amendment. The use of counsel by a
criminal defendant to assert rights on his behalf is protected by the
first amendment right "to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist...
in the assertion of ... legal rights." '252 Although the Supreme Court
cases that recognize this right have arisen in the context of organiza-
tions, such as labor unions or political action groups, there is no rea-
son in principle to limit the right to such situations.
Whenever an individual defendant associates with counsel to
communicate ideas in the public forum of the courtroom, first amend-
ment values are implicated. The applicability of the first amendment
freedom of association, the right primarily vindicated by these
cases,253 turns on the purpose of the association rather than its size.
Whenever an individual associates with "others" for "the purpose of
engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exer-
cise of religion," the protection of the first amendment is afforded.254
It should make no difference whether those "others" are a law firm or
an individual attorney, as long as the purpose of the association comes
within the purview of the first amendment.255
252. United Mine Workers Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967);
accord California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd., 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); United
Transp. Union v. Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Virginia Bar Ass'n, 377 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
429-30 (1963); In re Abrams, 62 N.Y.2d 183, 465 N.E.2d 1, 476 N.Y.S.2d 494 (1984) (The first
amendment protects the criminal defendant's right to counsel of choice.); see also In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978).
253. Although these cases invalidated restrictions found to violate the "associational rights"
of the group involved, e.g., United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 225; see Walters v. National
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 334-35 (1985) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he First
Amendment interest at stake [in these cases] was primarily the right to associate collectively
for the common good."); L. TRIBE, supra note 186, § 16-45, at 1640 (treating these cases as
"invalidating, as contrary to the first amendment freedom of association, various state
prohibitions against concerted legal action"), they also separately mention freedom of speech
and petition. E.g., United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 221; Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 377
U.S. at 5.
254. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 622 (1984).
255. Support for the proposition that the first amendment freedom of association applies to
an association composed of as few as two people can be found in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). In recognizing a constitutional right of privacy protecting the marital
relationship, Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court grounded the new right in "penumbras,
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Certain speech within the courtroom-that of spectators, for
example, or of demonstrators within hearing distance 2" 6-may be lim-
ited or even prohibited. But speech by the parties and their witnesses,
provided it is within the bounds of the rules of evidence and of deco-
rum,2 57 as well as the arguments of counsel, are the essence of the
proceedings and, at most, can be regulated as to time, place, and man-
ner.25  Indeed, so important is such speech that the Constitution itself
protects the criminal defendant's ability to compel testimony from
witnesses by compulsory process.2 9 Not only is the advocacy of the
attorney on behalf of his client protected speech within the meaning
of the first amendment, but also it is an exercise of the right to petition
formed by emanations" from various Bill of Rights protections, including "the right of
association contained in penumbras of the First Amendment ...." Id. at 482-83. Indeed,
political theorists as diverse as Aristotle and Freud have shown that the man-woman
relationship and then the family served as the "first form of association," which ultimately
evolved into the polis or state. See THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 3-4 (E. Barker trans. 1962)
("first form of association"); S. FREUD, Civilization and Its Discontents, in 21 STANDARD
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 59 (1962).
Although freedom of association claims may not arise often in the context of associations
composed of only two individuals, there can be no doubt that the first amendment freedom of
association would extend to a husband and wife who come together for the purpose of
exercising their religion or to engage in other intimate communication, cf. G. ORWELL, 1984
(1949) (fictional account of a negative utopia that does not recognize freedom of intimate
association), or to an individual and his priest or rabbi who associate for these purposes. An
individual and his attorney who associate for the purpose of engaging in first amendment
protected expression in the courtroom or to petition government also should receive the same
additional protection deriving from their association that is afforded in the marital and
religious relationships. Indeed, in all three of these contexts, the privacy of the
communications of these groups of two are protected by common law and modern statutory
evidentiary privileges precisely to protect the existence and vitality of these associations.
Although I argue that the right of an individual, defendant to hire an individual lawyer to
advocate his rights in a criminal case should be within the protection of these freedom of
association cases, it is perhaps ironic that the RICO and CCE cases in which government
forfeiture practices have interfered with exercise of the right to counsel of choice almost always
have been multi-defendant cases in which the defendants, both individually and collectively,
have resisted charges that they conspired together or engaged in an "enterprise" or "pattern of
racketeering activity" with one another. See supra notes 2-3. Although each defendant
typically will have separate counsel, counsel inevitably will need to coordinate their defense
efforts in resisting the prosecutorial attack. As a result, the defendants and their attorneys can
properly be seen as "associat[ing] collectively for the common good" during trial. Walters, 105
S. Ct. at 3196. To the extent that they can be regarded as an association, the right of each
defendant to retain counsel of his choosing serves not only individual but also associational
interests.
256. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (upholding narrowly drawn court
picketing statute); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
257. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN
THE COURT (1973); Hazard, Securing Courtroom Decorum, 80 YALE L.J. 433 (1971).
258. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); cases cited supra note 217.
259. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right.., to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor"); see Webb v. Texas,
409 U.S. 95 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
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the government for the redress of grievances, also protected by the
first amendment. 260 The right of a defendant to use his own funds to
choose the attorney with whom he wishes to associate for the purpose
of engaging in these first amendment protected activities therefore
should be deemed to be within the purview of the first amendment
freedom of association and the cases that apply it in order to protect
the right to hire counsel to assert rights.
This conclusion is also supported by the policies that underly the
first amendment freedom of expression. Among the places in which
first amendment speech occurs, the American courtroom is an histori-
cally important one. What is said there influences government action,
not only in the case before the court, but also frequently in other cases
for which it will become a legal or political precedent. Moreover, the
courtroom has always served as an important forum for the discus-
sion and dramatization of ideas and, consequently, as an important
forum for political expression and action.26' What is said in court
may make an enormous contribution to public attitudes and political
discourse, thereby furthering the core political values of the first
amendment freedom of speech.26 2 This is particularly true in the case
260. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (right "to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances"); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1982) ("[T]he
right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the
Government for redress of grievances."); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unltd.,
404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) ("The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the
right to petition."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430-31 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(The first amendment protects not only the right to petition the legislature for the redress of
grievances, but also "the right to join together for purposes of obtaining judicial redress.").
261. See 0. KIRCHHEIMER, POLITICAL JUSTICE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR
POLITICAL ENDS 47 (1961) ("Throughout the modern era, whatever the dominant legal
system, both governments and private groups have tried to enlist the support of the courts for
upholding or shifting the balance of political power."); Greenberg, Litigation for Social
Change: Methods, Limits and Role in Democracy, 29 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 320, 320 (1974)
("In recent decades courts have caused or helped to generate much of the important social
change in America."); Rothman, The Courts and Social Reform: A Postprogressive Outlook, 6
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 113, 113 (1982) ("[Ihe judiciary has become a forum in which
attorneys have pressed for social change.").
262. The first amendment "is indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy ..... " First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978); see Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 10 (Vintage Books ed. 1967). See A. MEIKLEJOHN, Free Speech and Its
Relation to Self Government, in POLITICAL FREEDOM 3-93 (Galaxy ed. 1965); F. SCHAUER,
FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 35-46 (1982); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26-28 (197 1); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-20 (1965). The
Supreme Court has described "the central meaning of the First Amendment" as the "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open .... New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see
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of criminal trials, which are so widely covered by the press26 and
electronic media,26 thereby providing a wide audience for speech.
Indeed, the Supreme Court bases its reading of the first amendment as
protecting a right of access by the press to criminal trials2 65 on "the
common understanding that 'a major purpose of that Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs' . . . to
ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and
contribute to our republican system of self-government. 2 66 This is a
recognition not only that what goes on in the criminal trial itself con-
stitutes "governmental affairs," but that the public needs to know
what is said there in order that the "'discussion of governmental
affairs' be an informed one."
267
These first amendment policies are most clearly implicated in
"political" trials, which have always been part of our history.2 68
When, in 1735, Andrew Hamilton advocated for his client John Peter
Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 204-10. Fostering such public debate serves a "central
purpose" of the amendment, "to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Abood
v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977). The "primary aim" of the first amendment
is "the full protection of speech upon issues of public concern .... " Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 154 (1983), which "occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment
values.'" Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985)
(quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 145; NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913
(1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). Such speech is "the essence of self-
government." Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 145; Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)).
263. See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 596; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555 (1980); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
264. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975).
265. See cases cited supra note 263.
266. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604.
267. Id. at 605.
268. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 352 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[P]olitical
trials ... frequently recur in our history .... "); 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 261, at 47
("Political trials are inescapable."); J. SINK, POLITICAL CRIMINAL TRIALS: How TO DEFEND
THEM vii (1974) ("[P]olitical trials are an [sic] historical constant of Anglo-American law.");
Belknap, Introduction, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 3 (M. Belknap ed. 1981)
("Throughout United States history, from pre-Revolutionary time to the post-Vietnam era,
war, economic conflict, racial and ethnic tensions, fundamental disagreements about the
organization of government, and occasionally even simple partisan competition for office have
spawned political trials."). See generally AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS (M. Belknap ed.
1981) (collection of essays on the role of political trials in American history); N. DORSEN & L.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 257, at 72-89 (analyzing disruptive and disorderly political trials); 0.
KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 261 (analyzing the difference between a typical criminal trial and a
political trial); POLITICAL TRIALS (T. Becker ed. 1971) (survey of notable political trials);
Friedman, Political Power and Legal Legitimacy: A Short History of Political Trials, 30
ANnOCH REV. 157 (1970) (discussing the trials of uncommon criminals, principally Susan B.
Anthony); Hakman, Political Trials in the Legal Order: A Political Scientist's Perspective, 21 J.
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Zenger, in a colonial New York courtroom, he advanced ideas that
reverberated throughout the colonies and planted the seeds of revolu-
tion and of the new order.2 69 When abolitionist John Brown was
prosecuted for his 1859 raid on the Harpers Ferry arsenal, intended to
incite a slave revolt, his moving speech to the court converted many
Northerners to the abolitionist cause.27° When Judge Henry R. Sel-
den argued that the recently adopted fourteenth amendment pro-
tected the right of women to vote in his defense of Susan B. Anthony
during her 1873 prosecution for voting in a federal election when it
was illegal for women to vote, his advocacy "arrested the attention of
legal minds as no popular discussion had done."' 27' When Clarence
Darrow used the pulpit of the courtroom to dramatize the plight of
labor in its battle to unionize the railroads in his representation of
Eugene V. Debs, tried for criminal conspiracy in federal court in
1895,272 to attack the Tennessee law forbidding the teaching of evolu-
tion on behalf of biology teacher John Thomas Scopes in the 1925
Dayton, Tennessee "monkey trial,"273 and to plead for an end to capi-
tal punishment in his defense of Leopold and Loeb in their prosecu-
PUB. L. 73 (1972) (Trials can be explained in terms of the political, social and economic
interests involved.).
269. See Finkelman, supra note 105, at 80-82; supra notes 105-59 and accompanying text.
270. 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 261, at 232-33; S. OATES, PURGE THIS LAND WITH
BLOOD: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN BROWN 308-09 (1970); Belknap, supra note 268, at 8, 13;
Finkelman, supra note 105, at 79-80.
271. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 691 (S. Anthony, E. Stanton & M. Gage eds. 1882
& photo reprint 1985). The trial of Susan B. Anthony "was in many ways advantageous to the
cause of freedom. Her trial served to awaken thought, promote discussion, and compel
investigation of the principles of government." Id. A narrative of the trial with commentary
by Ms. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Matilda Joslyn Gage is reported in id. at 647-91.
Anthony, with the aid of several Rochester, New York election officials, had registered and
voted in open defiance of the law in order to set up a test case of the issue and "to use her trial
as a political forum." Belknap, supra note 268, at 7, 101. The constitutional challenge to the
denial of the vote that Anthony sought to raise in her trial was rejected by the Supreme Court
of the United States in another case. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). The
woman's suffrage movement was not to succeed in obtaining constitutional recognition for the
right of women to vote until 1920, when the nineteenth amendment was adopted. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX.
272. United States v. Debs, 63 F. 436 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894); see Novak, The Pullman Strike
Case: Debs, Darrow, and the Labor Injunction, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 129 (M.
Belknap ed. 1981). The criminal trial was aborted when a juror fell ill; Debs was not
reprosecuted. Id. at 131. Darrow's strategy of putting George Pullman and the railroad
association on trial had succeeded, but the success was short-lived. Convinced their efforts
would not succeed before a jury, the railroads shifted to a new tool, the labor injunction-
equitable relief to be granted by the court, thereby avoiding jury trial. See id. at 147-48.
273. See Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927) (reversing conviction on state
law grounds); A. HAYS, LET FREEDOM RING 26 (1925 & repr. ed. 1972); Belknap, supra note
268, at 9. For a novelistic account of the case, later made into a popular film, see J.
LAWRENCE & R. LEE, INHERIT THE WIND (1955). Such limits on what can be taught in the
public schools were later held unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause. Edwards v.
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tion for the 1924 "thrill killing" of little Bobby Franks, 27 4 the nation
watched closely, and a public dialogue about these controversial
issues was sparked. During the civil rights struggle in the 1960's,
when civil rights activists, who found the ordinary political process
closed to them, resorted to such protest techniques as "sit-in" demon-
strations that courted criminal prosecution in order to dramatize their
cause and press their constitutional claims in the courts, their efforts
helped to produce passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.275 The
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Daniel v. Waters,
515 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1975).
274. See J. KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 12-15 (1973); I. STONE, CLARENCE DARROW FOR
THE DEFENSE 414-17 (1941). The two defendants received life imprisonment, rather than the
death penalty. J. KAPLAN, supra, at 12 n.t. Although Loeb died in prison several years later,
Leopold was paroled after thirty-one years. Id. He became a social worker and is cited
frequently as an example of the possibility of redemption for capital defendants, and proof of
the merits of Darrow's argument. Id. For a novelistic account of the trial, later made into a
popular film, see M. LEVIN, COMPULSION (1956).
275. An important part of the civil rights struggle was carried out in criminal trials of civil
rights demonstrators challenging discriminatory laws and practices in the Southern states.
Denied access to the ordinary political process in these states and with the prospects of
Congressional remedies stalled by the filibuster, activists often disobeyed the law and
deliberately provoked prosecution in order to call attention to the struggle for racial equality
and try to obtain redress in the Supreme Court. One civil rights lawyer commented:
The Negro demonstrator is testing the validity of laws he feels in good faith are
unconstitutional or are being unconstitutionally applied. By refusing to obey
these laws he is introducing a bill for their repeal or for a fair application of these
laws in the only way he can: by deliberately letting himself be prosecuted and
appealing any conviction to the Supreme Court where they can be judicially
repealed. Since the ordinary political processes are closed to him, he is pursuing
an alternate peaceful way of bringing about an orderly change in his society's
laws.
Friedman, Introduction, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 5-6 (L. Friedman Meridian Books ed. 1967);
see also J. GREENBERG, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 121 (1977) ("The legal
effort of the 1960's to extend the Fourteenth Amendment protections to public accommoda-
tions was inextricably interwoven with the. . . 'sit-in' demonstrations .... "); Cover, Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 47 (1983). See generally SOUTHERN JUSTICE,
supra (accounts and commentary by civil rights lawyers, many of whom came from the North
and other parts of the country to represent defendants in such cases when members of the local
bar in the Southern states would not do so). The technique of provoking a criminal prosecu-
tions as a test case to attack racial discrimination did not, of course, originate in the 1960's.
For an early, and constitutionally disasterous, example, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896) (legitimating racial segregation through the separate but equal doctrine), which was a
test case on the part of a civil rights organization in New Orleans brought to attack the consti-
tutionality of the Jim Crow laws then spreading throughout the South. See Greenberg, supra
note 261, at 323-26. During the early 1960's a common tactic for challenging the widespread
practice of refusing service to blacks in restaurants, lunch counters, hotels, and similar service
establishments was the "sit-in" demonstration. E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
(demonstration outside of a courthouse); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) ("sit-in"
demonstration in an amusement park that refused to admit blacks); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S.
226 (1964) ("sit-in" demonstration in a restaurant); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964) ("sit-in" demonstration at a drug store lunch counter that refused to serve blacks);
Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) ("sit-in" demonstration at a lunch-counter);
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messages conveyed in the courtroom in the late 1960's by the defend-
ants and their attorneys in a series of celebrated criminal trials that
arose out of the defendants' militant activities against the war in Viet-
nam, were also provacative in the court of public opinion. The trials
of Daniel Ellsberg, 276 the Chicago Conspiracy, 27 7 the Fort Hood
Three,278 Dr. Benjamin Spock and the other members of the Boston
Five,2 79 the Oakland Seven,28 ° the Harrisburg Seven,281 the Gaines-
ville Eight,28 2 and the Catonsville Nine28 3 dramatized the antiwar
movement, stimulating a broad public dialogue concerning the war
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) ("sit-in" demonstration on State House
grounds); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961) ("sit-in" demonstration by black protes-
ters in "whites only" section of a lunch counter); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960)
(black bus passenger's refusal to leave the section of a bus terminal restaurant reserved for
whites only); see J. GREENBERG, supra, at 121; P. Low, J. JEFFRIES, & R. BONNIE, supra note
56, at 99; Pollitt, Dime Stores Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of First Sixty Days,
1960 DUKE L.J. 315, 319. Groups of blacks would seek to obtain service in "whites-only"
facilities, refusing to leave when denied service. In their ensuing prosecutions for criminal
trespass, breach of the peace, or disorderly conduct, they would press the claim of a constitu-
tional right to equal treatment at such facilities, hoping ultimately to succeed in the Supreme
Court. Id. at 322 (The Supreme Court faced thirty-three such cases in the years 1960-1963.).
The Court had avoided deciding the constitutional question for years by reversing such convic-
tions on a variety of alternative grounds, such as vagueness, overbreadth, and statutory con-
struction. Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and Civil Dissonance, 77 YALE L.J.
1520, 1528-29 (1968); e.g., Bouie, 378 U.S. at 355 (Retroactive application of the new construc-
tion of the statute at issue deprived petitioners of their right of fair warning.); Boynton, 364
U.S. at 462-64 (The black petitioner had a federal right to remain in the white portion of the
restaurant under the Interstate Commerce Act.). When, however, it appeared that the Court
was about to confront the issue in a series of cases that arose in its 1963 Term, the political
process finally responded and Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
(1982), extending the right to non-discriminatory treatment in public accomodations. P. Low,
J. JEFFRIES & R. BONNIE, supra note 56, at 99-100. The "sit-in" demostrations and the trials
they produced were "the focus and cutting edge of the black civil rights movement" in the
early 1960's and succeeded in "arous[ing] support for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
.... .J. GREENBERG, supra, at 121.
276. United States v. Russo, No. 9373-WMB-CD (C.D. Cal. 1973); Belknap, supra note
268, at 11; Ely, The Chicago Conspiracy Case, in AMERICAN POLITICAL TRIALS 265 (M.
Belknap ed. 1981). See generally P. SCHRAG, TEST OF LOYALTY (1974).
277. United States v. Dellinger, 357 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd, 472 F.2d 340 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); see THE CONSPIRACY TRIAL (J. Clavir & J.
Spitzer eds. 1970); N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 257, at 56-64; J. EPSTEIN, THE
GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL (1970); Ely, supra note 276, at 287.
278. See Belknap, supra note 268, at 11; Ely, supra note 276, at 265.
279. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969); J. MITFORD, THE TRIAL OF
DR. SPOCK (1969); Ely, supra note 276, at 266.
280. See Belknap, supra note 268, at 11; Ely, supra note 276, at 265.
281. See Belknap, supra note 268, at 11; Ely, supra note 276, at 265; Hakman, supra note
268, at 73.
282. See Belknap, supra note 268, at 11; Ely, supra note 276, at 266.
283. See United States v. Berrigan, 437 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v. Moylan,
417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970); United States v. Berrigan, 283
F. Supp. 336 (D. Md. 1968); D. BERRIGAN, THE TRIAL OF THE CATONSVILLE NINE (1970).
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and playing a significant role in ending it. Finally, can there be any
doubt that the trial of Col. Oliver North for his role in the Iran-Con-
tra affair, just beginning at this writing, will affect public discourse
about that political controversy, particularly with the prospect that
former President Reagan may be called to testify now that the district
court has declined to quash a subpoena served upon him by the
defense?
284
First amendment protection, however, should extend to the
advocacy of counsel and the defendant's choice of counsel, not only in
"political" cases. In an important sense, all criminal trials are polit-
ical. As noted by Otto Kirchheimer, one of the foremost scholars of
the political trial, "political issues may well pervade trials involving
common crimes." '285 What Kirchheimer called "political coloring"
could "be imparted to such garden variety criminal trials by the
motives of the prosecution, or by the political background, affiliation,
or standing of the defendant. '2 6 Or, we might add, by the issues the
case may happen to produce, sometimes quite unpredictably. Clar-
ence Darrow's impassioned plea against the death penalty in the Leo-
pold and Loeb case287 -not a political trial by any ordinary
measure-serves as an illustration. The criminal trial therefore is
inherently an important "marketplace of ideas," 288 deserving of first
amendment protection. Moreover, as Zenger's case and many of our
historic "political" trials demonstrate, the criminal trial serves the
"checking value" of the first amendment, limiting the abuse of power
by public officials.289
284. United States v. North, No. CR. 88-0080-02 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 16, 1988); see N.Y.
Times, Jan. 31, 1989, at A20, cols. 3-6.
285. 0. KIRCHHEIMER, supra note 261, at 52.
286. Id.
287. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
288. The marketplace of ideas metaphor, originating in Justice Holmes's dissenting opinion
in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919), has become a dominant motif in first
amendment jurisprudence. E.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1,
8 (1986) (plurality opinion); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642
(1985); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982) (plurality opinion); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 295 (1981); see Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 137-38, 298
(1946); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 82-89
(1948); Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas." A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
289. See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521 (free speech as a restraint on the abuse of power by government); see
Goodpaster, supra note 62, at 134-35, 137. The United States Supreme Court has been most
explicit in its recognition of the "checking value" of the criminal trial in its discussion of the
role of news reporting of the trial as "subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes
to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560
(1976) (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966)).
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In addition, criminal trials are an important part of the govern-
mental process "and by their very nature are of interest to those con-
cerned with the administration of government. ' 290  Some political
scientists, defining "politics" as the authoritative allocation of values
in a society or system, contend that all trials can be considered polit-
ical. 291 Because courts are the "governmental arenas or sub-systems
in which a distribution of power is achieved," Professor Nathan
Hakman suggests that all courtroom participants are acting politically
"when their legal activities are seen as involving other members of
society. ' 292 Thus, Hakman contends, court cases can be seen as polit-
ical, whether the litigants are seeking to affect merely their own inter-
ests or are using the courts "as instruments for changing legal
symbols (i.e., applicable rules of law)" or as "means of organizing
and/or suppressing movements for social or economic control.
293
Even considering only this last function-the most clearly "political"
of those listed-all criminal trials would qualify as political because
their basic purpose is to effect social control through the deterrent,
retributivist, educational, and rehabilitative aims of criminal law and
punishment.2 94 Frequently occurring in the glare of extensive media
coverage, criminal trials are our public morality plays. This is partic-
ularly true for the high visibility RICO and CCE cases for which
criminal forfeiture is sought. Conceived of more broadly, the criminal
trial is political in the sense that it constitutes an important govern-
mental institution where public business is conducted. As such, the
information generated there is vital to first amendment values because
it is "of critical importance to our type of government in which the
citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public
business."2 95
Moreover, the advocacy of defense lawyers in the courtroom is
addressed not only to judges-public officials exercising governmental
power-but also to juries, which play a unique role in our democratic
290. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 464, 495 (1975).
291. Hakman, supra note 268, at 81 (citing D. EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (1953)).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See generally G. EZORSKY, PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (1972)
(philosophical analysis of theories of punishment); J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 296-324 (1960) (justification for punishment); H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1968) (discussion of the impact of
punishment and retribution on social responsibility); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-61 (1968) (discussing theories of punishment); Greenawalt,
Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343 (1983) (moral principles of punishment).
295. Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 495; see also supra notes 266 & 267 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 43:765
FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
traditions. The Supreme Court has long recognized that criminal
juries are "instruments of public justice," that accordingly must be
"truly representative of the community." '2 9 6 Community participa-
tion in the jury system comports with "our basic concepts of a demo-
cratic society and a representative government" 297 and allows the jury
to serve its essential purpose of interposing the "common sense judg-
ment of the community as a hedge against the over-zealous or mis-
taken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps
over-conditioned or biased response of a judge." 298 To serve this cru-
cial "checking function, ' 299 the jury must not be shut off from the
advocacy of the defendant's counsel of choice. In short, as deToc-
queville recognized more than one hundred fifty years ago, the jury
plays a significant role in the American system of government. 300
Advocacy addressed to the criminal jury is political in every meaning-
ful sense and should be within the purview of the first amendment.
In addition, now that the death penalty is a potential punishment
for many federal drug offenses for which RICO and CCE forfeiture is
sought,30 1 all such cases involving a killing that trigger a possible
death sentence can be considered political in still another sense. In
the death penalty context, the Supreme Court frequently emphasizes
the special role of the jury in capital sentencing as an indication of
community values.3 °2 Under the Court's eighth amendment jurispru-
296. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). Smith was an equal protection case
involving racial discrimination in state jury selection, but the Court has since subsumed the
jury representativeness principle within the sixth amendment fair "cross section of the
community" requirement. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia, 435
U.S. 223, 230, 239 (1978); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975); see also Winick,
Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study and a
Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 62-77 (1982) [hereinafter, Winick, Prosecutorial
Peremptory Challenge]; Winick, Witherspoon in Florida: Reflections on the Challenge for
Cause of Jurors in Capital Cases in a State in which the Judge Makes the Sentencing Decision,
37 U. MIAMI L. REV. 825, 856-62 (1983) [hereinafter, Winick, Witherspoon in Florida].
297. Smith, 311 U.S. at 130; see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 ("our democratic heritage").
298. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530; see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
299. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
300. A. DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 127-28 (New American Library ed.
1956); see also Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 AM B. FOUND. RES. J. 605, 606
(The jury system allows "citizens to express their ideas about public policy and actually put
them into practice.").
301. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982), as amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 7001.1, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4387 (signed into law Nov. 18,
1988) (adding death penalty for a CCE defendant who "intentionally kills or counsels,
commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual" and for any
defendant who in the course of a violation of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 802-966 (West 1981 & Supp. 1988), intentionally kills any federal, state, or local law
enforcement officer).
302. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2691 (1988) (plurality opinion).
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dence, the constitutionality of the death penalty depends on its con-
tinued acceptance by society. The Court reads the cruel and unusual
punishment clause as an evolving constitutional norm that reflects
society's changing moral judgments concerning the limits of appropri-
ate punishment.
30 3
In upholding capital punishment under this standard in 1976, 3°
the Court relied not only on the actions of legislatures in revealing the
society's standards of decency, but also stressed the conduct of capital
juries acting as reflectors of community sentiment on the death pen-
alty question.305 Noting that some 460 death sentences were imposed
in less than four years following its decision in Furman v. Georgia,30 6
which invalidated the nation's then-existing death penalty statutes,
the Court found that these jury determinations served as a "signifi-
cant and reliable objective index of contemporary values" 30 7 and indi-
cated that the community had not rejected, the death penalty as an
appropriate punishment. Using the same approach, the Court has
rejected, as cruel and unusual, statutes that mandate capital punish-
ment for conviction of certain crimes, 308 and that make capital pun-
ishment available for rape,30 9 for certain types of felony murder,310
and for offenses committed when the defendant is under 16 years of
age.31 ' In each instance, the Court has relied on the reluctance of
capital juries to convict or to impose death in such cases. Thus, the
jury plays a crucial constitutional role concerning the continued valid-
ity of capital punishment. Advocacy in a capital RICO or CCE case
addressed to the jury-the political institution to which the life or
303. As. early as 1910, the Court recognized that the eighth amendment is "progressive"
and "may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). Because the language of the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment is not precise and its scope is not static, "[t]he
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion);
accord Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976)
(plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
304. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffit v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg, 428
U.S. at 173.
305. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181; see also Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691-92, 2697-98; Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 299-300 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge, supra note 296, at 3-4,
78-82; Winick, Witherspoon in Florida, supra note 296, at 830-31, 862-64.
306. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
307. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181.
308. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293.
309. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97.
310. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 795-96.
311. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691-92, 2697-98.
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death question is assigned-is therefore speech that is inherently
political and that affects both the defendant's fate and the future
validity of capital punishment for these offenses.
In any event, the first amendment is not limited to political
speech, and the right to hire an attorney to assert rights is not limited
to political cases. Although NAACP v. Button,3 12 the case originally
recognizing the right as protected by the first amendment, involved a
civil rights organization using litigation not as "a technique of resolv-
ing private differences," but as a means of securing racial equality and
as "a form of political expression,"'3 13 the Court has declined to limit
the principle to such plainly political contexts. In applying the right
to cases involving the settlement of private civil damage claims,314 the
Court noted that, although the litigation in question was not political
as in Button, "the First Amendment does not protect speech and
assembly only to the extent it can be characterized as political. ' 3 5 As
a result, the Court rejected the contention "that the principles
announced in Button were applicable only to litigation for political
purposes. "316 The right therefore should apply in all criminal cases
without regard to their "political" nature.
Use of the forfeiture statutes to disqualify a defendant's chosen
counsel and therefore render unavailable all but public defenders
312. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
313. Id. at 429.
314. E.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
315. United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223; accord Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983).
316. United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 223; see also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 377
U.S. at 8 (rejecting this contention, which was made in the dissent of Justice Clark, see id. at 10
(Clark, J., dissenting)). Four members of the Court have appeared to question this principle
more recently. In Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985), the
Court reversed a district court's nationwide preliminary injunction in a case raising a due
process and first amendment challenge to the statutory ten dollar maximum fee that a veteran
could pay his attorney for representing him in connection with a benefits claim before the
Veterans Administration. A footnote in the Court's opinion suggested that a higher level of
constitutional scrutiny would be appropriate for restrictions on "core political speech" than
for those on the pursuit of an individual claim for government benefits in an administrative
agency. Id. at 335 n. 13. However the opinion in Walters occured in the context of reviewing a
preliminary injunction granted on likelihood of success, in which an appellate decision may
"intimate no view as to the ultimate merits," e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 934
(1975); furthermore, a majority of the Court did not determine the constitutional issues.
Walters, 473 U.S. at 355 n.37 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. at 336 ("[S]uch claims remain
open on remand.") (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.); id. at 358-72 (Stevens,
J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.). In any event, regardless of whether the
informal and essentially nonadversary administrative claim procedure designed by Congress
for the handling of veterans' benefit claims, see id. at 325, constitutes a forum for first
amendment expression, the high visibility and inherently political criminal trial surely does.
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implicates these important first as well as sixth amendment concerns.
Consequently, it must meet the "exacting scrutiny" traditionally
applied in the first amendment area.31 7 What, in other contexts,
plainly will qualify as important governmental interests justifying a
variety of regulatory measures will not, accordingly, suffice when the
government's actions infringe on the defendant's ability to hire coun-
sel of choice, as they inevitably do in the forfeiture context.18
Such strict first amendment scrutiny is also mandated by the
Court's approach in a number of cases that involve restrictions on
participation in the political process. Once it is recognized that the
criminal trial is an important aspect of the political process, cases that
strictly scrutinize a variety of statutory and regulatory limitations on
expenditures for political campaigns become applicable. In Buckley v.
Valeo 3 19 and its progeny, 320 the Supreme Court reviewed, under the
stringent standards of the first amendment, such limits placed on
expenditures that an individual, a corporation, or a political action
317. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 362 (1976); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). To meet this standard the
government must show "a subordinating interest which is compelling." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
786; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). The governmental interest advanced
"must be paramount, one of vital importance, and the burden is on the government to show
the existence of such an interest." Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786; see Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362. "To
characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has
employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount;
urgent; strong." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). Even when this heavy
burden is carried, the government is required to employ means "narrowly tailored," Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1986); Bellotti, 435 U.S.
at 786, or "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment" of the first amendment interest in
question. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 610 (1982); Brown v.
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1982); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 786; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25
(1976). "[T]he limitation of first amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or
essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved." Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see also NAACP v. Clairborne Hardward Co., 458 U.S.
886, 912 (1982). To justify an infringement on first amendment rights, it must be found that
the state interest "cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive" of the right
involved. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Brown v. Socialist
Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982); Democratic Party v. Wisconsin,
450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25; United Mine
Workers, 389 U.S. at 223-25; Button, 371 U.S. at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488
(1960).
318. See United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222-25; id. at 225-26 (Upholding the right "cuts
deeply into one of the- most traditional of state concerns, the maintenance of high standards
within the state legal profession.") (Harlan, J., concurring); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen,
377 U.S. at 6-8.
319. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
320. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480 (1985); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 765.
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committee could make to influence the election of a political candi-
date or the outcome of a referendum.32' If statutory limitations on
expenditures for such political speech are subject to strict scrutiny,
then limitations on political speech in the courtroom imposed by
restraining orders issued pursuant to the forfeiture provisions should
be as well.3 22 The total abridgment of the right to counsel of choice
accomplished by an order restraining the defendant's use of his assets
to hire any advocate is a form of prior restraint,323 substantially more
restrictive on expression than the limitations on expenditures involved
in the political campaign cases. Like a prior restraint, such a
restraining order has "an immediate and irreversible" impact that
irretrievably prevents exercise of the right.324  As a result, such a
restraining order should bear "a 'heavy presumption' against its con-
stitutional validity.
325
Advocacy in the court-as public a forum as there is 326 -- is a
321. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 251-52; National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 496-97; First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 786-87; Buckley, 424 U.S. at
11.
322. A footnote in the Court's opinion in Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors,
473 U.S. 305, 335 n.13 (1985), appears to cast doubt on this conclusion. Walters dealt with a
due process and first amendment challenge to the statutory ten dollar maximum fee that may
be paid an attorney for representing a veteran in his claim for benefits before the Veterans
Administration. Id. at 308. In responding to the argument of the dissent that Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (The
limitation of a political action committee's expenditures to propagate its political views is a
restriction on first amendment speech.), was controlling, Walters, 473 U.S. at 364 n.13
(Stevens, J., dissenting), the Court's opinion stated that "the constitutional analysis of a
regulation that restricts core political speech, such as the regulation at issue in [National
Conservative Political Action Comm.], will differ from the constitutional analysis of a
restriction on the available resources of a claimant in government benefit proceedings."
Walters, 473 U.S. at 335 n.13. As indicated previously, this statement is not only an
inappropriate expression of views concerning the merits of a controversy reviewed only on the
grant of a preliminary injunction, but it also reflects the views of only four of the justices. See
supra note 316. Moreover, the advocacy occurring in a criminal trial, not infrequently
affecting the course of the law and stimulating political debate on public issues, is considerably
closer to the "core political speech" occurring in political campaigns than is that occurring in a
low visibility, essentially nonadversary veterans' benefits hearing.
323. See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138 (1988); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-59 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See generally Blasi, Toward a
Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); Emerson, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955); Redish, The Proper Role
of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984).
324. See Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559.
325. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
326. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948) ("[E]very criminal trial is subject to
contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion .... "); Craig v. Harvey, 331 U.S. 367,
374 (1947) ("A trial is a public event."); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (affording the accused
"the right to a... public trial"). Although the sixth amendment right to public trial belongs
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matter of vital first amendment concern. From the John Peter Zenger
trial to this very day, who appears in court and what he advocates
there makes an enormous difference to our system of justice and to
our entire society. By keeping the advocate chosen by the accused
from ever entering the door of the courtroom, the government in
effect bars from this important marketplace of ideas the communica-
tions of the defendant-the object of the controversy-in the form
and by the advocate he has chosen to make them. Instead of the free
market of ideas that the right to counsel of choice best promotes, the
government would be substituting the public monopoly of appointed
counsel, thereby producing a serious structural distortion in the mar-
ket. Restricting this marketplace to public defenders or appointed
lawyers would be analogous to permitting newspapers to report
whatever a political candidate wished to communicate to the public,
but requiring that all reporters be either government employees or
free-lance reporters selected by the government and paid fees substan-
tially below market rates. Clearly it would be inconsistent with our
traditions of free choice, with free enterprise, and with basic first
amendment values to restrict expression to such state-controlled
channels.327
to the defendant rather than the public, Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 381 (1979),
historically it has been "the universal requirement of our federal and state governments that
criminal trials be public .... " Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273; see also DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 384
("common law rule of open civil and criminal proceedings"); Note, The Right to a Public Trial
in Criminal Cases, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1138, 1150 (1966) (judicial recognition of a common
law right of the public to a public trial). Moreover, the Court has recognized that the first
amendment protects the general public's right of access to criminal trials. Eg., Globe
Newpaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 603 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 558-81 (1980) (plurality opinion). This public right of access coupled
with the Court's recognition of first amendment protection for the news media in the reporting
of criminal matters constitutes both an acknowledgement of the importance of the criminal
trial as a public forum and an assurance that it will remain an important forum of public
opinion. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1986); Waller v.
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45-46 (1984); Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505
(1984); Globe Newpaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 601 (1982); Richmond
Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555 (surveying the tradition of openness of courts); Nebraska Press Ass'n,
427 U.S. at 548-50.
327. Indeed, even though the public schools are "the primary vehicle for transforming the
values on which our society rests," Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982), the state may not
exercise a monopoly over the education of children. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (It is unconstitutional to require compulsory education in public schools only.); see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish parents could remove their children from
school after the eighth grade on religious grounds.); M. YUDOFF, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 233 (1983) (The
right of parents to educate their children at home is recognized in many states. States
commonly provide for parental control over attendance in controversial courses like sex
education.). And even within the public school, the Supreme Court has "long recognized
certain constitutional limits upon the power of the State to control even the curriculum and
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C. Scrutinizing the Governmental Interests Underlying the
Forfeiture Statutes
Both sixth and first amendment principles support the view that
the burden of justification required for this total abridgment of the
right to counsel of choice should be framed in terms of the usual test
of strict scrutiny invoked whenever fundamental constitutional rights
are violated, thereby requiring a compelling governmental interest
and the use of least restrictive means.328 What, then, are the justifica-
tions asserted to support the infringement upon sixth and first amend-
ment rights that result from application of the forfeiture statutes to
legitimate attorneys' fees?
Congress designed the criminal forfeiture provisions to deprive
criminal organizations of their economic bases, which, if left intact,
could sustain their operations despite conviction of their individual
members.329 Congress designed the civil in rem forfeiture provision of
the Controlled Substances Act 330 to impose a penalty upon those who
were significantly involved in a criminal enterprise and to remove the
operating tools of crime from criminals.331 In 1978, Congress
amended this statute "to strike at the profits of illegal drug traffick-
ing,"'3 32 by adding language designed to reach proceeds traceable to an
classroom." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 861 (1982) (plurality opinion); e.g.,
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (declaring unconstitutional a state law forbidding
the teaching of evolution unless accompanied by instruction in the theory of "creation
science"); Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (Local school boards may not remove books from a school library
only because they dislike the ideas that the books convey.); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968) (declaring unconstitutional a state law prohibiting the teaching of Darwin's theory of
evolution); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating a state law forbidding the
teaching of modern foreign language in public and private schools). The Court has stressed
that public schools may not be "enclaves of totalitarianism" and that "students may not be
regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate."
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Commun. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
328. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (first amendment right to freedom
of expression); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973) (substantive due process right to
abortion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (first amendment right to free exercise of
religion).
329. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 19, at 191, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3374; see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981) (RICO was
designed "to divest the [criminal] association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains.").
330. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see supra notes 14 & 26.
331. See United States v. One 1976 Lincoln Mark IV, 462 F. Supp. 1383, 1390-91 (W.D.
Pa. 1979).
332. 124 CONG. REC. 34,667 (1978) (statement of Sen. Culver); see also 124 CONG. REC.
36,946 (1978) (statement of Rep. Rogers) (strike at profits of illicit trafficking); 124 CONG.
REC. 23,055 (1978) (statement of Sen. Nunn) (striking out against profits from drug
trafficking).
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exchange for a controlled substance.333 Senator Nunn, who spon-
sored this amendment, described it as enhancing the "punitive and
deterrent purposes ' 334 of the Controlled Substances Act.335 Senator
Nunn complained that, under prior law, drug agents had been "com-
pelled to return seized money to defendants even though it had been
apparent the money is the profit from illicit drug trafficking or has
been used or intended to be used in drug trafficking.... [or] to replen-
ish their stock of drugs that were seized at the time of arrest. ' 336 The
basic purpose of the 1978 amendment therefore was to prevent forfeit-
able assets from being used to further the drug enterprise.
The RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions, as originally drafted,
enjoyed only limited success, in part because defendants were able to
transfer or conceal forfeitable assets prior to conviction.337 The Com-
prehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984,338 amending the original RICO
33 9
and CCE340 forfeiture provisions, allowed for issuance of preindict-
ment restraining orders to prevent transfers of assets prior to trial,34" '
and for forfeiture of assets received by third parties from defendants
342 aedin transactions following the commission of the crime. The amend
ments also provided for a postconviction hearing at which a third
party with a legal interest in forfeitable property could avoid forfei-
ture by showing that he held title superior to that of the defendant, or
by showing that he was a bona fide purchaser, which Congress defined
as one reasonably without cause to believe the property was subject to
forfeiture.343
The legislative history strongly suggests that the preconviction
transfers sought to be prevented or voided were those made to parties
who were not dealing at "arms' length" with a defendant, in other
words, "sham" transactions. The Senate Report explains the relation-
back amendments as follows:
The purpose of this provision is to permit the voiding of cer-
tain pre-conviction transfers and so close a potential loophole in a
333. Pub. L. No. 95-533 § 301(a), 92 Stat. 1276 (1978) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
334. 124 CONG. REC. 23,055 (1978).
335. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1982).
336. Id.
337. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 19, at 195, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 3378; see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
338. Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57 (codified in scattered sections
of 18, 19, 21, 26 & 28 U.S.C.).
339. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
340. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
341. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(d)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(B).
342. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c); 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
343. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(cc); 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).
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current law whereby the criminal forfeiture sanction could be
avoided by transfers that were not "arms' length" transactions. On
the other hand, this provision should not operate to the detriment
of innocent bona fide purchasers of the defendant's property. 3"
Elsewhere, the Senate Report states that the third party provisions
"should be construed to deny relief to third parties acting as nominees
of the defendant or who have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudu-
lent transactions. ' 345 The legislative history reveals that Congress'
only stated objective in adopting the relation-back provisions was
"setting out clear authority for voiding improper pre-conviction
transfers of assets subject to criminal forfeiture. ' 34 6 As to what con-
stitutes an "improper transfer," the legislative history refers only to
transfers not at arms' length terms or in which the transferee actually
is serving as the defendant's nominee.347
Do the governmental interests underlying the 1984 amendments
justify application of the forfeiture provisions to legitimate as opposed
to "sham" attorneys' fees? Plainly, these governmental interests out-
weigh any interest by a defendant in transferring tainted properties to
his counsel as a sham transaction to prevent forfeiture. Such sham or
fraudulent transfers, in the view of the panel opinion in United States
348v. Harvey, since reversed en banc, "define the permissible constitu-
tional reach of the Act in permitting the forfeiture of attorney
fees."' 3 4 9 Exempting bona fide attorneys' fees from preconviction
restraint, like exempting necessary living expenses, does not under-
mine the legislative purpose of stripping drug dealers of their eco-
nomic bases. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit concluded in rejecting the government's contention that such
exemptions would allow the defendant to benefit economically from
crime:
Expenditures the defendant must make to keep himself and his
dependents alive and to secure competent counsel to prove his
innocence or protect his procedural rights should not be consid-
ered incentives to crime. The notion that a defendant would com-
mit criminal acts to accumulate monies or property in order to pay
for necessary food, clothing, and shelter while he is being tried or
344. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 19, at 200-01, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3383-84.
345. Id. at 209 n.47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3392 n.47.
346. Id. at 197, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3380.
347. See id. at 209 & n.47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3392 &
n.47.
348. 814 F.2d 905 (1987), replaced on reh'g en banc sub nom. United States v. Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
349. Id. at 924.
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in order to pay a reasonable fee to the attorney he chooses to assist
in his defense is sophistry.350
Freeing legitimate attorneys' fees from forfeiture does not permit
the defendant "to retain his ill-gotten economic power after convic-
tion," nor "to shelter untainted assets by paying a lawyer with tainted
property first."3 51 Although it will permit defendants who later are
found guilty to use what turns out to have been ill-gotten economic
power to hire an attorney, the legitimate governmental interests in
preventing such use are small. The government's legitimate interest
in deterring crime is met, as the prospect of hiring an attorney with
the proceeds of crime alone does not provide an incentive to commit
crime.35 2 The government's legitimate interest in punishing crime is
not implicated, as punishment constitutionally may be imposed only
after conviction.353 The government's legitimate interest in prevent-
ing the proceeds of crime from being used to fuel additional crime
either by the defendant or a criminal organization with which he is
associated is fully satisfied. The government interest in forfeiture is
not to raise revenue; therefore, the government may not assert a finan-
cial interest in attorneys' fees.354 Nor may the government assert a
350. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1474-75 (5th Cir. 1986), modified on other
grounds, 809 F.2d 249 (1987).
351. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1403 (2d Cir.) (Feinberg, C.J., concurring,
joined by Oakes & Kearse, JJ.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
352. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
353. E.g., United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445, 1451-52 (8th
Cir. 1988) mandate stayed by 864 F.2d 1421; Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1408 n.3 (Winters, J.
concurring, joined by Meskill & Newman, JJ.); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746-47
(1987); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 &
n. 16 (1979); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). Moreover, the legislative
history of the forfeiture statutes reveals that Congress, in enacting the pre-trial restraint
provisions, was concerned not with punishing the defendant prior to conviction, but merely
with preventing fraudulent transfers, improper dispositions, or concealment of assets that
might be subject to forfeiture postconviction. Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1407-08 (Winters, J.,
concurring, joined by Meskill & Newman, JJ.).
354. See Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1407 (Winters, J., concurring, joined by Meskill &
Newman, JJ.) ("[T]he government expressly disclaimed at oral argument any interest in
criminal forfeitures under the Act as a means of raising revenue. The mere fact that the assets
ultimately forfeited after conviction may be less than if a total preconviction restraint had been
imposed does not, therefore, contravene any purpose of the Act.") Any financial interest the
government may assert in forfeiting attorneys' fees would in any case be modest, because the
government's gain would need to be offset to some extent by the expenses of paying for
appointed counsel. United States v. $70,476 in U.S. Currency, 677 F. Supp. 639, 646 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), appeal dismissed, 845 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1988). In any event, under traditional
principles, this financial interest would be insufficient to outweigh the defendant's fundamental
right to counsel of choice. In other contexts the Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected
financial interests as sufficient justification for government infringment upon fundamental
constitutional rights. E.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 139 (1979); Ballew v. Georgia,
435 U.S. 223, 244 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29 (1977);
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legitimate interest in the adversarial advantage it will gain by prevent-
ing the defendant from hiring his chosen counsel.355 As a result, the
interest in preventing the use of "ill-gotten economic power" to hire
attorneys is "weak" in the context of bona fide fees and cannot out-
weigh the defendant's constitutional right to counsel of choice.356 The
"small societal cost" of exempting such bona fide fees from forfeiture
"is the price we must pay for protecting the rights of the innocent,
who might otherwise be deprived of legitimate economic power in
waging a full defense." '357
Applying the forfeiture statutes to legitimate attorneys' fees will
not promote the predominant congressional interest asserted in the
legislative history of the 1984 amendments-the avoidance of fraudu-
lent transfers. So long as it can be assured that the fee paid to the
attorney is a bona fide and reasonable one, rather than a sham or
fraudulent transfer designed to avoid forfeiture, Congress' stated pur-
pose is not frustrated. Indeed, exempting legitimate attorneys' fees
from forfeiture would serve Congress' interest in stripping drug deal-
ers and racketeers of their "economic power bases.
3 58
One of the primary reasons to strip criminals and their organiza-
tions of their "economic power bases" is to prevent the profits of
crime from being used to sustain the criminal enterprise, even after
the conviction of individual members. The use of otherwise forfeitable
assets to pay legitimate attorneys' fees does not frustrate this interest,
but instead furthers it. Funds that the defendant pays to his attorney
for his services are thereafter unavailable to the defendant or to any
criminal organization to which he may belong.359 The congressional
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825 (1977); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147-49 (1972);
Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633
(1969).
355. See Monsanto, 852 F.2d at 1403 (Feinberg, C.J., concurring, joined by Oakes &
Kearse, JJ.) ("Of course, weakening the ability of an accused to represent himself at trial is an
advantage for the government. But it is not a legitimate government interest that can be used
to justify invasion of a constitutional right.").
356. Id.
357. Id.
358. As Professor Cloud points out:
Payment of fees to defense counsel actually guarantees that a defendant will
"lose" the asset. Even if the defendant is acquitted, the asset is conveyed to the
attorney. Conversely, a defendant represented by appointed counsel who
prevails on the forfeiture counts will retain all title to the assets, even if convicted
on some substantive counts. In other words, exempting legitimate defense
counsel fees from forfeiture guarantees that the defendant will be deprived of the
asset used to pay the fees with more certainty than does the forfeiture mechanism
itself.
Cloud, supra note 49, at 832.
359. $70,476 in US. Currency, 677 F. Supp. at 646; Note, supra note 34, at 139.
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interest in deterring crimes by depriving criminals of the economic
incentives to engage in them therefore would be fully satisfied without
applying the forfeiture provisions to legitimate attorneys' fees. 3 °
As a result, because the interests asserted by Congress in support
of the forfeiture provisions are not furthered by the forfeiture of legiti-
mate as opposed to sham or fraudulent attorneys' fees, application of
the forfeiture provisions to such fees is gratuitous and unnecessary.
Whatever the result would be if Congress were to seek to further
other compelling interests through forfeiture, the application of the
forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE to legitimate attorneys' fees
constitutes an arbitrary and unreasonable intrusion on the defendant's
right to counsel of choice and should be held unconstitutional.
IV. AVOIDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that application of the for-
feiture statutes to legitimate attorneys' fees violates the sixth and first
amendment right to counsel of choice. At the very least, such appli-
cation raises extremely serious constitutional questions. Need these
difficult constitutional questions be resolved by the Supreme Court in
the cases pending before it? A number of legal principles counsel in
favor of avoiding the constitutional dilemma and therefore avoiding
or at least deferring the necessity of judicial imposition of constitu-
tional constraints on Congress' ability to deal with difficult questions
of social policy. As Justice Scalia recently reminded the Court:
"Striking down a law approved by the democratically elected repre-
sentatives of the people is no minor matter.
3 61
The Court predictably and properly will wish to give Congress a
wide berth when dealing with such pressing social problems as the
war on organized crime and illicit drugs. These avoidance principles
reflect "the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be need-
360. United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1474-75 (1986), modified on other grounds, 809
F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987); Genego, supra note 65, at 849-50 (Including attorneys' fees within
the scope of the forfeiture law advances neither of the objectives underlying the 1984
amendments.); Cloud, supra note 49, at 833 ("It appears that if legitimate defense attorneys'
fees are exempted from forfeiture, the government's valid law enforcement interests survive
unimpeded."); Note, supra note 34, at 138 ("[T]he government interest allegedly furthered by
forfeiture is not hindered by the exclusion of [legitimate] attorneys' fees from forfeiture.").
361. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, -, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2600 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319
(1985) (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("Judging the constitutionality of an Act of Congress is properly
considered 'the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform .......
(quoting Rustker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981); Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148
(1927) (Holmes, J.)).
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lessly confronted." '362 These methods of prudence, "passive virtues"
as Alexander Bickel called them,363 involve techniques of remanding
these admittedly complex issues to the Congress for what Dean
Calebresi called a "second look." 3 ' Two such techniques are espe-
cially appropriate here-the canon of statutory construction that
counsels that an act should not be construed to violate the Constitu-
tion if a constitutional interpretation is possible, and a principle
drawn from administrative law that broad delegations of legislative
authority to administrative officials must be scrutinized closely when
such discretionary authority is invoked to intrude on fundamental
constitutional values, potentially finding such assertions to be ultra
vires.
A. Avoiding the Dilemma Through Statutory Construction
1. THE REQUIREMENT OF A CLEAR EXPRESSION OF
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WHEN AN INTERPRETATION OF
A STATUTE IS ASSERTED THAT RAISES SERIOUS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that, if possi-
ble, statutes should be construed to avoid an unconstitutional inter-
pretation. 365  Although like other canons of construction, this
principle is not always consistently applied,3 66 the Supreme Court has
362. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988). This "fundamental rule of judicial restraint," which is "more
deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication," requires that
courts not "pass on questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoidable."
Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 257
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 737
(1950)). "Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, federal courts must consider
nonconstitutional grounds for decision." Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361
n.10 (1983); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 60 (1980); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
363. See generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
364. G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 135-36 (1982).
365. See, e.g., DeBartolo Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1397; Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 190 (1985);
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361, 367 (1974); Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 307 (1970); United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45 (1953); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S.
549, 569 (1947); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); Ashwander,
297 U.S. at 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring); George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S.
373, 379 (1933); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); United States v. Delaware &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909). This canon of statutory construction is an application
of the prudential principle that courts should not decide constitutional issues unnecessarily.
See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
366. DeBartolo Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1397; see Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500.
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invoked it with special force when it found that the application of the
statute in question raised "serious constitutional problems. 
' 367
The Court's approach in one such case, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop
of Chicago368 is highly instructive. In Catholic Bishop, the issue
before the Supreme Court was whether the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Act extended to teachers in church-oper-
ated parochial schools who taught both religious and secular sub-
jects.369  The statutory definition of "employer" was exceedingly
broad, covering "any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly," with eight specified exceptions that did not
include church-related organizations of any kind.370 The Court had
previously read the statute as evincing Congress' intent to "vest in the
[National Labor Relations] Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth
constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause, ' 37 1 holding
that employers within the reach of Congress' interstate commerce
power were covered by the Act, regardless of the nature of their activ-
ity.3 72 The Court was concerned, however, that applying the statute
to church-operated schools would present "a significant risk that the
first amendment [free exercise clause would] .. .be infringed.
373
Given that serious constitutional concern, the Court strove to
avoid the constitutional question through statutory construction.
Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall, the Court noted that "an Act of
Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any
other possible construction remains available. ' 371 When "serious
constitutional questions" were raised concerning application of a stat-
ute, the Court held that it "must first identify 'the affirmative inten-
tions of the Congress clearly expressed' before concluding that the
367. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950); see also
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 873-75, 880 (1930) (Maxims of
statutory construction are either vacuous or contrary to ordinary usage.); id. at 885
(Traditional doctrines of statutory construction are "cardboard structures" that function as
post hoc rationalizations of decisions.).
368. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
369. Id. at 491.
370. Id. at 505 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) (presently codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982))); see id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by White, Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ.).
371. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (citing Guss v. Utah
Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1, 3 (1957); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647-48
(194); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939)).
372. Polish Nat'l Alliance, 322 U.S. 643 (1944) (nonprofit fraternal organization);
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (nonprofit newsgathering organization).
373. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 502; see id. at 501-04.
374. Id. at 500 (citing Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
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Act" applies.37 5 Applying this approach, the Court, although admit-
ting that Congress used "very broad terms" in defining the Board's
jurisdiction over "employers,"376 found "no clear expression," in
either the explicit language of the statute or its legislative history, "of
an affirmative intention of Congress that teachers in church-operated
schools should be covered by the Act." '377 Based on the language of
the statute and its legislative history, the Court found that there was
"nothing to indicate an affirmative intention that such schools
[should] be within the Board's jurisdiction," '378 and "that Congress
375. Id. at 501. The Court quoted from McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963), a case involving the NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction
over foreign seamen. The Catholic Bishop Court summarized the holding of McCulloch as
follows:
[T]he Court declined to read the National Labor Relations Act so as to give rise
to a serious question of separation of powers which in turn would have
implicated sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive over relations with
foreign nations. The international implications of the case led the Court to
describe it as involving "public questions particularly high in the scale of our
national interest." Because of those questions the Court held that before
sanctioning the Board's exercise of jurisdiction "'there must be present the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.' "
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500 (citations omitted) (quoting McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 17, 21-22;
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)).
The Court, in a recent application of the Catholic Bishop approach, described it as the
"traditional rule." DeBartolo Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1398. This approach requires that if the
Court concludes that an application of a statute raises serious constitutional questions, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid the application unless it finds a clear expression of
congressional intent to support it. The rule often is invoked in the context of statutes pur-
ported to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims. E.g., Webster v. Doe, 108 S. Ct.
2047, 2053 (1988) ("[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional
claims its intent to do so must be clear.... We require this heightened showing in part to
avoid the 'serious constitutional question' that would arise if a federal statute were construed
to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim."); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S.
749 (1975); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys.
Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 237-38 (1968); id. at 240-43 (Harlan, J., concurring); Harmon
v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958); Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 52 (1955);
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 120-23 (1946); id. at 128 (Murphy, J., concurring); Lloyd
Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 334-37 (1932); Winick, Direct Judicial Review of the
Actions of the Selective Service System, 69 MICH. L. REV. 55, 58-59, 68-70 (1978) (discussing
availability of judicial review in Oestereich and Estep). Moreover, the Court sometimes
invokes the approach where serious non-constitutional questions are raised. See, e.g., Liparota
v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (declining to construe the federal statute governing food
stamp fraud to omit a mens rea requirement in the absence of an explicit and unambiguous
indication in either its language or legislative history, to avoid a departure from a basic
assumption of the criminal law). The Catholic Bishop rule is an illustration, in the context of a
statute in derogation of the Constitution, of what has been termed "the policy of clear state-
ment." See A. BICKEL, supra note 363, at 156-69; H. HART & A. SAKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
1240 (tent. ed. 1958).
376. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 505.
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simply gave no consideration to church-operated schools."37 9 The
Court concluded that, "in the absence of a clear expression of Con-
gress' intent to bring teachers in church-operated schools within the
jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to construe the Act in a manner
that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive
questions arising out of the guarantees of the first amendment Reli-
gion Clauses.
380
In view of the "serious constitutional questions" that application
of the forfeiture statutes to attorneys' fees raises under the sixth and
first amendments, the "traditional rule followed in Catholic Bishop
' '381
should be applied in construing them. Applying this approach leads
to a result similar to that reached by the Supreme Court in Catholic
Bishop. In order to avoid the serious constitutional difficulties
presented by the application of the forfeiture statutes to bona fide
attorneys' fees, the Supreme Court should read these statutes as appli-
cable only to sham or fraudulent attorneys' fees, and not to legitimate
fees that are the product of arms' length arrangements.
Several district courts have reached this conclusion based on the
legislative history of the forfeiture provisions, although without
explicitly applying the Catholic Bishop approach.382 On the other
hand, several circuit courts have rejected this conclusion, finding the
legislative history ambiguous.383 None of these circuit court opinions,
however, cited Catholic Bishop, and none appear even to have consid-
379. Id. at 504.
380. Id. at 507.
381. DeBartolo Corp., 108 S. Ct. at 1398. In this recent application of the Catholic Bishop
rule, the Court avoided a serious first amendment freedom of expression question by
construing the NLRB's jurisdiction to deal with unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(4) of
the National Labor Relations Act as not extending to a union's peaceful distribution of
handbills at the entrances to a shopping mall. The handbills urged customers not to shop at
any stores in the mall until the mall's owner promised that all construction there would be
performed by contractors paying fair wages. Id. at 1397.
382. See, e.g., United States v. Truglio, 660 F. Supp. 103, 105-06 (N.D. W. Va. 1987);
United States v. Figueroa, 645 F. Supp. 453, 455 (W.D. Pa. 1986); United States v. Bassett,
632 F. Supp. 1308, 1312-14 (D. Md. 1986); United States v. Ianniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 455-
56 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1339-45 (D. Colo. 1985).
383. United States v. Bissell, No. 87-8246 slip op. at 1593 (11 th Cir. March 2, 1989); United
States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb.
17, 1989); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1491-96 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 913-18 (1987), replaced on other grounds on reh'g en banc sub nom.
United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 641 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 109
S. Ct. 363 (1988). But see United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1405-11 (2d Cir. 1988)
(Winters, J., concurring, joined by Meskill & Newman, JJ.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363
(1988); United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332, reh'g en banc granted, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.
1988); United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463 (1986), modified, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
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ered the Catholic Bishop approach.384 Viewing the statutory language
and legislative history of the forfeiture provisions through the lens of
Catholic Bishop supports the conclusion reached by the district courts,
not because the legislative history clearly contemplates the exemption
of bona fide attorneys' fees, but because neither the language nor the
legislative history clearly reveal the "affirmative intention" that such
fees are subject to forfeiture.
2. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The plain language of the criminal forfeiture statutes does not
provide explicitly that attorneys' fees are forfeitable; it provides only
for the forfeiture of "any property" obtained as a result of the
crime. 3 5  "Property" is broadly defined to include two concepts:
"(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found
in land; and (2) tangible and intangible personal property, including
rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities. ' 38 6 Although Con-
gress defined the "property" subject to forfeiture in very broad terms,
there is no indication in the language of the statutes that attorneys'
fees are deemed to be covered. The language of the civil forfeiture
statute likewise does not cover attorneys' fees explicitly.38 7 Under the
approach taken in Catholic Bishop,3 8 the broad statutory definition of
"property" does not, without a strong manifestation of intent in the
legislative history, constitute the "clear expression of an affirmative
intention of Congress" 389 necessary to find the statutes applicable to
bona fide attorneys' fees.
384. See cases cited supra note 383. The opinions rejecting this contention do not
acknowledge the principle that requires a finding of an affirmative intention of Congress,
clearly expressed, before interpreting a statute to apply in circumstances that raise serious
constitutional questions. An examination of the briefs filed in these cases reveal that Catholic
Bishop was neither cited nor argued to these courts. The first time Catholic Bishop was raised
in the attorneys' fee forfeiture context was in an amicus brief submitted by the author in the en
banc reconsideration in United States v. Jones, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988) (Nos. 87-5556, 87-
5575), granting reh'g en banc to 837 F.2d 1332, filed on August 29, 1988. Jones was argued en
banc on September 19, 1988, but in light of the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in
Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, the Fifth Circuit has decided to withhold decision in Jones
pending the Supreme Court decision in the cases before it. Letter from the Clerk of the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to the author (Jan. 9, 1989).
385. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1). The criminal forfeiture statutes also
reach "any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of" RICO, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1963(a)(1); "any... property" used to facilitate commission of a felony drug law violation,
21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2); and "any... interest in" and "any... property.., affording a source of
control over" a criminal enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2); 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(3).
386. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b), 21 U.S.C. § 853(b).
387. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a).
388. See supra notes 368-80 and accompanying text.
389. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504.
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The statute construed in Catholic Bishop had a very broad provi-
sion defining basic coverage and numerous specific exceptions. Yet
the Court, in effect, carved out another exception for teachers in
church schools. The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984390 con-
tains a broad forfeiture provision that reaches "any property" and
provides exemptions for both owners with superior title and bona fide
purchasers.39 1 It would be perfectly proper under Catholic Bishop to
carve out a further exemption for legitimate attorneys' fees in order to
protect the sixth and first amendments. It may not be necessary to go
that far, however, because of the language employed in the existing
provisions defining the exemptions.
The criminal forfeiture statutes provide for a postconviction
hearing at which third parties may challenge a forfeiture judgment
concerning property transferred to them, 392 but again fail to refer to
attorneys' fees. Indeed, not only do these third party exemption pro-
visions fail explicitly to refer to attorneys' fees, but also the plain lan-
guage of these provisions leaves ample room for exempting legitimate
attorneys' fees from forfeiture. Several of the circuit courts rejecting
the argument that the forfeiture provisions should be construed to
exempt legitimate attorneys' fees have found these third party provi-
sions to evince a contrary intent.393 They point to the general inclu-
siveness of the statutory language and to the fact that the only
conceivable statutory exception to forfeiture in these cases is the pro-
vision for bona fide purchasers.394 Their conclusion is based on the
premise that attorneys who are on notice that forfeiture claims are
pending against their clients' property by virtue of the indictment are
unlikely to qualify under the bona fide purchaser exception contained
in these third party provisions. These courts, however, fail to
examine closely the definition of bona fide purchaser contained in
these provisions.
In order to qualify for exemption under the third party provi-
sions, an individual must show that he is a "bona fide purchaser for
390. Pub. L. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat. 1837, 2040-57 (codified in scattered sections of 18,
19, 21, 26 & 28 U.S.C.) (The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, also called the "1984
Amendments," amended RICO, CCE, and other federal forfeiture provisions.).
391. Id. (The same provisions are repeated in various parts of the Act because the Act
amends several parts of the United States Code in similar ways.).
392. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(c), 1963(l)(6)(B), 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(c), 853(n)(6)(B).
393. See United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1493 & n.5 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 641-42 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988); see also United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1413 (2d
Cir.) (Mahoney, J., dissenting, joined by Cardamone & Pierce, JJ.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct.
363 (1988); Brickey, supra note 6, at 503.
394. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
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value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time
of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture. ' 395 What did Congress mean when it used the
italicized language to define the bona fide purchaser exception it cre-
ated? It is possible to read this language as expressing Congress'
intent that purchasers with some cause to believe the property was
subject to forfeiture may nonetheless qualify for exemption. Con-
gress, after all, did not exclude those providers of legitimate services
or other valuable consideration who were "without cause to believe"
the property was subject to forfeiture. 39 6 Had Congress used this lan-
guage, any type or degree of knowledge would have been disqualify-
ing. By placing the word "reasonably" before this phrase, Congress
must have intended to modify the phrase in order to characterize the
kind of "cause to believe" that would not disqualify the purchaser or
provider from being classified as bona fide. Forfeiture results in a
severe and inequitable hardship when applied in such a way that the
provider of legitimate services or hard cash loses the benefit of his
good faith bargain, even though he had nothing whatsoever to do
with the actions that serve as the basis for the forfeiture. Congress
presumably recognized this and provided that such third parties
would gain exemption from forfeiture, not only if they were totally
without knowledge that they were dealing with someone whose prop-
erty might be the subject of a criminal forfeiture proceeding, but also
if they were "reasonably" without such knowledge.
The term "reasonably" connotes conduct bounded by reason:
conduct that is performed in a reasonable manner; a condition that
395. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(l)(6)(B), 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (emphasis added).
396. The government has suggested in fee forfeiture litigation that the bona fide purchaser
exception is an exceedingly narrow one that defense attorneys cannot meet if they are
defending a criminal defendant against charges that include a forfeiture claim. See Jones En
Banc Government Brief, supra note 242, at 19. This argument relies on E.D. Systems Corp. v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 674 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1982). In ED. Systems, the court found
that a claimant to property could not be considered a bona fide purchaser if at the time of the
alleged purchase the claimant had actual notice of a competing claim to the property. Id. at
459. The court remanded the litigation to the trial court to decide the factual issue of whether
there was actual notice. Id. at 459-60. The government's reliance on ED. Systems is
misplaced, however, because that case was a dispute between two private parties, applying
Texas law on the status of bona fide purchasers under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), because it was a federal court diversity action. ED. Systems, 674 F.2d at
459. Furthermore, the court was not construing the third party forfeiture provisions of RICO
or CCE. Id. Unlike the generous "reasonably without cause" bona fide purchaser exception
created in these provisions, see supra note 395 and accompanying text, Texas law restrictively
limits the bona fide purchaser doctrine to one "without knowledge (actual or imputed)," E.D.
Systems, 674 F.2d at 459 (quoting Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977)), and broadly defines the concept of "notice." Id. (quoting Hexter v. Pratt, 10 S.W.2d
692, 693 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928)).
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exists moderately; a proposition that is somewhat or fairly sufficiently
true, is rational and sensible, is governed by logic or justice, or is sub-
ject to a rule of reason.3 97 All these shades of meaning import the
idea of flexibility into the statutory scheme. When Congress
exempted persons who were "reasonably without cause to believe"
that property might be forfeited, Congress may have intended to
include those persons, such as defense lawyers, whose knowledge that
the property might be subject to forfeiture does not amount to reason-
able cause to visit the hardship of forfeiture upon them.
Congress' definition of the bona fide purchaser exception under
RICO and CCE is an unusual one. Comparison to the definition of
bona fide purchaser typically used in other statutes is instructive. In
defining the bona fide purchaser exception under RICO and CCE,
Congress did not speak of persons who were "without reason to
believe"3 9 ' or who were "without reasonable cause to believe '3 99 that
property was subject to forfeiture. Instead, Congress exempted per-
sons who were "reasonably without cause to believe" that the prop-
erty might be forfeited.' The word "reasonably" can only be read to
modify the "without cause to believe" phrase that follows it. More-
over, the choice to locate this "reasonableness" modifier at the begin-
ning of the phrase, rather than later as descriptive of the quantum of
"cause" needed to defeat the purchaser's claim-"without cause rea-
sonably to believe"-indicates that the modifier serves a purpose
other than to define a standard of proof. The purpose arguably is to
introduce a rule of reason into the determination of the forfeiture of
the interests of those who acquire a defendant's property in good
faith.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with-
out engaging in the analysis of the language of the third party excep-
397. See II THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2432 (Compact Ed. 1971); THE RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1608 (2d ed. unabridged 1987);
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1892 (unabridged ed. 1976);
WORDFNDER DICTIONARY THESAURUS (Model WF-220, 1987) (electronic dictionary/
thesaurus compiled for Xerox Corporation and Microlytics, Inc.).
398. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3668(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (A claimant for remission or
mitigation of forfeiture under the liquor laws must show "that he had at no time any
knowledge or reason to believe that [the property at issue] was being or would be used in the
violation of laws."); 15 U.S.C. § 714(p) (1982) (A buyer in the ordinary course is released from
any claim by the Commodity Credit Corporation provided he "did not know or have reason to
know" of a defect in the seller's authority to sell.).
399. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2465 (1982) (In an action for return of property seized persuant to an
act of Congress, the existence of "reasonable cause" for the seizure bars the victorious claimant
from an award of costs and confers immunity upon both the prosecutor and the person who
made the seizure.).
400. See supra note 392 and accompanying text.
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tion performed here, recognized this in United States v. Thier,"'° when
it held that "the defense attorney's necessary knowledge of the
charges against his client cannot defeat his interest in receiving pay-
ment out of the defendant's forfeited assets for legitimate legal serv-
ices."'"' 2 The attorney's "necessary knowledge" should not defeat his
interest in payment for his legitimate services because it would be
unreasonable to do so. Indeed, it is unreasonable and unjust for a
defense attorney who provides bona fide services for his client to be
barred from receiving a reasonable fee merely because of what the
lawyer needed to know in order properly to represent the defendant.
By establishing a "reasonably without cause to believe" exception,
Congress arguably authorized the courts to avoid this unreasonable
result by finding that the attorney's "necessary knowledge" is not
disqualifying.
This analysis provides a textual basis in the language of the stat-
utes for the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in Thier that Congress did not
intend "to exclude attorneys from bringing a third-party claim for a
reasonable attorneys fee against potentially forfeitable assets in a post-
conviction hearing. '"" On the other hand, this analysis permits the
forfeiture of sham or fraudulent payments to attorneys that are not
genuine fees, but are attempts to evade forfeiture. The forfeiture of
such sham fees is not unreasonable and fulfills Congress' intent to pre-
vent the defendant from circumventing forfeiture by laundering his
ill-gotten gains through transfers to others.
This reading of the unusual "reasonably without cause to
believe" language used by Congress in defining the bona fide pur-
chaser exception therefore is both plausible and consistent with con-
gressional intent. Even if this reading is rejected, however, at the least
401. 801 F.2d 1463 (1986), modified on other grounds, 809 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987).
402. Id. at 1474. The court adopted the distinction made in United States v. Bassett, 632 F.
Supp. 1308 (D. Md. 1986), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (1987),
replaced on rehearing en banc sub nom. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837
F.2d 637 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988), that although the attorney is not
" 'innocent' of knowledge that the money with which he is paid might be tainted," he "is
certainly not, however, just a bogus conduit for this money when providing bona fide legal
services." Thier, 801 F.2d at 1474 (quoting Bassett, 632 F. Supp. at 1315-16). Thus, the court
recognized that a defense lawyer's knowledge of the charges against the client does not ipso
facto disqualify the attorney's claim to be a bona fide purchaser under the RICO and CCE
forfeiture provisions. Id. at 1472, 1474. The Fifth Circuit recently followed the logic of Thier
in United States v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1988), but is currently reconsidering the
issue en banc. United States v. Jones, 844 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1988) (granting rehearing en
banc) (argued September 19, 1988).
403. Thier, 801 F.2d at 1474. The court did not ground this conclusion in the language of
the statutes, but rather in its finding that there is "no indication in the statute or the legislative
history that Congress intended to exclude" attorneys from eligibility as bona fide purchasers.
Id.
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this language must be regarded as ambiguous. As such, it should be
viewed through the lens of the "rule of lenity," as appropriate in the
forfeiture context,' as it is in that of the criminal prohibition. 4°5
Given this ambiguity, the language of the forfeiture statutes certainly
cannot be said to evince the clearly expressed, affirmative intention of




3. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Because of the lack of clarity in the statutes and the serious con-
stitutional difficulties that are raised by construing the statutes to
cover legitimate attorneys' fees, it is appropriate to look at the legisla-
tive history to determine whether it can provide the needed "affirma-
tive intention . . . clearly expressed."'"' 8 As the discussion of
404. See United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 DeLuxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226
(1939) ("Forfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only when within both letter and
spirit of the law."); United States v. $38,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 816 F.2d 1538, 1547 (1 1th
Cir. 1987) (paraphrasing same proposition); United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up
VIN F14YUB03797, 769 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting One 1936 Model Ford, 307
U.S. at 226). This view, expressed in the civil forfeiture context, is even more appropriate
when criminal forfeiture is involved. See United States v. McKeithen, 822 F.2d 310, 315 (2d
Cir. 1987).
405. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); Bifulco v. United States, 447
U.S. 381, 387 (1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); United States v.
Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293 (1971). The liberal construction clause contained in the RICO
criminal forfeiture provisions, 21 U.S.C. § 853(o) (Supp. IV 1986) ("The provisions of this
section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."), should not be relied
upon to cure the ambiguity here. As the Eighth Circuit has found, "[t]he extent of judicial
deference" owed such a clause "stands unclear" in view of the countervailing force of the
constitutionally based rule of lenity. United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1369-70 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). In any case, the "remedial" purpose of the
forfeiture provisions can be effectuated fully without construing them to apply to legitimate
attorneys' fees. See supra Section III(c).
406. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979).
407. When the Senate Report briefly described the bona fide purchaser exemption, it
paraphrased the statutory requirement in more traditional wording than the language actually
employed in the statute. The Report states that property in the hands of a third party would
not be subject to forfeiture if "the petitioner acquired his legal interest after the acts giving rise
to the forfeiture but did so in the context of a bona fide purchase for value and had no reason
to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture." S. REP. No. 225, supra note 19, at 209,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3392. The Report does not elaborate
what Congress meant by its "reasonably without cause to believe" wording of the bona fide
purchaser provision. Moreover, the Report stresses that the basic purpose of the 1984
amendments was to prevent sham transfers to nominees. Id. at 209 n.47, reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3392 n.47. As a result, the statutory language supports the
exemption for legitimate fees urged in this Article, or at least is ambiguous. In either event,
the statute is fairly amenable to the interpretation suggested here.
408. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501, 504; see also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,
20 (1983) (A "clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary" may justify disregarding
even unambiguous statutory language.); United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S.
534, 543 (1940) (When the plain meaning of a statute has led to an "absurd or futile result[ ]"
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legislative history in Section Ill(C) of this Article makes clear, Con-
gress, in enacting the 1984 amendments, expressed its intention to
close a loophole in the previous criminal forfeiture scheme that had
allowed defendants to evade forfeiture by means of third party trans-
fers prior to conviction.' The district court opinions construing the
statutes not to reach legitimate attorneys' fees concluded that Con-
gress intended the forfeiture provisions to reach only fraudulent third-
party transfers, such as "sham" attorneys' fees.410
The legislative history demonstrates that Congress did not con-
template the application of the statute to legitimate as opposed to
fraudulent attorneys' fees. A footnote in a House Report accompany-
ing an earlier draft of the 1984 amendments states that "[n]othing in
this section is intended to interfere with a person's sixth amendment
right to counsel. '41 1  This footnote, in its next sentence, states that
"[t]he Committee, therefore, does not resolve the conflict in District
Court opinions on the use of restraining orders that impinge on a per-
son's right to retain counsel in a criminal case."' 41 2 Although some
courts have construed this sentence to mean that Congress "simply
left the question for the courts, ' 413 a careful reading of the two
sentences, in sequence, suggests a more plausible conclusion: Con-
gress did not contemplate application of the forfeiture statute to legiti-
mate attorneys' fees. In view of the clear disclaimer in the first
sentence that the statute not be read "to interfere with a person's sixth
amendment right to counsel," it would be unnecessary to resolve the
conflict in the district courts concerning the constitutionality of the
statute because Congress did not contemplate that the statute would
or to "an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole'
this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words."); 2A N. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.01 (Sands 4th ed. rev. 1984).
409. See S. REP. No. 225, supra note 19, at 200-01, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3383-84; supra notes 337-47 and accompanying text.
410. See cases cited supra note 382.
411. H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 19 n.l (1984).
412. Id.
413. United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1496 (10th Cir. 1988); accord United States v.
Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 722-23 (7th Cir. 1988), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 17, 1989);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 1, 1985 (Payden), 605 F. Supp. 839,
850 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 767 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Brickey, supra
note 6, at 501-02. Note that Congress repeated the first sentence but omitted the second
sentence in a 1986 Conference Report to a bill adding espionage to those offenses punishable
by criminal forfeiture. H.R. REP. No. 783, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1865, 1963. This deletion appears to have been
deliberate, intended to express agreement with the district court cases concluding that the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act does not reach attorneys' fees. See 132 CoNG. REC. H9,509
(1986) (statement of Rep. Edwards, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights).
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be applied in this way. Rather, Congress expected the statute to be
applied only to sham fees. At the least, to apply it to legitimate fees
potentially would interfere with the right of counsel, which Congress
stated it did not intend to do. The use of the word "therefore" in the
second sentence indicates that Congress did not merely announce that
it intended to leave the constitutional question to the courts. The
word "therefore" refers to the first sentence and links Congress' state-
ment that it would not resolve the question with its earlier expressed
intention not to interfere with sixth amendment rights. Because of
this expressed intention, it "therefore" would be unnecessary to
resolve the question.
The Senate Report, in discussing the bona fide purchaser excep-
tion to forfeiture, states that "[t]he provision is to be construed to
deny relief to third parties acting as nominees of the defendant or who
have knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transactions."414 The
same Senate Report states that "[t]he purpose of this provision is to
permit the voiding of certain pre-conviction transfers and so close a
potential loophole in current law whereby the criminal forfeiture
sanction could be avoided by transfers that were not 'arms' length'
transactions."4" 5 A Senate Report declaring the "purpose" of a legis-
lative provision and directing how it "is to be construed" argues
strongly against an interpretation authorizing greater mischief than
required by that purpose. This is particularly true when the House
Report declares what is not "intended"-interference with sixth
amendment rights. Hence, the legislative history plainly supports the
view that forfeiture of legitimate attorneys' fees was not intended.
In any event, the legislative history fails to demonstrate a "clear
expression of an affirmative intention of Congress"4 16 to subject bona
fide attorneys' fees to forfeiture. The fairest conclusion is that "Con-
gress simply gave no consideration"417 to the application of these pro-
visions to legitimate as opposed to sham attorneys' fees418 and, as the
414. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 19, at 209 n.47, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3392.
415. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 19, at 200-01, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 3384.
416. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 504.
417. Id.
418. Although the Senate Report cited with approval a pre-1984 amendment case holding
that some of a defendant's property was forfeitable even though it was transferred to his
attorney prior to conviction, S. REP. No. 225, supra note 19, at 200 n.28, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3383 n.28 (citing United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911
(3d Cir. 1981)), it has been observed that "the facts in this case suggest that the transfer was
part of a sham." Note, Attorneys' Fee Forfeiture Under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of
1984: Can We Protect Against Sham Transfers to Attorneys?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 734,
741 n.72 (1987). The conclusion that attorneys' fees were never contemplated as subjects of
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House Report stated, had no intention of interfering with defendants'
sixth amendment rights.41 9 Indeed, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Nichols,420 conceded
that Congress failed to consider the issue.4 2 1 In Nichols, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the contention that the statutes should not be con-
strued to cover legitimate attorneys' fees.422 After an independent
"review of the hearings and the rest of the legislative history," the
court could find "only a few oblique references to payments of attor-
neys, '4 23 and concluded that "[n]one of these passages indicate that
Congress specifically considered whether payments made to attorneys
should be subject to forfeiture. 4 24 In order to avoid the difficult sixth
and first amendment problems that otherwise would result, the stat-
utes accordingly should be construed not to reach legitimate attor-
neys' fees, but to apply only to those that are sham or fraudulent
transfers.
forfeiture is supported by the post-enactment statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, a member of
the Senate Judiciary Committee and a co-sponsor of the 1984 amendments: "During the entire
debate in Congress, there was never any discussion of using these statutes as the government is
using them now [to forfeit attorneys' fees]. In fact, if there had been any suggestion that they
would be used that way, the bill never would have passed." Viles, Attorney's Fees Forfeiture
and Subpoenaing Defendant's Attorneys, 1986 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 335, 341 n.43. This
conclusion also is supported by the post-enactment statements of several members of the
House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, who participated in the drafting of the
statute. See Field Hearings on Federal Drug Forfeiture Activity: Hearings Before House of
Representatives, Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 177, 181
(1986) (statement of Rep. Shaw and Chairman Hughes); Forfeiture Issues: Hearings Before
House of Representatives Subcomm. on Crime, Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
178 (1985) (statement of Rep. Shaw); Miami Review, July 31, 1986, at 4 (statement of Rep. E.
Clay Shaw) ("Attorney's fees were never discussed in the original legislation. I can say with all
certainty that I don't think we ever contemplated that it would be applied in that manner.");
id. (statement of Rep. Larry Smith) ("We share a common goal of eliminating drugs, but the
way to get at it is not by going after lawyers.").
419. See supra. notes 411-13 and accompanying text.
420. 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988).
421. Id. at 1489.
422. Id. at 1509.
423. Id. at 1496 n.6.
424. Id. Where the majority of the panel in Nichols went wrong was in failing to consider
the principles of statutory construction represented by Catholic Bishop. See supra note 368-80
and accompanying text. The majority also failed to recognize the natural reconciliation
between the government's interest in bringing about forfeiture and the defendant's interest in
having the property go to a defense lawyer. See supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
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B. Avoiding the Dilemma: Lessons from
Administrative Law
1. THE BROAD PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION ASSERTED
BY THE GOVERNMENT
As has been shown, the broad discretion asserted by prosecutors
under the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions raises profound ques-
tions about the future of the adversary system.4 25 Because prosecu-
tors easily can allege many crimes as RICO offenses4 26 and have
unrestrained authority to seek forfeiture and to freeze the defendant's
assets through pretrial restraining orders, the forfeiture tool can easily
be abused to gain adversarial advantage and to "punish" particular
defendants or, indeed, particular lawyers. Lodging such unfettered
power in the hands of any governmental authority raises troubling
questions. When such wide power to tamper with the adversary pro-
cess is placed in the hands of one of the adversaries in the contest-
the prosecutor-the resulting potential for abuse is simply too
great.27 Moreover, the potential for abuse is magnified when, as here,
neither the statute nor any guidelines issued by the Attorney Gen-
eral428 set standards for the exercise of this awesome power. Because
prosecutors alone decide whether to invoke fee forfeiture in a particu-
lar case, this "unilateral, discretionary authority" provides them with
"a means to retaliate, even if only unconsciously, against their most
vigorous and successful adversaries.
'4 29
Congress could not have foreseen these possibilities when it
425. See supra Section II(C).
426. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
427. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (Any pecuniary interest of the judge in the
outcome of proceedings results in per se bias that is ground for reversal, even without a
showing that the bias affected the judge's conduct of the trial.); cf Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquis. Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2194 (1988) (A district judge must recuse himself in a suit involving
a University of which he is a trustee.); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (An
appellate judge who is pressing his own suit against a party to a second suit may not adjudicate
the second suit.); Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (A warrant is invalid if issued by
an officer of the court who is paid per warrant issued.); Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975)
(The combination of investigatory and adjudicative functions is a due process violation.); Ward
v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (A mayor who is responsible for village finances can not
judge a traffic violation if the fine goes into the village coffers.).
428. Speaking on behalf of the American Bar Association in 1986 testimony before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, former Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson acknowledged the
existence of Department of Justice Guidelines on Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees, see 38 Crim.
L. Rep. (BNA) 3001-08 (Oct. 2, 1985), but noted that they "play no role in the decision to seek
a pre-trial restraining order which affects fees. They are invoked only when a prosecutor seeks
an order requiring counsel to give up fees already paid." Statement of Elliot L. Richardson,
May 13, 1986, at 5. Moreover, by their own terms, the guidelines are not legally enforceable.
38 Crim. L. Rep. at 3003.
429. Genego, supra note 65, at 847-48.
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enacted and amended the RICO and CCE forfeiture provisions, and
would not have approved them had it done so. Congress did not con-
template in authorizing forfeitures that it was giving prosecutors a
vast discretion to invade the sixth amendment rights of defendants
and impair the very nature of our adversary system. Without men-
tioning attorneys' fees, these provisions simply authorize the forfei-
ture of "any property" that is obtained as a result of the crime and
that is in the hands of the defendant or transferred to third parties. 3°
The 1984 legislative history merely addresses the sham or fraudulent
transfer and does not mention legitimate attorneys' fees, other than to
disclaim any intention to interfere with sixth amendment rights of
defendants. 31 Obviously Congress was not thinking of attorneys'
fees, an exceptional kind of transfer, that arise out of the necessity to
defend and that must occur after indictment but before conviction.
Moreover, the 1970 and 1978 legislative history is entirely devoid of
any intent to unleash forfeiture against defense counsel.
2. THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE OF KENT v DULLES
Can the general language contained in the forfeiture statutes sup-
port such a broad assertion of prosecutorial discretion, which
impinges so heavily on individual liberties and alters so dramatically
the nature of our adversary system? In other contexts, when a govern-
ment agent or agency purports to have authority to infringe upon fun-
damental rights, the Supreme Court has insisted upon an explicit
legislative expression of that authority.432
The leading case is Kent v. Dulles,433 which involved the funda-
mental administrative law problem-the control of official discre-
430. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), (c); 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(a), (c), 881(a)(6); supra notes 385-86
and accompanying text.
431. H.R. REP. No. 845, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 19 n. 1 (1984); see supra notes 409-13
and accompanying text.
432. Eg., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 308-09 (1973) (opinion of
Powell, J., stating judgment of the Court); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105-14
(1976); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275-76 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Greene
v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958); see J.
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 83-85 (1978); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 72-
73 (abr. ed. 1965); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.9, at 49-50 (2d ed. 1984); L.
TRIBE, supra note 186, § 5-17, at 365-66; Stewart, The Transformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1680-81 (1975); cf City of Lakewood v. Plain
Dealer Pub. Co., 108 S. Ct. 2138, 2143-44 (1988) (The delegation of power to restrict first
amendment rights requires more than broad legislative directives to guide the restricting
authority.); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (same).
433. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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tion.4 34 The official involved was a high level one, the Secretary of
State. 4" The Passport Act of 1926 had given the Secretary of State
authority to "grant and issue passports ... under such rules as the
President shall designate and prescribe. '436 At the time of Congress'
delegation, a passport was regarded as a mere privilege to which no
one had a claim of entitlement.4 37 At this time, though undoubtedly a
convenience, a passport was not a requirement for travel abroad.3
This began to change after World War II, however, and by the early
1950's most countries required a passport for entry.439 This increased
importance of the passport made its possession essential to the exer-
cise of the constitutional right to travel abroad and led to the recogni-
tion that, although once a privilege, the passport had become a
right."0 Starting in 1952, the courts began to recognize that with-
holding or revoking a passport infringed on the right to travel and
therefore required notice and an opportunity to be heard. 4 '
In 1952, the Cold War was at its peak. The tide of post-war anti-
communism had been steadily rising since 1948."2 Senator Joseph
McCarthy had not yet been exposed as the witch-hunting demagogue
434. Id. at 124-25; see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT §§ 1.07, 1.08, 2.09, 2.10
(3d ed. 1972); W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 54-57 (6th ed. 1974); B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 432, § 1.13.
435. Id. at 117.
436. Ch. 772, 44 Stat. 887-88 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 21 Ia (1982)), cited in
Kent, 357 U.S. at 123.
437. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 432, § 15.14, at 233.
438. Kent, 357 U.S. at 121; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 432, § 5.14, at 233.
439. Kent, 357 U.S. at 124, 128 (Congress made a passport necessary for foreign travel in
1952.); Schactman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1955); L. JAFFE, supra note 432, at
72.
440. Kent, 357 U.S. at 125-27.
441. See Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 450-52 (D.D.C. 1952) (three-judge court); see
also Dulles v. Nathan, 225 F.2d 29, 30-31 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
442. For discussion of anti-communist activity during this period, see generally C.
BELFRAGE, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: 1945-1960, at 117-52 (1973); A. LINK & W.
CATIrON, AMERICAN EPOCH 682-87 (2d ed. 1963); THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (D. Bell ed.
1955); Millis, The Rise and Fall of the Radical Right, 44 VA. L. REV. 1291 (1958) (discussing
the rise of the radical right in the mid 1940's as the latest reoccurrence of a historical cycle).
For an autobiographical account, see L. HELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME (1976). See also
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534-35 (1952) ("[T]he Internal Security Act of 1950 marked
[a] change of attitude toward.., the Communist Party of the United States."). The passage of
the Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987 (requiring registration of communist
organizations and other measures to protect the United States against "subversive activities")
was spurred by the abundant expressions of popular anti-communist sentiment reaching
Congress. Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HARV. L. REV. 383, 408 & n.121
(1951) (citing 96 CONG. REC. 12,904 (1950)). This sentiment was manifested at all levels of
government by the application of new laws that curbed the rights of Communists. No fewer
than thirty-eight anti-communist measures were introduced in the 81st Congress. Id. at 388-
89 & nn.25-27.
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America observed in what perhaps was our first national video
event-the 1954 Army-McCarthy hearings. In 1952, McCarthy, at
the top of his power, was reelected to the Senate. This was the heyday
of the House Un-American Activities Committee, 4 3 and a time of
national paranoia-the "second Red Scare."'  President Truman
earlier had introduced a new loyalty-security program that provided
for investigation of all federal employees, an extraordinary step not
even taken during the war. The Justice Department prosecuted Com-
munists under the Smith Act445 for conspiring to teach the overthrow
of the government." 6 J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), appeared before the House Committee
to denounce Communists as a "fifth column," justifying expanded
FBI espionage activities. 447 State Department employees were dis-
missed as loyalty risks without a hearing." The fear of communism
intensified with Mao's conquest of China, Russia's attainment of
atomic capacity, and the continuation of the Korean War. This was
the political environment at the time the Secretary of State issued the
regulations that led to Kent v. Dulles."9
Freedom to travel abroad had become one of the first casualties
of the Cold War.40 ° Artists, writers, scientists, and other groups were
443. See C. BELFRAGE, supra note 442, at 117-52; A. LINK & W. CATION, supra note 442,
at 682-87; P. STEINBERG, THE GREAT 'RED MENACE': UNITED STATES PROSECUTION OF
AMERICAN COMMUNISTS 1947-1952, at 3-14 (1984); Sutherland, supra note 442, at 383, 408 &
n.121; see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (overturning on first
amendment grounds a contempt of Congress conviction for refusing to answer questions about
alleged communist infiltration in education); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957)
(overturning on first amendment grounds a contempt of Congress conviction for refusing to
answer questions about alleged communist infiltration in organized labor).
444. See A. LINK & W. CATTON, supra note 442, at 682-87. The first "Red Scare"
occurred in 1919-1920, after World War I. See id. at 237-40. This period of public hysteria
and xenophobia followed the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, the spread of
communism into parts of Europe, and several domestic incidents of labor unrest, political
bombings, and assassination plots that came to be viewed as parts of an international
communist conspiracy. Id. It culminated in the attack by members of the American Legion
on a local headquarters of the Industrial Workers of the World, Attorney General Palmer's
raids on alleged communist front organizations, and the trial of anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti.
Id.
445. Ch. 439, §§ 2, 3, 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982)).
446. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354
(2d Cir. 1954) cert. denied, 348 U.S. 909 (1955); A. LINK & W. CATTON, supra note 442, at
686-87; P. STEINBERG, supra note 443, at 13, 235, 240.
447. See P. STEINBERG, supra note 443, at 183.
448. See, e.g., Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 663 (1957); see also A. LINK & W. CATrON, supra
note 442, at 683-86.
449. Kent, 357 U.S. at 124 & n.7.
450. Farber, National Security, The Right to Travel, and the Court, 1982 SuP. CT. REV.
263, 263.
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singled out for special restrictions on foreign travel.45' In 1952,
invoking the broad power conferred by the Passport Act, the Secre-
tary of State adopted regulations prohibiting issuance of passports to
members of the Communist Party.452 This was the first time the 1926
451. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47, 66 (1956); Farber,
supra note 450, at 263-64; Jaffee, The Right to Travel: The Passport Problem, 35 FOREIGN
AFF. 17, 24 (1956); Parker, The Right to go Abroad: To Have and to Hold a Passport, 40 VA. L.
REV. 853, 858 (1959); Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons, 61 YALE L.J. 171,
176-78 (1952).
452. Dep't Reg. No. 108.162, 17 Fed. Reg. 8013 (1952) (effective Aug. 28, 1952) (codified at
22 C.F.R. § 51.135-.143 (1957 Supp.)), cited in Kent, 357 U.S. at 117-18 & nn.l-2, 124 & n.7.
Several factors converged to prompt the Secretary to use the Passport Act, see supra note 436
and accompanying text, instead of the more comprehensive passport provision of the Internal
Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 6, 64 Stat. 987, 993 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 785
(1982)) [hereinafter ISA]. Most significantly, the Executive Branch resented any legislative
encroachment upon the issuance of passports. The Executive had always claimed this area as
its exclusive province. See Brief for the Respondent at 29-42, Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958) (No. 481) (tracing lengthy history of Secretary of State's unhindered discretion in this
area). The ISA, however, curtailed the Secretary's discretion, making it a crime for any
government official to issue or renew the passport of a member of a "communist-action
organization." See Note, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 625
(1954) (citing ISA § 6(b)). Thus, not surprisingly, the Executive had opposed passage of the
Act. Veto Message of President Truman, H.R. Doc. No. 708, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); see
also 96 CONG. REC. 15,672 (1950). Hence it was the Passport Act that the Secretary relied on
as his authority for the new regulations.
In Kent, the government argued that the Secretary could exercise discretion over
passports under the authority of the Passport Act, notwithstanding the ISA's specific
standards regulating the same subject. Brief for the Respondent at 73-74, Kent (No. 481). It
claimed that the Act had not "occupied the field." Id. In response, the petitioners asserted
that "[w]here Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis
confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis .... Reply
Brief for Petitioners at 6 & n.5, Kent (No. 481) (citing Justice Clark's concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 884 (1952)). The Secretary's
intransigence in not opting for the standards prescribed by Congress in the ISA must be
interpreted as a test of executive power because, in all likelihood, the Executive Branch could
have achieved the same goal under the ISA.
The government, arguing in the alternative, also contended that the ISA had not as "yet
become effective because the full administrative and judicial process [had] not yet been
completed with respect to any organization" and that consequently, the Secretary possessed
complete discretion pending effectiveness. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 5 n.4, Kent (No. 481).
The Supreme Court flatly rejected this argument, although conceding that the ISA had not yet
become effective. Kent, 347 U.S. at 130 & n.14, 121 & n.3. Because of the procedural
safeguards incorporated into the ISA, the average proceeding lasted roughly two years,
exclusive of possible additional time for appeals. Note, supra, at 616 & n.1 16, 657-58; see, e.g.,
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activ. Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 19-21
(1961) (The proceeding, which began November 22, 1950, ended on April 30, 1953 when the
Board determined the Party was a "communist-action organization" requiring registration.);
see also 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 74-85 (4th ed. 1976) (tracing history of proceeding against Communist Party
from 1950 to unsuccessful conclusion in 1967). Thus, the ineffectiveness of the ISA provided
the government with excellent support for its argument that the Secretary's regulations were
necessary to fill the void inadvertently created by the ISA, while simultaneously attempting to
enhance executive authority.
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Act or any predecessor passport statute had been invoked to justify a
regulation imposing a substantive limit on the issuance of a passport;
prior regulations were of a routine administrative nature, prescribing,
for example, the identifying information required on passport applica-
tions or the size of passport photographs. 4" The 1952 regulations
amounted to a wholesale abrogation of the right of Communists to
travel outside the United States. Could the broad language of the
Passport Act of 1926 support this new assertion of authority, particu-
larly at a time when the passport had been transformed from a privi-
lege into a right?
The Supreme Court, in Kent, confronted the issue in 1958, after
McCarthy had been discredited and public opinion had shifted.454
The case involved Rockwell Kent, an artist and writer who had
sought a passport to visit England and attend a meeting of an organi-
zation known as the "World Council of Peace" in Helsinki, Fin-
land.455 Kent was alleged to be a Communist.456 When he refused to
swear that he was not, the Secretary of State denied him a passport.45 7
He then brought an action challenging the Secretary of State's denial
453. See Brief for Petitioners at 27, Kent (No. 481); see also id. at 27 n.18 (citing the routine
regulations that had been issued previously).
454. See A. LINK & W. CArrON, supra note 442, at 744-46.
455. Kent, 357 U.S. at 117.
456. Frances G. Knight, Director of the Passport Office, wrote to Kent stating that Kent
was "a consistent and prolonged adheren(t] to the Communist Party line," had been
"affiliated" with numerous "Communist front organizations," and had an "interest in and
espousal of the Communist cause .... Brief for Petitioners at 7, Kent (No. 481) (quoting
Knight's letter). She cited as evidence in support of these conclusions Kent's "prolific
writings" expressing his "interest in Communism" and "sympathetic support for the Soviet;"
his speaking at a dinner in 1954 in honor of Paul Robeson; a 1952 speech in which he allegedly
"urged that Communists in the United States must be defended;" his sponsorship of a petition
to Attorney General Brownell "criticizing the use of paid informers;" his signing of a petition
sponsored by the Peace International Center "urging ban on use of atomic bomb;" his alleged
seeking of "the repeal of the Walter-McCarran Law;" his urging of clemency for Ethel and
Julius Rosenberg, who were convicted of giving atomic bomb secrets to the Soviet Union; his
urging of "release on bail of Steve Nelson who was convicted of sedition in Pennsylvania;" his
alleged subscription to the Daily Worker, The Worker, and the US.S.R. Information Bulletin;
and his "repeatedly includ[ing] nationally known Communists among [his] friends and house
guests." Id. at 7-8.
457. Kent, 357 U.S. at 116; Brief for Petitioners at 10, Kent (No. 481). Kent was given an
"informal hearing" at which the State Department produced no witnesses, but offered in
evidence Kent's autobiography, R. KENT, IT'S ME 0 LORD (1955), to show that he had joined
organizations on the Attorney General's list of communist front organizations, and a
transcript of a hearing before a congressional committee at which Kent had declined to answer
questions, asserting his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Brief for
Petitioners at 9, Kent (No. 481); Kent v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 600, 600-01 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (en
banc), rev'd, 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Kent declined to provide a sworn statement as to whether
he was a Communist and stated that "because I am an American citizen I am entitled to a
passport .... " Id. at 601.
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of the passport.458
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that, if a regula-
tion affects the exercise of a constitutionally protected right, the Court
"will not readily infer that Congress gave the Secretary of State unbri-
dled discretion to grant or withhold it." 459 The Court further noted
that any regulation of such a constitutional liberty "must be pursuant
to the law-making functions of the Congress,"' 460 which if delegated,
must be delegated pursuant to an adequate standard.4 6' Although the
delegation doctrine had not been applied strictly in this period to
invalidate broad congressional delegations, 462 the Court invoked it
with renewed seriousness in Kent in view of the constitutional liberties
at stake: "Where activities or enjoyment, natural and often necessary
to the well-being of an American citizen, such as travel are involved,
we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute
them. 4 63 Referring to the Passport Act, the Court was hesitant "to
find in this broad generalized power an authority to trench so heavily
on the rights of the citizen. ' 46 The Court thereby avoided what it
characterized as the "important constitutional questions" 465 that
would have been raised if Congress had given authority to the Secre-
tary of State "to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs
or associations. '466 Noting that "Congress has made no such provi-
sion in explicit terms" in the Passport Act, the Court held that
"absent one," the Secretary of State could not enforce the
regulations.467
This approach therefore requires a more explicit delegation of
authority when an agent of Congress asserts power to act in a consti-
tutionally sensitive area than is required under usual circum-
458. Kent, 357 U.S. at 119.
459. Id. at 129.
460. Id.
461. Id. (invoking the delegation doctrine by citation to Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935)).
462. See, e.g., Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Ref. Co., 338 U.S. 604 (1950)
(upholding delegation to Secretary of Agriculture of authority to make sugar allotments);
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (holding authority to determine existence and
definition of excessive profits not to be excessively broad); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947) (upholding delegation to Federal Home Loan Bank Board of authority to proscribe
terms and conditions of the appointment of a conservator); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414 (1944) (upholding delegation to Executive of power to control prices); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (upholding delegation to FCC of
authority to regulate broadcasting in the public interest).
463. Kent, 357 U.S. at 129.
464. Id.
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stances.468 Although the broad delegation contained in the Passport
Act easily could have been read to cover the asserted authority, the
Court properly hesitated to conclude that Congress had intended to
confer this power on its agent. The Court did not treat Kent simply as
a case of statutory construction. The broad language of the Passport
Act was not ambiguous, and the congressional history did not negate
this application. Kent was an administrative law case in which the
agency asserted an "unbridled discretion" to act in a constitutionally
questionable manner."' The Court quite sensibly avoided deciding
468. The function of requiring those delegated power by Congress to adhere to
congressional policy is to assure that "important choices of social policy are made by
Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will." Industrial
Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); see also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); L. JAFFE, supra
note 432, at 33-34; Stewart, supra note 432, at 1672-73, 1694. Nevertheless, modern delegation
cases allow the delegation of congressional power to the Executive Branch with undetailed
expressions of congressional policy. See cases cited supra note 462; L. JAFFE, supra note 432,
at 57-72; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 432, § 2.6, at 43-44. If, however, the statute delegates
power to regulate a personal right, more detailed delegation and clearer expression of
congressional policy will be required. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("The area of permissible indefiniteness narrows, however, when the
regulation... potentially affects fundamental rights .... [V]ague legislative directives.., to
an executive officer ... are far more serious when liberty and the exercise of fundamental
rights are at stake.") (citations omitted). In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1967), the
Court stated:
[E]xplicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality, requires careful
and purposeful consideration by those responsible for enacting and implementing
our laws. Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional
import and effect would be relegated by default to administrators who, under our
system of government, are not endowed with authority to decide them.
Id. at 507.
There has been much recent judicial and scholarly interest in a revival of the delegation
doctrine. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.); Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 625-26 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined
by Stewart & Douglas, JJ.); J. FREEDMAN, supra note 432, at 93-94; T. Lowi, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 129-46 (1979); Aranson,
Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 17 (1982);
Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw.
U.L. REV., 646, 647-50, 659-61 (1988); Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 295,
296-98 (1987); Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional
Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 355 (1987); Stewart, supra note 432, at
1697; Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-86 (1972). Whatever the
merits of these proposals to revitalize the delegation doctrine generally, they carry special
weight when the delegation in question affects the exercise of fundamental liberties.
469. 357 U.S. at 129. In a number of other contexts in which similarly "unbridled
discretion" was applied in constitutionally questionable ways, the Supreme Court used what
can be seen as related approaches. In a case that had the effect of invalidating the nation's
then-existing death penalty statutes, the Court was concerned primarily with the unfettered
discretion, allowing arbitrariness and discrimination, that such largely standardless statutes
left in the hands of capital juries making the life or death decision. Furman v. Georgia, 408
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whether Congress had the constitutional power to withhold passports
U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional death penalty statutes in Georgia and
Texas). Justice Brennan, for example, wrote that the essence of the eighth amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is the "condemnation of the arbitrary infliction
of severe punishments." Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring). The state, in Justice Brennan's
view, "does not respect human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a
severe punishment that it does not inflict upon others." Id. For Brennan, this potential for
arbitrariness was inherent in capital punishment, but a majority of the Court could not be
mustered to support the proposition that the death penalty was always cruel and unusual
punishment. The separate concurring opinions of Justice Stewart and Justice White turned on
the absence of standards to guide the jury decision. The lack of standards permitted "this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 310 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Justice Stewart found death sentences imposed pursuant to such broad and
unfettered delegation to juries to be "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual." Id. at 309. Justice White found the unlimited discretion of
capital juries unconconstitutional because "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the
few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not." Id. at 313 (White, J.,
concurring). The Supreme Court thus invalidated the death penalty statutes in Furman
because the statutes delegated total discretion over the crucial life or death decision to juries.
The Court did not use the broad approach urged by Justices Brennan and Marshall that would
have recognized the death penalty as per se cruel and unusual. That approach would have
deprived the states of the power to use the death penalty, a preemptive step the Court was not
prepared to take. Instead, the Court in effect remanded the question to the state legislatures,
leaving open the question of whether differently written death penalty statutes would pass
constitutional muster. When the states responded by reenacting death penalty statutes that
contained criteria channeling the exercise of jury discretion, the Court upheld such laws
against eighth amendment challenge. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Another approach akin to that employed in Kent v. Dulles was applied in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Prouse invalidated random police stops of motor vehicles to
check operator licenses and car registrations. Id. at 663. The total absence of standards
regarding which cars to stop permitted arbitrary and discriminatory use of investigatory power
in violation of the privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure. 440 U.S. at 655-57, 663. The Court did not, of course, hold
that all police stops of vehicles for these purposes would be unconstitutional. Id. at 663. The
Court suggested that spot check decisions based on either observed violations or more
individualized factors that give rise to articulable suspicion would be permissible, as would
other methods "that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of
discretion." Id.
Another application of a similar approach can be found in a series of void-for-vagueness
cases occurring in first amendment contexts. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)
(voiding, as unconstitutionally vague, a prohibition against contemptuous treatment of the
flag); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (voiding a vagrancy ordinance
for vagueness); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (voiding a breach of peace statute for
vagueness). In Smith, for example, the Court overturned the conviction of a youth for wearing
an American flag sewn to the seat of his blue jeans. The statute, making it a crime to publicly
treat the flag "contemptuously," Smith, 415 U.S. at 568-69, was found too vague, the Court
expressing concern that its imprecision allowed "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"
action by police, perhaps to punish dissenting youths but not others using the flag carelessly,
unceremoniously, or commercially. Id. at 572-76. Below, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
had agreed with the defendant's contention that the statute was both impermissibly vague and
overbroad, in violation of the first amendment. Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1972),
aff'd, 415 U.S. 566 (1974). The Supreme Court, however, declined to determine the first
amendment question of whether the state could punish the activity in question if it acted with
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based on citizens' beliefs or associations, either directly or through
authority granted to an agency. A constitutional holding would have
been preemptive. Instead, the Court, in effect, expressed to Congress
its uncertainty as to whether Congress had intended to delegate this
constitutionally questionable power to its agent, thereby remanding
the issue to Congress for clarification.
This sensible approach has strong support in agency law.
Assume someone known to be the agent of a wealthy principal
presents a general power of attorney in his favor from the principal.
Asserting the power of attorney as his authority, the agent offers to
sell one of the principal's major assets, perhaps a mansion worth sev-
eral million dollars. Assume further that the principal executed the
power many years before, at a time when the principal was not yet
wealthy. Although unexpired, and by its terms purporting to vest the
agent with full general powers, among other things, to sell or other-
wise dispose of assets, it certainly would seem reasonable for an
offeree in this situation to raise the question of the agent's authority
and to request from the principal further clarification as to whether he
really intends to permit the agent to dispose of the major asset in
question.47 ° This use of the power of attorney, originally granted
more specificity, Smith, 415 U.S. at 583 n.32, in effect agreeing with a concurring opinion in
the court of appeals that had seen "no need to reach the 'far broader constitutional ground'
relied on by the First Circuit majority, noting the 'settled principle of appellate adjudication
that constitutional questions are not to be dealt with unless this is necessary to dispose of the
appeal.'" Id. at 572 (quoting Goguen, 471 F.2d at 105 (Hamley, J., concurring)).
Thus, Smith, Prouse, and Furman all are applications of an approach similar to that used
in Kent. In these differing contexts, the Supreme Court was concerned with the potential that
delegations of unbridled discretion pose for arbitrary and discriminatory applications of the
law in ways that trench upon constitutional liberties. The Court did not, however, altogether
remove the constitutional ability of the government actor to exercise the power in question.
Instead, it proceeded more narrowly and invalidated the delegation of unchannelled discretion
in a constitutionally sensitive area.
470. See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Progressive Housing, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1103, 1106-
07 (D. Colo. 1978) (A general power of attorney was held insufficient to authorize an agent to
execute a guaranty agreement binding the principal. "[R]epresentatives, [dealing with the
agent] as persons of ordinary prudence in business matters, should have perused the
instrument granting... [the agent] a general power of attorney and should have insisted upon
more than was furnished by him as evidence of his authority to enter into the specific
transaction."); Gittings, Neiman-Marcus, Inc. v. Estes, 440 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. Civ. App.
1969) (A broad power of attorney authorizing an agent "to sell, transfer and convey all lands
that I may have in the said state of Texas, and generally to do and to perform all acts and
deeds for me and in my name concerning any and all property that I now own in said State of
Texas" was said, in dictum, to be insufficient to authorize the agent to barter or exchange the
principal's land.). The same principle applies in construing corporate bylaw provisions
granting officers broad authority. See General Overseas Films, Ltd. v. Robin Int'l, Inc., 542 F.
Supp. 684, 691-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (A bylaw provision granting a treasurer "power on behalf
of the company to sign checks, notes, drafts, bills of exchange and other evidences of
indebtedness" was held not to authorize him to execute a guaranty binding the corporation.
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some years earlier when conditions were different, may not evince the
principal's authorization of the agent to assert the power claimed,
even though the power of attorney purports to accomplish this. The
concern is heightened when, as here, the power asserted is a signifi-
cant one.47' Demanding clarification from the principal in this situa-
tion does not deny the principal the right to act consistent with his
agent's assertions. It merely provides a prudent check to avoid a
potential abuse of power. The principal's authority is not being ques-
tioned-just his agent's-and this questioning is being carried out in a
manner that the principal may well appreciate.
The analogy here is a strong one. Like the agent in our hypothet-
ical and the Secretary of State in Kent, the prosecutor in the forfeiture
situation is an agent asserting authority delegated by a principal. 472
In all three situations, the delegation is exceedingly broad, and in all
three, questions are raised about whether the power asserted is within
the contemplation of the principal's delegation. The forfeiture provi-
sions give prosecutors the broad authority to forfeit assets generally,
much like the broad language of the Passport Act involved in Kent, or
the general power of attorney involved in the agency law hypotheti-
cal. Moreover, the forfeiture provisions do not name attorneys' fees
any more than the Passport Act mentioned the possibility that pass-
ports could be denied based on political party affiliation, or the hypo-
"Such a contract is unusual and extraordinary and so not normally within the powers accruing
to an agent by implication, however general the character of the agency; ordinarily the power
exists only if expressly given." (quoting 2A C.J.S., Agency § 181 (1979)), aff'd, 718 F.2d 1085
(2d Cir. 1983).
471. See Chicago Title Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. at 1106 ("Courts have recognized that a
guaranty agreement imposes serious obligations upon a guarantor and have generally required
evidence of specific authorization before finding that an agent has the authority to bind his
principal in a guaranty agreement.").
472. The prosecutor's charging discretion and his activities in presenting the evidence may
be deemed quasi-judicial. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976); see also Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973). Such prosecutorial action is subject to only limited review.
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974). But when the prosecutor exercises other kinds of
discretionary authority-performing investigatory or national security functions, for example,
see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), and as in this situation, administering a forfeiture
scheme-the prosecutor is exercising executive power, and it is appropriate to regard him as
an administrative agency. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE (1971); R. PIERCE, S.
SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 6.4.11 (1985); cf Dunlop v.
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (agency prosecutorial discretion). In any event, the question
here is not whether individual acts of discretion in applying forfeiture are reviewable. Rather,
the question is whether prosecutors possess the statutory power to apply forfeiture to
legitimate attorneys' fees. Whether such a claim of authority is ultra vires is a question of
statutory construction traditionally subject to independent judicial review.
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thetical's general power of attorney mentioned the disposition of
major assets.
In addition, the practice under the forfeiture provisions prior to
the 1978 amendments did not involve attorneys' fees at all. Although
there were several cases involving forfeiture of attorneys' fees prior to
the 1984 amendments, the practice was rare and appeared mainly to
involve sham or fraudulent fees rather than bona fide fees.473 The
burgeoning application of the forfeiture provisions to attorneys' fees
occurred only after the 1984 amendments gave prosecutors expanded
powers, including pretrial restraining orders and various procedures
for the forfeiture of assets in the hands of third parties.474 The possi-
bility that the forfeiture provisions could be invoked to prevent
defendants from retaining counsel simply had not occurred to Con-
gress when it enacted the original provisions in 1970 and then
amended them in 1978. Moreover, there is no evidence that, when
it amended these provisions in 1984, Congress thought it was author-
izing prosecutors to expand the use of forfeiture of attorneys' fees as
they thereafter did.476 The 1984 amendments added a number of
tools designed to provide prosecutors with broader opportunities for
forfeiture, and designed in particular to end the fraudulent transfers
that had frustrated the forfeiture provisions of RICO and CCE.47 7
Neither the language nor the legislative history of these amendments,
however, suggests a widening of forfeitures to legitimate attorneys'
fees. This troubling assertion of authority did not occur to Congress
in 1970, in 1978, or in 1984, any more than the Secretary of State's
regulation occurred to the Congress that enacted the broad Passport
Act of 1926,478 or any more than the hypothetical agent's claim of
broad authority to sell major assets occurred to the principal who first
executed the power of attorney when his possessions were far more
modest.
All three assertions of power-the passport regulations, the
attempt to sell the mansion, and the application of forfeiture to attor-
neys' fees-raise troubling questions. All three invoke concern about
whether the principal's broad and perhaps careless use of delegating
language contemplated the assertion of authority. In all three, the
consequences of error are exceedingly high: the intrusion on the right
473. E.g., United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1981) (transfer of plane to attorneys
prior to indictment); see Note, supra note 418, at 741 n.72.
474. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 14-20 & 329-36 and accompanying text.
476. See supra notes 409-24 and accompanying text.
477. See supra notes 337-47 and accompanying text.
478. See supra notes 464-67 and accompanying text.
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to travel and the threat to first amendment rights presented in Kent,
the sale of a major asset, perhaps worth several million dollars, in the
agency hypothetical, and the intrusion on the constitutional right to
counsel of choice and the threat to the nature of our adversary system
in the forfeiture situation. In all three contexts, remanding the ques-
tion to the principal for a more explicit expression of authority is
appropriate.
Particularly when, as in the fee forfeiture context, courts are
faced with broad assertions of discretionary power that could seri-
ously invade constitutional rights, a general legislative delegation
should be found insufficient to support the claimed assertion of
authority.479 This technique allows courts to avoid deciding difficult
constitutional issues and, in effect, to remand the underlying policy
questions to the legislature for decision with the knowledge that its
choice will implicate fundamental values and will be subjected to
searching constitutional scrutiny.480 Given the dubious constitution-
ality of applying the forfeiture statutes to bona fide attorneys' fees and
the absence of considered congressional judgment, this legislative
remand, or "second look" approach, seems especially appropriate.
The Supreme Court therefore should invoke the doctrine of Kent v.
Dulles4"' and hold that the asserted discretion of prosecutors to use
the forfeiture statutes against legitimate attorneys' fees is ultra vires.
Congress plainly has not thought sufficiently about the problem
of applying these statutes to attorneys' fees. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Caplin & Drys-
dale, Chartered,"' a case pending before the United States Supreme
Court, virtually acknowledged that Congress had not thought suffi-
ciently about these troubling questions. Although the Fourth Circuit
noted that the issue "does indeed raise many complex problems,
'48 3
and that "[t]he interests on each side of this controversy are weighty
and profound,"48 4 it concluded that "Congress... is the proper body
479. Cf W. SELL, AGENCY § 39, at 31 (1975) (Authority of an agent to perform a tortious
or illegal act "will not usually be inferred.").
480. See A. BICKEL, supra note 363, at 111-98; J. FREEDMAN, supra note 432, at 83; Tribe,
The Emerging Reconnection of Individual Rights and Institutional Design: Federalism,
Bureaucracy, and Due Process of Lawmaking, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 433, 442-43 (1977);
Winick, Legal Limitations on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REv. 331, 406-
07 (1981); see also G. CALABRESI, supra note 364, at 135-56.
481. 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see supra notes 459-69 and accompanying text.
482. United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 648 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
483. Id. at 648.
484. Id. at 649.
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to deal with these issues,"'485 and "that this is not a debate that should
be silenced by judicial fiat."4" 6 This suggested approach has the virtue
of giving to Congress the responsibility of balancing these weighty
and profound interests, as well as resolving these complex
problems. 87 Thus judicial fiat does not silence the debate. Instead, it
stimulates the debate on an issue that obviously has not been suffi-
ciently debated.
V. CONCLUSION
Application of the forfeiture provisions to legitimate attorneys'
fees, as opposed to sham or fraudulent attorneys' fees, should be held
unconstitutional as an infringement of the right to counsel of choice,
protected by both the sixth and first amendments. This fundamental
right to use one's own property to hire one's own counsel is the pri-
mary and preferred right protected by the sixth amendment.48 8  The
trial of John Peter Zenger,489 which provides an early illustration of
the exercise of that right, was the model the Framers had in mind.490
Moreover, the advocacy of the defendant's chosen counsel in the pub-
lic forum of the courtroom is also protected by first amendment prin-
ciples. This fundamental right to retain an advocate of choice may
not be totally abridged absent the most compelling of justifications.
Criminal forfeiture, long disfavored in our law, should not be permit-
ted to reach this far, particularly when there is no evidence that Con-
gress intended this application of forfeiture, and when Congress'
expressed purpose can be met fully by limiting application of such
forfeiture to sham or fraudulent attorneys' fees.
Rhetoric about the war on crime and the drug crisis should not
be permitted to destroy this basic constitutional right. In moments of
hysteria that from time to time grip this country, vigilance is needed
to protect our basic constitutional values. This is the lesson of Kent v.
485. Id. at 648.
486. Id. at 649.
487. See A. BICKEL, supra note 363, at 165-66.
Judicial avoidance of the constitutional questions raised by fee forfeiture is especially
appropriate in view of the fact that Congress presently is considering the possibility of
amending the forfeiture statutes to provide clearly that legitimate attorneys' fees are not
subject to forfeiture. See Robinson, Legislative & Legal Developments, CRIM. JUST., Summer
1988, at 35, 37 (reporting testimony of Samuel J. Buffone, on behalf of the American Bar
Association, urging such legislation at a March 4, 1988 hearing of the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Crime); see also Forfeiture Issues: Hearings on H.R. 1193 Before the
Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); supra
note 428.
488. See supra notes 79-172 and accompanying text.
489. See supra notes 105-57 and accompanying text.
490. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
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Dulles.49 The McCarthy era that produced Kent was an ugly chapter
in American life-one in which for too long the nation was willing to
forsake the values of the Constitution out of fear of the great "Red
Menace" of the day. Kent serves as a triumph for the rule of law and
a reminder that the country must not lose sight of its basic values in
times of crisis. The drug problem of today is undeniably demanding
of innovative measures, but the measures utilized--criminal forfei-
ture, pretrial restraining orders, and the "relation-back" doctrine-
should not be permitted to undermine the sixth and first amendments
and our basic commitment to the adversary system. The "relation-
back" doctrine is invoked as if punishment followed by trial492 was an
acceptable procedure.493 This theory not only "completely begs the
question," 49 4 but by hampering the accused in making his defense, it
also threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The right to hire counsel of one's own choosing is distinct and
separate from the right to have counsel appointed by the court. The
former's commitment to participatory autonomy and advocacy values
independent of the concern for reliability is not satisfied by the
appointment of counsel, no matter how competent counsel may be.
In the short run, the government's theory will remove private counsel
from many of those cases in which their skills are most needed. Not
only are drug cases affected, but also all prosecutions that can be
brought as RICO cases are affected as well. In the long run, the gov-
ernment's use of forfeiture against attorneys' fees threatens to under-
mine the adversary system of justice. If the government can use
forfeiture theory to freeze or to seize assets before they can be wielded
in defense of accusations, or to void the payment of legitimate fees to
counsel after the trial is over, it will expand the use of forfeiture
beyond drug or racketeering cases. Soon the prosecution will assert
the necessity of seizing a defendant's assets to ensure their availability
to pay fines or make restitution. Given the dramatic expansion in the
size of federal felony fines in 1984-to $250,000 per count for individ-
uals 9 5-and the authorization of alternative fines based on a doubling
491. 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see supra notes 433-69 and accompanying text.
492. Cf. L. CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 148
(Grosset & Dunlap ed. 1983).
493. See United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1404 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
494. United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8 (Kiser), 853 F.2d 1445, 1451 (8th Cir. 1988),
mandate stayed by 864 F.2d 1421; accord United States v. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837
F.2d 637, 652 (4th Cir.) (Phillips, J., dissenting, joined by Winter, C.J., Sprouse & Ervin, JJ.)
("With all respect, this simply begs the constitutional question rather than answering it."),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988).
495. 18 U.S.C § 3571(b) (Supp. IV 1986).
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of the pecuniary gain to the defendant or loss to the victim,496 few
criminal defendants will be able to enjoy the assistance of retained
counsel. Given the penchant of the states to follow the federal exam-
ple, this pernicious practice will spread. Eventually, 'prosecutors will
be able to exclude private counsel for almost any person accused of
any felony in any court. When that day arrives, we will return to a
form of the former English practice rejected by the sixth amend-
ment-the right to appear with chosen counsel in misdemeanor cases,
but with only appointed counsel in felony cases.
The sixth amendment demands repudiation of this use of forfei-
ture. In addition, the first amendment mandates rejection of the prior
restraint on protected advocacy and association effectuated by the use
of pretrial restraining orders that prevent the defendant from hiring
the advocate of his choice. These serious constitutional questions
may be avoided, however, by construing the forfeiture provisions so
that they do not reach legitimate attorneys' fees. The absence of an
affirmative congressional intention, clearly expressed either in the
statutory language or in the legislative history, that forfeiture extend
to bona fide fees permits a construction that will leave the constitu-
tional questions for another day.
Alternatively, the interpretation of the forfeiture provisions
advocated by the government-vesting in prosecutors the vast discre-
tion to invade sixth and first amendment rights and to threaten the
nature of the adversary system-should be rejected as an assertion of
authority ultra vires the statute. Congress may generally use broad
grants of delegated power to accomplish its purposes, but when the
power asserted intrudes on fundamental constitutional values in a
manner that seems not to have been contemplated by Congress, the
Supreme Court should find the delegation wanting and should, in
effect, remand the issue to Congress for reconsideration.
The two techniques of avoiding the constitutional dilemma dis-
cussed here bear a striking kinship. The statutory construction doc-
trine of Catholic Bishop4 97 and the administrative law doctrine of
Kent"49 are both children of the prudential desire to avoid unneces-
sary constitutional clashes with a coordinate branch of government,
499
particularly when it is not at all clear that the branch in question, the
496. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
497. See supra notes 368-80 and accompanying text.
498. See supra notes 459-69 and accompanying text.
499. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985); Rescue Army
v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-75 (1946); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see generally A. BICKEL, supra note 363.
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legislature, intended the action invoked in its name. Indeed, they are
both applications of what has been termed "the policy of clear state-
ment." 5" When administrative officials clothed with wide discretion
assert a power of dubious constitutionality, as is the case here, the two
doctrines converge. Catholic Bishop, it will be recalled, involved an
agency, the NLRB, which asserted such a power,50 1 and Kent
involved a statute, the Passport Act, that lacked a clear expression in
either its language or legislative history to provide affirmative support
that Congress clearly intended the controversial interpretation
asserted.5 °2 Catholic Bishop therefore easily could have been decided
using the ultra vires approach employed in Kent, and Kent easily
could have been decided invoking the canon of statutory construction
employed in Catholic Bishop. As techniques to limit arbitrary and
unconstitutional exercises of discretion by politically nonresponsive
administrative officials who seek to justify their constitutionally ques-
tionable actions by invoking a broad congressional delegation, these
two sister doctrines coalesce with heightened power in the context of
fee forfeiture.
A recent and closely related use of what can be seen as a combi-
nation of both of these doctrines occurred in Justice O'Connor's con-
curring opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma,5"3 the child death penalty
case. A plurality of four Justices concluded that the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause of the eighth amendment prohibited execution
of a defendant for a murder committed when he was fifteen years
old.5" Justice O'Connor, the swing vote, came close to joining in this
opinion, but instead she avoided reaching the constitutional ques-
tion. 05 Although the statute authorized capital punishment for mur-
der without setting any minimum age limit at which the commission
of the crime could lead to the death penalty, Justice O'Connor con-
strued the statute as not reaching crimes committed by fifteen-year-
olds.5°6 She found "considerable risk that the Oklahoma legislature
either did not realize that its actions would have the effect of render-
ing fifteen-year-old defendants death-eligible or did not give the ques-
tion the serious consideration that would have been reflected in the
500. See A. BICKEL, supra note 363, at 156-59; H. HART & A. SAKS, supra note 375, at
1242; Stewart, supra note 432, at 1680-81, 1697.
501. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); see supra notes 368-80 and
accompanying text.
502. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see supra notes 433-67 and accompanying text.
503. 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2706-11 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
504. Id. at 2700 (plurality opinion).
505. Id. at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
506. Id.
[Vol. 43:765
FORFEITURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
explicit choice of some minimum age for death eligibility. '50 7 In the
absence of such specificity, Justice O'Connor found that the statute
presented the Court with a serious constitutional dilemma-"a result
that is of very dubious constitutionality, and ... without the earmarks
of careful consideration that we have required for other kinds of deci-
sions leading to the death penalty."508 This result, she noted, was
dictated not only by the Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence, but
"[i]t is also supported by the familiar principle-applied in different
ways in different contexts-according to which we should avoid
unnecessary, or unnecessarily broad, constitutional adjudication." 50 9
In this manner, Justice O'Connor applied the prudential princi-
ples of legislative remand reflected in both Catholic Bishop and Kent,
in a context not involving the need to check the actions of administra-
tive officials, but rather the comparable need to check the potential for
abuse of similarly non-politically responsive juries acting under broad
legislative delegations. Justice O'Connor wrote:
By leaving open for now the broader Eighth Amendment question
that both the plurality and the dissent would resolve, the approach
I take allows the ultimate moral issue at stake in the constitutional
question to be addressed in the first instance by those best suited to
do so, the people's elected representatives. 5'0
Similarly, Congress, in the first instance, should address the complex
issues presented by the application of the RICO and CCE forfeiture
provisions to attorneys' fees and should reach a solution that strikes
an appropriate balance between the public interest in punishing and




509. Id. (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
510. Id. at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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